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POWER, DISCOURSE AND PRIVILEGE: 
POWER RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF CHILD PROTECTION. 
MAVIS WHYCER 
THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY. 




The aim of this project is to consider Michel Foucault's concept of 
disciplinary power and his idea of knowledge-power in a specific site 
of power relations. The site selected, the field of child protection, 
affords a study of various forms of power operating at different 
levels and within different institutionalised contexts, against a 
contemporary background of cultural change and discontinuities. 
The discourses and discursive practices of privileged agents in the 
human sciences, and the privileging effects of institutionalised rules, 
are analysed and discussed. It is argued that the market-driven 
discourse of resource management is privileged over the discourses of 
the human sciences; that the privileged knowledge/truths of the 
human sciences are increasingly being challenged and opposed, 
through the ubiquitous discourses of the media, by organized 
alliances of subjects, and by a population generally less compliant 
than in previous generations; and that the exercise of disciplinary 
power by expert agents is being increasingly regulated by the State 
through the privileged rules of the law. The conclusion reached is 
that privilege and resources are significant factors in power relations 
and that specialised knowledge is only one of a range of privileging 
resources that are always in play in a complex field of force relations. 
The methodology used draws on research in to theories of power, on 
analyses of power relations and discursive practices, and case 
studies. It incorporates theory with an experiential perspective 
derived from 18 years employment in local authority social work and 
management. The discourses and discursive practices of social work 
intersect with theoretical discourses; and first-person narratives from 
the author's work experience are used as illustrations. 
In chapter 1, Foucault's theories of discourse, disciplinary power and 
knowledge-power are introduced and critically reviewed. Theories of 
organizational power and the notion of agency are considered in 
chapter 2. Chapter 3 reviews Foucault's idea of bio-power, the 
historical intervention of the State and its agents in the family, and 
the changing concept of childhood. Changes in the family, and 
professional, legal and managerial discourses intersecting in the field 
of child protection, are discussed in chapter 4. 
A case study is used in chapter 5 to illustrate and analyse power 
operating in the field of child protection in 1987, prior to the 
Children Act 1989. The privileging effects of specialised knowledge 
and other factors affecting power relations are identified. In chapter 
6, sections of the text of the Children Act 1989 are analysed to 
identify the ways in which the discourse of the law now seeks to 
adress the power imbalances between parents, children and the 
professional agents. The ambiguities of its language and the way it 
privileges the agents with the right to exercise discretion in their 
practices are discussed. The power of the agents, the politics of 
child protection, and media power are considered in chapter 7. The 
discourses of social work and its historical development as part of the 
state apparatus of discipline and control are discussed in chapter 8. 
A case study is used to illustrate power relations among social 
workers and other professional agents in the field of child protection, 
and to identify key privileging factors in the operation of power, 
among them the organizational mechanisms and statutory instruments 
that empower the agents. 
Chapter 9 summarises the main points in the preceding chapters and 
discusses the ways in which privileged knowledge-power is regulated 




Michel Foucault's concept of discourse. 
Knowledge-power. 
2. Organizational power relations. 
3. The state and bio-power. 
4. Professional, institutional and legal 
discourses and discursive practices. 
5. A case study 
The operation of power in the field of child 
protection in Cleveland in 1987. 








power relations. 127 
7. The power of the agents, media power and 
the politics of child protection. 
8. Power relations at the local level -




9. Rules, resource-power and privilege. 
Conclusions. 260 
10. Bibliography 305 
PREFACE 
This thesis explores the concept of power and the ways in which it 
operates; and it provides a detailed analysis of power relations 
operating in a specific site. It cross-references the disciplines of 
social work and cultural studies, using a methodology derived from 
the ideas of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. His theoretical 
concepts are applied to an analysis of the power relations, the 
discourses and discursive practices of professional social work and 
related disciplines. While it is focussed on the field of child 
protection and social work in the public sector, the methodology could 
be applied to other sites and other professional disciplines, throwing 
new light on to their practices. My demonstration of the practical 
application of the theoretical concepts could be of interest also to 
students of cultural studies. 
Coming from two decades of local authority social work to the 
discipline of cultural studies and particularly to the work of Michel 
Foucault, opened up for me a new way of thinking about the practices 
of social workers and the complex networks of power relations within 
which they become enmeshed. Foucault's ideas on power relations 
provided me with the conceptual tools with which to undertake a 
critical analysis of the ways in which power, in its various forms, 
operates in specific sites of social work practice. I found Foucault's 
notions of 'knowledge-power,' 'disciplinary power' and 'bio-power' and 
his concept of specialised discourse immediately applicable to an 
analysis of social work practices, social work language, and the 
currently shifting power-base of local authority social work. 
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While it is inescapable that social workers must be generally aware of 
power issues in the environments within which they work and in their 
interactions with clients, it has not traditionally been part of social 
work practice to analyse these power relations and power networks 
and to apply the lessons of such analysis to the practices. In the 
rapidly changing "post-modern" world of fragmentation and 
discontinuities and the shrinking of welfare provision into the 
dominant market culture, it is of particular importance that social 
workers should be aware of how they are positioned in the various 
power-games within which they, and those who use or wish to use 
their services, are being enrolled. 
Key concepts and selected extracts from the work of Michel Foucault 
provided the starting point for my thesis, as I recognised their 
relevance to my own experiences in local authority social work and 
management. It was readily clear that Foucault'S ideas could be 
directly applied in the context of a professional/client social work 
relationship. I would explore whether they might be usefully applied 
to an in-depth study of more complex inter-personal and inter-
disciplinary power relations. 
It seemed questionable, however, whether the Foucauldian approach 
would provide the whole answer to understanding power relations. 
There was no reason why it should nor did Foucault assert that he 
had written the last word on the subject. It is, in fact, evident from 
his writings and the transcripts of lectures and interviews that his 
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ideas on the difficult and elusive concept of power were continually 
in process. 
It proved useful to research into other theories of power and set 
them alongside those of Foucault. Given the organizational context of 
local authority social work, linking organizational theories of power 
with Foucault's theories was a productive next step. I had already 
some knowledge of organizational theories from management-training 
and I could again draw on my direct experience of the culture and 
structures of management and the complex power relations 
encompassing the social worker as manager and local government 
officer. Adding this other dimension to the conceptual framework 
usefully supplemented the ideas of Michel Foucault, which continued 
to be the principal tools for my exploration into the operation of 
power. 
Since the focus of my thesis was to be on the site of child protection, 
the move from theory to its application led first to a consideration of 
Foucault's notion of 'bio-power,' the intervention of the state, through 
its agencies, in the family and in the up bringing and care of 
children; and a discussion of the historical and contemporary changes 
in the concept of family and childhood. Against this background, 
with the Cleveland child abuse Inquiry still fresh in mind and with 
the implementation of the Children Act 1989 pending, I developed the 
structure and developmental sequence of my thesis. I would use the 
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Report of the Cleveland Inquiry as a case study of power relations 
and follow this with an analysis of sections of the Children Act 1989, 
recognising this as a direct outcome of the Cleveland affair. This 
would lead me to a discussion of the power of the professional agents 
within the context of changing cultural norms and the emergence of 
the sexual abuse of children as a widespread social phenomenon. I 
would then call on my personal experiences as a local authority social 
worker to analyse power relations from the "inside," using the 
theoretical concepts I had applied to my other analyses and case 
studies. 
Identifying and analysing the discourses and discursive practices 
subsumed in the official report of the Inquiry into Child abuse in 
Cleveland in 1987 revealed it to be riddled with a multiplicity of 
power issues that needed to be recognised and addressed; not least 
in the light of emerging evidence that the lessons of the Cleveland 
affair, as those of earlier child abuse inquiries, had not been learned. 
The theoretical concepts applied to this analysis opened up a new way 
of understanding the forms of power and privilege operating in this 
site of complex and shifting power relations. 
Following this, a critical overview of sections of the text of the 
Children Act 1989 revealed ambiguities in its language which have 
unresolved implications for power relations among the statutory 
agents as well as between the agents as providers of services and 
the potential recipients of services. 
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From this I proceeded to an analysis of the forms of power of the 
professional agents; those authorised by their specialised 
qualifications and knowledge to exercise disciplinary power over 
others, and those authorised also by statute with the enforceable 
right to exercise power - social workers employed in the public 
sector, with their ambiguous complex identity as agents of the local 
authority and of the law. 
This brought me to a detailed exploration of the forms of power and 
the power struggles in which local authority social workers are 
enmeshed; through an analysis of their discourses and discursive 
practices and the institutionalised rules and systems that regulate the 
practices, and then through a detailed case study of a child abuse 
case conference. This model was chosen because the case conference 
arena is a frequent site of power struggles between professional 
agents as well as between professional agents and clients; because it 
is recognisable as an apparatus for the exercise of power and as a 
mechanism of control; and because it encompasses a multiplicity of 
power processes at work. This was also a personal exploration that I 
needed to pursue, from which I have learned much and which may be 
of use to other social workers and their professional colleagues. 
Applying the theoretical concepts enabled me to undertake a new kind 
of analysis that provided a greater understanding of the multiple 
forces at work in this complex field of power relations. 
My study has demonstrated how, within the context of rapid political, 
ideological and cultural changes, professional agents, among them 
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social workers, are not only increasingly dominated by the resource 
managers but are also faced with oppositional forces resisting their 
professional discourses and their 'knowledge-power.' Gender issues 
have inevitably been recurring themes throughout my thesis as they 
are inescapably central to many of the power struggles in 
contemporary society and, specifically, in relation to child sexual 
abuse; and they are a significant issue for many of us in social work, 
with its disproportionate number of male managers, particularly at the 
most senior levels, in what is a predominantly female workforce. 
My thesis has been not only an exploration of the concept of power 
but also a productive way of applying theoretical concepts, notably 
those of Michel Foucault, to a better understanding of power relations 
in a specific site in the "real world" of social work. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
MICHEL FOUCAULT'S CONCEPT OF DISCOURSE. KNOWLEDGE/POWER. 
'The word power is apt to lead to a number of 
misunderstandings - misunderstandings with respect to 
its nature, its form, and its unity.' (Foucault 1979, p.92). 
The French philosopher Michel Foucault has afforded us new insights 
into understanding power. He has provided us with a language, the 
language of discourse, with which to think and speak about power 
and analyse the ways in which it operates. From his historical study 
of power and how it has changed over the centuries, he has argued 
that the old received ideas are no longer relevant in the context of 
Western societies in the late 20th century. He conceptualises power 
as a 'multiple and mobile field of force relations' in which we are all 
enmeshed, both the 'vehicles' of power and its objects. 
There is no single unitary definition of power. As a concept it is 
complex, elusive and transitory, over-determined by historical and 
locational contexts and contemporary truths. It has connotations of 
sovereignty, authority, legitimacy, influence. It operates at many and 
diverse levels within the social fabric of societies. Many theorists at 
different historical periods have attempted to analyse or define power 
- 'this most "contested" of concepts.' (Clegg 1989, p.xv). 
Stewart R. Clegg posits that a 'modernist' view of power has its roots 
in Hobbes' 17th century ideas of sovereignty, a unitary conception of 
power, the supreme power of the sovereign and the identification of 
each subject with the sovereign; while 'post-modern' analyses of 
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power are closer to Machiavelli's 16th century emphasis on strategies 
and organization, on alliances, negotiations and expedient game-
playing; power not perceived as a generalizing concept but embodied 
in many diverse forms of practice. (ibid pp.3-7; 21-38). He perceives 
Machiavelli's interpretation of power deriving from the political world 
in which he lived and studied 'a world of flux, discontinuity, intrigue 
and illusion ... ' (ibid p.32), a description that resonates in the post-
modern world of national and international fragmentation and 
discontinuities, new alliances, myths and intrigues; the world within 
which Foucault has posited his theory of power relations. 
Foucault argues that the new methods of power operate not through a 
central locus of 'sovereignty' but through strategies and techniques 
of control and normalization, through what he calls 'bio-power,' 
mechanisms of surveillance and control embodied in the state 
apparatuses and in the formulations of the law. This form of power, 
'disciplinary power,' is directed to the disciplining of the body and 
the "body" of the population and the construction of a new kind of 
subjectivity. He posits that power must be understood in the first 
instance as a multiplicity of force relations. (Foucault 1979, p.92). 
He argues that power is everywhere, it comes from everywhere; 'it is 
the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a 
particular society... ' (ibid pp.93). He proposes 'a conception of 
power which replaces the privilege of the law... the privilege of 
sovereignty with the analysis of a multiple and mobile field of force 
relations ... The strategical model, rather than the model based on 
law.' (ibid p.102). 
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Foucault is not concerned with the essence of power, what it "is," but 
about how it operates and about the effects of power relations. He 
argues that in any society there are multiple relations of power which 
'permeate, characterise and constitute the social body. ' These 
relations of power become established through the production of 
certain 'discourses of truth,' notably the specialised discourses of the 
human sciences. He argues against the notion of a legitimate right of 
sovereign power, the right of the king; and he proposes instead the 
'right' of subjects in their mutual relations. But he finds that a 
theory of sovereignty persists which is irrelevant in the context of 
contemporary Western society: that 'the representation of power has 
remained under the spell of monarchy. . .. we still have not cut off 
the head of the king.' (ibid pp.88/89). 
Foucault argues that we must base our analysis of power on the 
study and tactics of domination. In order to understand power in the 
West we must free ourselves from perceiving power in terms of the 
obedience of the subj ect to the sovereign. Power operates in and 
through specialised discourses, the rules that govern and regulate 
them, and the discursive practices through which a new order of 
disciplinary power and subjectivity has replaced sovereign power and 
the sovereign/subject relationship. Power, he says, is not the 
possession of one individual or one group, not a possession that the 
one has and the other lacks. Power is everywhere, multi-directional, 
coming from everywhere. 
I will argue that, allowing this, allowing that power is inextricably 
interwoven into the complex fabric of the social formation, "it" can 
nevertheless, in certain circumstances, be ascribed or acquired and 
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made use of, even if not possessed in the sense of being totally 
"owned." 
For Foucault power is the effect of social relations. It has no 
essence, 'it exists only when it is put into action, ... a mode of action 
which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts 
upon their actions.' (Foucault 1982, pp.219/220). Power is not 'in' 
individuals but is within the social structure, it is "'always already 
there,'" one is never "'outside'" it. (Foucault 1980 (iii), p.141). 
Power as such does not exist. It is an effect of the operation of 
social relationships between groups and between individuals; and 
there are as many forms of power as there are types of relationships. 
It is arguable that power does exist, in its many forms, as a 
"capacity" which is always in action since it is everywhere within the 
social structure, thus always in a relation with all of us as subjects. 
It is perhaps more accurate to say that it can only be seen to exist 
when it is operating within a specific environment and context, in a 
specific "site." 
Foucault is concerned with the privileging effects of specialised 
knowledge, finding power and knowledge inter-connected in a 
mutually generative fashion. He argues that 'power produces 
knowledge that power and knowledge directly imply one another; 
that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of 
a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose 
and constitute at the same time power relations.' (Foucault 1977, 
p.27). He finds power operating through relations of domination and 
subjugation - 'multiple forms of subjugation that have a place and 
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function within the social organism' constituting the subjectivity of 
subjects (Foucault 1986, pp.23l/232); domination operating through 
techniques and instruments of control and through a whole complex of 
apparatuses, institutions and regulations. He examines the ways in 
which language is used in the production of serious 'statements,' 
'true' discourses, (Foucault 1979; 1980(ii», the expert utterances of 
professionals. Statements gain their authority from the rules that 
govern them, from the contexts within which they operate, and from 
the qualifications that authorise their expert speakers - those who 
are authorised through their specialised disciplines to speak the 
language of serious meaning. Statements are 'constituted as serious 
by the current rules of a specific truth game ...' (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1982, p.54); rules through which 'disciplinary power' is 
exercised, truth games which are constituted and determined within 
the specialised discourses of expert speakers. 
Foucault uses the term 'discipline' both in the sense of "to discipline" 
and "the" disciplines; and the 'domain' of the disciplines are the 
human sciences, the 'dubious' social sciences with, for Foucault, their 
questionable status as sciences. Through the discourses and 
discursive practices of these specialised disciplines and their 
'technologies of normalization,' truth comes to be attributed to certain 
concepts and theories, constructions of particular epochs. There are 
different truths at different historical times, linked with systems of 
power which produce and 'extend' them. 
By critically examining the truths attributed by the discourses of 
medicine and psychiatry to the concept of madness, Foucault has 
demonstrated how the language and the practices of an earlier age 
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have subsequently been regarded and treated as meaningless or 
untrue; and we can see how the "truth" of madness and the meaning 
attributed to certain behaviours have changed significantly even in 
the last decade. The serious statements of professional experts and 
the rules that formerly led to the labelling and incarceration of the 
"mad" have changed. A new discursive strategy scatters the 
"mentally ill" to the winds of "community care," those who would 
formerly have been designated and disciplined as mad. 
It is arguable that the changes in this field owe as much to the 
discourse of common sense (questioning the inappropriate detention of 
so many not-mad people in psychiatric hospitals) and the dominant 
ideology of market forces (the economic benefits of closing down the 
large old psychiatric hospitals), as to the specialised discourses of 
the expert speakers. Changes in the operation of power in this 
context owe much also to extra-discursive factors such as the 
development of media technology through which such social issues are 
brought into the public arena. And these changes owe much also to 
the institutionalised privilege of the media and their campaigning 
discourses on social issues, informing and educating "public opinion" 
on the abuse and degradation of people living in the old 
workhouse/institution-type hospitals, on miscarriages of justice etc. 
Power operates also through the missionary "drive" of individual 
campaigners for change and through the alliance-power of pressure 
groups. This is not to deny the knowledge-power of expert 
professional discourses but to suggest that other discourses, non-
discursive factors and the motivations and missionary drive of 
autonomous subjects all play a part in power relations. 
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Foucault's theory of the operation of power has been criticised for its 
lack of any reference to drives and the potential for resistance by 
the autonomous subject. (Dews 1984, pp.90/92; Merquior 1985, p.116). 
Foucault posits that 'points of resistance are present everywhere in 
the power network' (Foucault 1979, p.9S); 'there are no relations of 
power without resistances.' (Foucault 1980 (iii), p.142); and that power 
'is exercised only over free subj ects, and only insofar as they are 
free.' (Foucault 1982, p.221). Resistance is conceptualised in terms of 
this freedom, a 'field of possibilities , ... , a range of behaviours 
available to the free subject. (ibid). But the mechanisms of resistance 
in Foucault's typology of power are not made clear. Peter Dews 
argues that Foucault's 'lack of any theory of drives' is conditioned 
by his hostility to psychoanalysis and that this relates also to his 
difficulty in defining what power operates against. (Dews 1984, 
pp.90,92). While Foucault posits that discourse can be an instrument 
of power and also a point of resistance and a starting point for an 
opposing strategy, (Foucault 1979, p.101) the boundary between power 
and resistance is not clear; whether and in what circumstances 
resistance may be seen as withholding of consent or itself a form of 
power, an oppositional force, a power/power relation. 
Meaning is not fixed in discourse; new 'truths' emerge as the 
disciplines engender 'new domains of understanding.' We may 
deduce from Foucault's examples of the ways in which meanings 
change and myth is constructed, that the truth claims of modern 
medicine and psychiatry, and indeed those of other specialised 
discourses, can likewise be perceived as arbitrary, as myths 
constructed through the meanings ascribed to certain behaviours; the 
signifiers of the mad and the not-mad for example and the changing 
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discourse of mental illness; the signifiers of child abuse and the 
changing discourse of child protection. 
The discourse of child abuse, and particularly child sexual abuse, 
constitutes one of the new 'truths' of the second half of this century, 
predicated in the discourses of psychiatry, medicine, preventive 
health care and social work. Professional discourses have shifted 
ground on the broad terrain of childhood sexuality, have moved away 
from the nineteenth century preoccupation with and censure of child 
masturbation and the mythology surrounding this, to the new truth of 
infant sexuality and the new truth of sexual abuse of children. As 
Foucault notes, 'It was necessary to wait until Freud for the 
discovery at last to be made that children have a sexuality.' 
(Foucault 1980 (il), p.120); and he cites the powerful influence of 
Freudian discourse on the reconstruction of sex and sexuality and on 
the general 'proliferation of sexual discourses' in contemporary 
Western cultures. 
In discourse, Foucault argues, power and knowledge are joined 
together, specifically in the privileged discourses of expert speakers. 
He perceives discourses as 'tactical elements or blocks operating in 
the field of force relations.' (Foucault 1979, pp.100j102). His concept 
of discourse is based on his notion of serious 'statements.' In 
Foucauldian terms, discourse is not formed in the common -sense 
language of everyday speech. The language of discourse is a form 
of specialised language use, the language of professional experts 
whose statements define particular fields of knowledge in which 
meaning and truth are constructed; language which only those 
appropriately qualified are authorised to speak. 
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Catherine Belsey posits discourse as 'a domain of language use, a 
particular way of talking (and writing and thinking);' and she argues 
that ideology is necessarily inscribed in discourse. 'No linguistic 
forms are ideologically innocent or neutral.' She associates the term 
ideology with common sense 'rather than with a set of doctrines or a 
coherent system of beliefs.' Her use of the term is derived from that 
of Althusser. She posits that ideology is inscribed in specific 
discourses in the sense that it is literally written or spoken in them. 
(Belsey 1980, pp.5/6). It is through language that we articulate 
experience; and it is through ideology that we represent to ourselves 
our experience of the world. For Belsey, language and ideology 
combine in discourse. 
Louis Althusser's theory of 'ideology in general' maintains that 
ideology is the very condition of our experience of the world. It 
always exists in an apparatus and its practices. He argues that there 
is no practice except by and in an ideology, and that it is through 
ideology that individuals are constituted as subjects and as subjected 
beings. (Althusser 1977, pp.153-l69). What is not accounted for in 
Althusser's deterministic formulation is the process of historical 
change and the production of ideas and meanings through which 
subjectivity is challenged, identity is re-constructed (women, gay 
people etc.) and societies reformulate themselves. 
Foucault finds the notion of ideology 'difficult to make use of,' 
(Foucault 1980 (li), p.118). The Marxist concept of ideology linked 
with the class struggle is inadequate for his theory of 
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knowledge/power and the truth claims of the specialised disciplines in 
the complex field of power relations. (Poster 1984, pp.83-87) He 
makes a somewhat ambiguous reference to the part played by ideology 
in the construction of the new mechanisms of power and apparatuses 
of knowledge: 
... it is quite possible that the major mechanisms of power 
have been accompanied by ideological productions. There 
has, for example, probably been an ideology of education, an 
ideology of the monarchy, an ideology of parliamentary 
democracy etc.; but basically I do not believe that what has 
taken place can be said to be ideological. It is both much 
more and much less than ideology. It is the production of 
effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of 
knowledge methods of observation, techniques of 
registration, procedures for investigation and research, 
apparatuses of control. All this means that power, when it 
is exercised through these subtle mechanisms, cannot but 
evolve, organise and put into circulation a knowledge, or 
rather apparatuses of knowledge, which are not ideological 
constructs. (Foucault 1980 (i), p.102) 
It is arguable that the 'major mechanisms of power' have not merely 
'been accompanied by ideological productions,' but are themselves 
rooted in the ideologies of the predominant culture, the contemporary 
beliefs and values through which such constructions and activities 
achieve legitimacy. For example, the discourse of child protection 
(on which this thesis is focussed), and the mechanisms through which 
power is exercised to protect children from abuse and neglect, are 
rooted in a predominant belief in the West of human rights; and in 
the growing recognition during the past few decades of the particular 
rights of the child (and other vulnerable subjects). While the truth 
of child abuse is material and is inscribed in the discourses of the 
human sciences, it is based on a liberal/humanistic ideological 
perception of the child as a subject dependent for his/her needs on 
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adults but not an object possessed by its parents or subject to the 
unqualified power of adults. 
Discourses do not emerge in a value-free vacuum but within an 
environment of beliefs and values. Beliefs may be transient and 
illusory but they permeate the social fabric and infiltrate into power 
relations. If power always operates against resistance, which is 
'present everywhere in the power network' (Foucault 1979, p.9S) 
resistance may be seen as part of the ideological struggles that 
emerge from changing values, conflicting beliefs and conflicts of 
interests; the "rights" and interests of parents, for example, that 
may be in conflict with the rights and best interests of a child; the 
rights of children (and adults) with disabilities to lead as normal a 
life as possible, to be valued as persons rather than being separated 
out in order that they do not "offend" the public gaze. The power-
truth-right model that Foucault proposes is founded in ideology in 
each of its component parts if not as a whole; and it is through 
ideological/hegemonic struggles that new 'truths' and new meanings 
emerge in the 'apparatuses of knowledge' and play a part in the 
mechanisms of power and resistance. 
Michele Barrett proposes a 'post-Marxist' approach to the concept of 
ideology, based on the notion that the term ideology is a general term 
referring to 'a process of mystification, or misrepresentation ... ' that is 
'not tied to anyone presumed cause, or logic, of misrepresentation;' 
and which can apply to non-class social divisions. She argues the 
need for 'new and more precise concepts, rather than mobilising the 
dubious resonances of the old.' (Barrett 1991, pp.167/168), which 
manifestly do not "fit" the present historical moment of political, 
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cultural and economic discontinuities and contemporary power 
struggles. 
The mechanisms of power and apparatuses of knowledge upon which 
Foucault focusses are the specialised discourses of the social sciences, 
which he calls the dubious sciences. He positions their 'disciplinary 
power,' their technologies of 'normalization,' their strategies and rules 
and the role they play, within the context of the economic, political 
and social issues of the present. He links them with the apparatuses 
of the state, the schools, the hospitals, the prisons, the sites of 
discipline and surveillance; the sites through which power, legitimised 
by the law, is exercised. He argues that law is an instrument of 
power; (Foucault 1980 (iii), p.141) but 'Power is quite different from 
and more complicated, dense and pervasive than a set of laws or a 
state apparatus.' (Foucault 1980 (iv), p.158). The notion of power is 
'impoverished' if posed solely in terms of the state and its 
apparatuses. 
The mechanisms of surveillance are everywhere, not only in the 
apparatuses of the state - from registration of the child at the time 
of birth and onwards - but also through the watchfulness which as 
citizens we are exhorted to exercise. We are expected to be watchful, 
for instance, for the ill-treatment of children; and we are expected 
to report our concerns to those who have specialised knowledge and 
who are authorised by their qualifications and by the rules of their 
professional and organizational discourses to operate disciplinary 
power, the power that acts upon the actions of others. We are all 
subject to this surveillance both formal and informal and to various 
forms of discipline and social control in our daily lives. On the 
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whole, although with some exceptions, we do not resist. It is 
questionable whether our acquiesence is necessarily an effect of the 
operation of power. 
Edward W. Said argues that 'Foucault seemed to have been confused 
between the power of institutions to subjugate individuals and the 
fact that individual behaviour in society is frequently a matter of 
following rules and conventions.' (Said 1986, p.151). There are, 
moreover, vastly different intensities of discipline and vastly different 
impacts that disciplinary practices make on our autonomy and our 
freedom to follow or disregard the rules and conventions. Michael 
Walzer suggests that it is Foucault's claim that the discipline of a 
prison represents a continuation and intensification of what goes on 
in more ordinary places. 
of authority,' work to 
He argues that while we all 'live in the eye 
time schedules and routines, and are 
periodically subject to examination and inspection, this type of 
subjection and social control is not the same thing as being in prison. 
But 'Foucault tends systematically to underestimate the difference ... ' 
(Walzer 1986, pp.58/59). 
Foucault traces the historical shifts in the mechanisms of power from 
the sovereign total power of the feudal monarchy to the contemporary 
mechanisms of disciplinary power and surveillance. He sees this 
new mechanism of power working in the interests of the bourgeoisie, 
positing that the bourgeoisie is interested in power per se, interested 
in the complex of mechanisms through which power operates and the 
economic and political advantages that derive from the mechanisms of 
power, rather than caring about the subjects of power, the "human 
bodies" over which power is exercised. 'The bourgeoisie is 
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interested in power ... in the system of control of infantile sexuality, 
not in that phenomenon itself.' Not interested either, he argues, in 
the phenomenon of delinquency and in the rehabilitation of 
delinquents, which economically has little importance; but interested in 
the 'complex of mechanisms with which delinquency is controlled, 
pursued, punished and reformed etc.' (Foucault 1986, p.237). This 
position is questionable in the context of current public concerns 
about child protection, particularly in relation to child sexual abuse, 
an abuse of power which occurs in all social classes. 
Foucault posits that 'What is needed is a study of power ... at the 
point where it is in direct and immediate relationship with that which 
we can provisionally call its object, its target, its field of application, 
... where it installs itself and produces its real effects.' (Foucault 
1986, p.233). Somewhat contradictorily, he argues that power 'is 
never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never 
appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth.' (ibid p.234). Yet, 
paradoxically, while it is everywhere it can be seen to be operating 
locally and episodically here and there in the "sites" where 
surveillance and discipline are exercised; and if it is to be targetted 
and studied in its field of application it has, by implication, to be 
seen as being localized as well as everywhere, operating at certain 
times in certain places, and studied at the point where it produces its 
real effects. 
It is the purpose of this project to undertake such a study, to 
identify the plurality of factors and the diversity of interests that 
intersect in the operation of power at this historical moment in one 
specific site focussed on one specific condition that of child 
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protection in the public sphere. I will consider whether the 
knowledge/power theory is adequate; and whether power can be said 
to exist even when it is not in action. I will consider whose 
interests are being served in the field of child protection and the 
competing discourses which intersect in this site where power is 'in 
direct and immediate relationship with its target its field of 
application. ' 
Attempts to understand and analyse the concept of power are 
informed by the perspective within which it is studied and the ways 
in which meaning is constructed in the privileged language of 
specialised discourse - the perspectives and languages of psychology, 
sociology, organization theory, economic and political theory, military 
theory, etc; whether it is studied at the micro-level of interpersonal 
relations, or at the macro-level of political groupings, formal and 
informal, national or international. In this proj ect the discourses 
and discursive languages of cultural studies and social work intersect 
to focus on the site of child protection and the operation of power in 
the public sphere. (1) 
In the complex field of power relations, in specific sites, certain 
categories of privilege operate; privilege legitimized by the 
constitutional and legal framework of the particular society, privilege 
inscribed in the dominant cultural norms, privilege institutionalised in 
the state apparatuses and the law, privilege inscribed in the status 
accorded to the specialised discourses of professional experts, a 
status which is not fixed but which changes over time. 
Institutionalised privilege is inscribed in language, in the 
contemporary meanings and "truths" of oppositional signifiers such as 
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black/white, male/female, capitalj1abour, employer/employee etc. 
Privilege is institutionalised in organizational structures and 
regulations through which disciplinary power is exercised over the 
discursive practices of professional experts as well as over the 
subjects of their disciplinary power. 
Foucault's focus on the discourses and discursive practices of expert 
speakers in the human sciences, privileged by their specialised 
knowledge, opens up a useful insight into the operation of power; 
but it is necessary to take into account the complex networks within 
which these function, the organizational structures and the effects of 
organizational ideology and culture on power relations (Mintzberg 
1983, pp.151-162; pp.367-387). I t is necessary also to consider the 
effects on power relations of leaderhip, missionary drive, and personal 
charisma, resource power and the power of sanctions. These are 
complex, unstable and interrelated variables; and the equilibrium or 
state of disequilibrium of the starting point affects the outcome of 
power relations. Parties, or "agents," operate from different power 
bases, themselves complex constructions - discursive, institutional, 
ideological, juridical - and they "own," or do not own, privileging 
variables such as authority, influence, position, resources (wealth, 
knowledge, etc.). As a consequence, the quality, the effects and 
pervasiveness of the outcomes of power relations must inevitably vary 
to an extent that makes it questionable whether it is meaningful to 
attempt to analyse power at all except in a specific context. 
Power is loosely referred to in "everyday" language (the discourse of 
common sense), in political discourse, in the discourse of armed 
conflict, etc., when the "size" of the power relation and its effects 
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within each of these general contexts, let alone the specific, are 
widely disparate. Moreover, often what is being referred to is 
influence, manipulation, violence etc., the effects of power, subsumed 
under the umbrella term of "power." As Foucault posits, the use of 
the word is apt to lead to misunderstandings. 
A generalised behaviourist approach to understanding power has been 
premised on the equation that A is able to get B to do something that 
B otherwise would not do, i.e. A achieves an intended effect in 
relation to B. (Dahl 1957, quoted in Lukes 1986, p.2). So, for example, 
a social worker or health visitor may get the parent of a child to 
behave in a way that he/she would otherwise not do; in the language 
of the Children Act 1989, to behave as a 'reasonable parent.' (the 
concept of the reasonable parent is discussed in chapter 6). But with 
this model there are problems. As Steven Lukes argues, not every 
change in behaviour within the relationship between A and B is 
necessarily an effect of power; it may derive from 'successful 
requests,' or 'persuasive advice,' or 'convincing arguments;' or there 
may be unintended consequences, etc. (Lukes 1986, pp.2/3). Charles 
Taylor criticises the behaviourist approach as 'sterile, just because 
acts of power are so heterogeneous; they absolutely do not admit of 
being described in such a homogeneous medium of culturally neutral 
makings and doings.' (Taylor 1986, p.89). 
B's behaviour may be changed as a consequence of simply being 
influenced by A as a role model, B freely choosing to modify own 
behaviour to accord with his/her perception of the admired model, 
particularly if A is perceived as prestigious or charismatic. 
Moreover, there is a disequilibrium at the starting point of most, if 
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not all, social relations, whether of position, authority, assertiveness 
and other personal characteristics, command of language, ownership of 
resources etc., all of which are likely to have a bearing on the 
behaviour of A and B in terms both of influence and intended effects. 
In the above example, the disequilibrium of the relationship can be 
seen immediately; the effect of the interaction between A and B is 
likely to be influenced not only by the personal characteristics of 
each of the parties but also by the privileged position and 
professional discourse of the social worker or health visitor. Both 
the latter are "expert speakers," drawing on specialised knowledge, 
organizational position, and ascribed - although not owned - power of 
sanctions. If the parent does not behave like a 'reasonable parent' 
(whatever that is), the social worker "has" the authority/power to 
institute disciplinary procedures. In the common sense discourse of 
the parent, "reasonable" may be defined differently from the meaning 
inscribed in the professional discourse of child care on which the 
social worker will draw, (Foucault's concept of normalization - the 
normal parent is reasonable); but the social worker has the 
privileged position of the expert speaker, the privileging resource of 
specialised knowledge, and the privileged status of the authorised 
agent. The effect of the struggle between these competing discourses 
is likely to be that the social worker will "discipline" the parent to 
act in a way that s/he otherwise would not do. This domination may 
be achieved through the expert power of discourse or through the 
power of threatened sanctions, the social worker's access to resources 
and disciplinary or punitive action; or the social worker may achieve 
this effect by suggestion and advice. The same effect could 
arguably be achieved by the parent's neighbour or friend through 
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suggestion and advice - through influence and the discourse of 
common sense; or through a threat to "report" the parent, invoking 
the institutionalised power of the "authorities." 
There is a fine dividing line between influence and power. Gerhard 
Lenski argues that 'Institutionalized (sic) power takes many forms, 
but it always involves the possession of certain enforceable rights 
which increase one's capacity to carry out one's own will even in the 
face of opposition.' (Lenski 1986, p.250). But, notwithstanding the 
privilege of institutionalised authority, this outcome cannot be 
ensured. As long as either party has a freedom of choice without 
a threat of punishment or other sanction, it is likely that we are 
talking about influence or persuasion or manipulation rather than 
power. Lenski defines authority, within the category of 
institutionalised power, as 'the enforceable right to command others. 
Influence, by contrast, is much more subtle. It is the ability to 
manipulate the social situation of others, or their perception of it, by 
the exercise of one's resources and rights, thereby increasing the 
pressures on others to act in accordance with one's own wishes.' (ibid 
p250). The 'enforceable right to command others' and the 'exercise of 
resources' are key factors in power relations. 
To the knowledge/power model we have to add the resource-power of 
sanctions working against resistance, and control of or access to 
material resources as in the power relation between the social worker 
and the parent. Without access to resources and the means of 
applying sanctions, the facility to act upon the actions of others is 
curtailed, the power relation is diminished or negated as the 
'enforceable right' of institutionalised authority turns out to be not 
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enforceable. For example, there have been occasions in my 
experience as a social worker (prior to the current child care 
legislation) when after a juvenile court had made a care order, it was 
then not possible to find somewhere suitable to place the child away 
from its home. The social worker having been authorised - given the 
power - by the court to remove the child from the care of its parents 
was unable to exercise this power through lack of (non-ownership of) 
resource power. With resources always in short supply, it could 
sometimes be diffcult for a social worker to negotiate with the 
resource managers to reserve a place for a child beforehand in 
anticipation of a care order being made; or a reserved place could be 
taken over in an emergency - for an abandoned child, or a child 
removed from home on a place of safety order. Many social workers 
will have experienced feelings of powerlessness as they desperately 
tried to find a place for a child, locally or further afield, to spend 
the coming night. 
Moreover, the "essence" of the power exercised by a social worker is 
enshrined in the discourse of the law which prescribes and legitimizes 
the actions of the social worker, and in the discourse of the agency 
which authorizes the social worker to act on its behalf. The actions 
of the social worker operate within a hierarchal structure of power 
relations Acts of Parliament, authority delegated to specific 
agencies, authorised individuals employed by those agencies acting 
according to their specialised discourses and the organizational 
discourses of the agency. A social worker who is not employed by an 
authorised agency may have the knowledge/power of specialised 
discourse but will not be able to act in the same kind of power 
relation as an employed authorised social worker; s/he will be in the 
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privileged position of knowing the rules and mechanisms of the 
discursive practices of statutory social work and will know how to set 
them in motion, but can only act directly through an authorised 
agency. And without "resources" being made available to its 
professional agents by an authorised agency, the agents are relatively 
powerless. 
Similarly, there are limitations on the power of other "expert 
speakers." For example, a situation may arise when a psychiatrist 
diagnoses an individual as needing compulsory admission to hospital 
for psychiatric treatment; but the knowledge/power of the 
psychiatrist and the discursive practices of this specialised discipline 
are constrained by the availability of resources over which the 
psychiatrist may have little control. There is much contemporary 
evidence of individuals inappropriately incarcerated in prisons for 
whom admission to hospital for psychiatric treatment has been 
recommended in a psychiatrist's report to a court. This is a 
consequence of the limitations of psychiatric discourse in relation to 
"owning" the resource of hospital beds. The exercise of power by 
a psychiatrist is, moreover, constrained by the authorised power of 
Approved Social Workers who are specially trained and designated 
persons under the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983 to 
safeguard the rights of an individual against unnecessary or 
inappropriate compulsory admission to a psychiatric hospital or unit. 
I have known instances of an Approved Social Worker disagreeing 
with a psychiatrist about the need for compulsory admisson - for 
example, when the person appears willing to go into hospital on a 
voluntary basis but the psychiatrist considers it unlikely that sjhe 
will do so or will remain there. The Approved Social Worker may 
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interpret the person's statement of intent differently from the 
psychiatrist; or, without disputing the medical diagnosis which s/he 
is not qualified to do, the Approved Social worker may disagree with 
the psychiatrist that compulsory admission to hospital is necessary on 
any basis, having considered whether that is in the person's best 
interests and whether the person is a danger to him/herself or to 
other people. The Approved Social Worker has the responsibility for 
making an application to a hospital for admission to a psychiatric bed, 
taking account of both the medical situation and his/her assessment 
of the social circumstances. A power struggle may then operate 
between the psychiatrist and the Approved Social Worker, the rules of 
whose discourse are concerned with the rights of the individual not 
to be unnecessarily or inappropriately committed to hospital. 
The operation of power is not necessarily oppressive in intention. It 
may work to protect the less powerful in the complex field of power 
relations. It can be productive in the sense that disciplinary power 
subjects "bodies" to health care, and to the rituals of teaching, 
training and disciplining 'with a view to making them productive.' 
(Sheridan 1980, p.219). Moreover, disciplinary action that may 
control, or punish, the actions of one party may be in the best 
interests of another. In the parent/child/social worker instance, the 
discursive practice of social work, itself subject to the regulatory and 
disciplinary procedures of the agency (discussed in chapter 8), may 
be seen as punishing or denying the rights of a parent, placing the 
parent in a position of subjugation and relative powerlessness. At 
the same time, the discourse of the social worker is primarily directed 
towards promoting the protection of a child who is relatively 
powerless and whose "rights" and best interests are perceived as not 
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being served by the parent. The problem here is the different 
ways in which meaning is ascribed to the notions of rights and 
responsibilities of the parent as well as rights of the child; issues 
which the Children Act 1989 addresses and which I will discuss below. 
Lenski argues that institutionalised power is 'a socially acceptable 
form of power, which means that those who exercise it are less likely 
to be challenged and more likely to obtain popular support than are 
those who use force.' (Lenski 1986, pp.249/250). In many instances of 
institutionalised power relations, for 'popular support' we may read 
"consent" or hegemony. Bertrand Russell makes the point in relation 
to Prohibition in the United States, arguing that 'The ultimate power 
of the Law is the coercive power of the State... But ... the Law is 
almost powerless when it is not supported by public sentiment, as 
might be seen in the United States during Prohibition ... The degree 
of feeling in favour of the Law is one of the most important 
characteristics of a community.' (Russell 1986, pp.20/21). A measure 
that is universally unpopular may invert the field of power relations, 
as we have seen over the Conservative government's climb-down on 
the poll tax. As Michele Barrett points out, 'politicians have now 
learnt the lessons of the theorists of hegemony,' dropping issues 
when a strong tide of opinion moves against them. (Barrett 1991, 
p.155 ). 
Public sentiment, reinforced by media discourses, can be seen to have 
entered the force field of power over the abuse of children, and over 
what is constructed in popular discourse as the abuse of power by 
social workers and paediatricians. It is questionable to what extent 
public sentiment informs the media or vice versa; and there is also a 
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question of why the media operate more powerfully over some social 
issues and less so over others; for example, in relation to 
homelessness. Notwithstanding the powerful impact of the "Cathy 
Come Home" television documentary drama and continuing occasional 
press coverage over this issue, the situation has deteriorated and 
homelessness, for a variety of reasons (including an increase in the 
number of one-person households, the splitting-up of families etc.) 
has increased over the past few decades and continues to increase. 
Media discourses predominantly focus on specific incidents of child 
abuse and social work "failures," as "news stories," rather than on 
the vast numbers of children living in the insecure circumstances of 
bed and breakfast accommodation or living on the streets or in 
squats; children who are being denied their rights and are "at risk" 
but who are not "news." These children are being abused by the 
"system" - by the mechanisms of power exercised by "the state," 
central government, that has tied the purse-strings of local 
authorities over spending capital receipts from the sale of council 
houses on new building; a hegemonic power relation between central 
government, local government and the body of the population, to 
which the population tacitly gives consent, notwithstanding the 
draining away of vast sums of its money in the costs, financial and 
social, of homelessness, bed and breakfast accommodation and 
temporary "lettings." 
On the one hand, public sentiment and media coverage over 
miscarriages of justice are forcing powerful institutions - the courts, 
the police, - to review their discursive practices. On the other hand 
the "human right" of shelter is being denied to substantial numbers 
of citizens, including children for whom the child care legislation 
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purports to afford protection and the meeting of their 'needs.' In 
addition to the absolutely homeless and the virtually homeless living 
in bed and breakfast accommodation, people living in sub-standard 
housing that lacks the basic amenities and/or which is dripping with 
damp and condensation, are not enjoying the kind of "shelter" that 
contemporary knowledge/right/truth demands; the occupants of such 
accommodation can be said to be technically homeless in relation to 
such signifiers of "home" as a warm and healthy environment. This 
failure of the 'rule of right' brings back the point made by Foucault 
that the new mechanism of power works in the interests of the 
bourgeoisie (see above) who are interested in the complex of 
mechanisms through which power operates rather than caring about 
the subj ects of power, the human bodies over whom power is 
exercised. It is however questionable who the bourgeoisie are in 
British society today. A disadvantaged "underclass" is more obvious 
than a clearly differentiated social grouping that can be classified as 
the bourgeoisie, many of whom have become the new poor of the 
1990s. 
In the power struggles that have emerged over the last few decades, 
we can see the increasing power of the centre, "the state," not only 
over the practices and resources of the local authorities but also over 
the discursive practices of the expert speakers. The power of 
psychiatrists, for example, is limited by the rules of the Mental Health 
Act 1983; the power of teachers is limited by the government's 
intervention in school curricula; the power of medical consultants is 
limited by the management structures and market mechanisms set up 
in the restructuring of the NHS; the power of social workers is 
limited by the rules of the Children Act 1989. I will consider below 
the impact of this last legislation on power relations in the field of 
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child protection and its effect on the discursive practices of the 
professional experts. 
I will argue also that we cannot ignore the effects on power relations 
of ideology, and of charismatic leadership and the driving force that 
motivates the person. We saw this operating on a national scale 
during the "Thatcher years;" (2) and we are witnessing it operating 
on a global scale with the resurgence of national identities and the 
ideology of the nation state, finding expression through 
assertive/charismatic, albeit unstable, leadership. Moreover, new 
forms of power relations have emerged in the past few decades, not 
from the discourses of expert speakers but from grass-roots cultural 
changes and new forms of knowledge and technology that have, for 
example, freed women from their subjugation to child bearing; and 
new knowledge/right that has given new meaning to the signifiers of 
gender and skin colour and the rights of women and black people, 
the rights of people with disabilities, alternative life-styles and sexual 
orien tations. This new knowledge, these new truths, new rights 
might be seen as resistance to the disciplinary power that Foucault 
posits; or alternatively might be seen as the emergence of new forms 
of oppositional power, a force stronger than resistance, in the 'mobile 
field' of multiple force relations. 
Foucault argues that the state 'is far from being able to occupy the 
whole field of actual power relations,' (Foucault 1980 (li), p.122). 
While this is manifestly the case, yet the power of the state in Britain 
in the last two decades has achieved a new dominance and a powerful 
resource of sanctions operating through the law to enforce the 
obedience of its subjects and their elected representatives (through 
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"capping" of local authority expenditure, for example); while also 
effectively diminishing the power of the specialised discourses of the 
human sciences and their expert speakers. Other categories of expert 
speakers, privileged by the political doctrines of the Conservative 
government, dominate power relations through their discourses of 
financial management. At the same time, new 'truths' and the 'serious 
speech acts' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, p.48) of grass-roots 
intellectuals (Gramsci's organic intellectuals) (3) are constructing new 
force fields of power, new discourses and new discursive practices, 
and new subject identities for oppressed and subjugated categories of 
the population resisting the procedures of 'normalization.' Alliances 
of 'free subjects' are organizing oppositional forces against the 
disciplinary power of expert speakers in the human sciences, and 
against the institutionalised rules and organizational structures which 
privilege the discourses of the appointed agents of the state. 
Foucault posits that 'discourse tan smits and produces power' 
(Foucault 1979, p.101); but disciplinary power operates over 'free 
subjects' not only through discourse and the discursive practices of 
expert agents. It operates also through the extra-discursive 
administrative procedures and hierarchichal structures of the 
institutions within which the agents function and to which the agents 
themselves are subject; the prisons, the schools, the hospitals, the 
social services departments of local authorities, etc. Foucault makes 
the point that it is 'perfectly legitimate' to analyse 'the relationship 
between power and freedom's refusal to submit by focusing on 
carefully defined institutions' which 'constitute a privileged point of 
observation;' providing that the analysis derives from the standpoint 
of power relations rather than from the standpoint of the institution. 
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(Foucault 1982, pp.221/222). While he argues that discipline may be 
identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus (Foucault 
1977, p.215), he cites the structural, procedural and ritual elements of 
such institutions as prisons, schools and hospitals as part of the 
'technologies' of power and processes of 'normalization.' He instances 
the effects on internal power relations of the purpose-built 
architecture of institutions and their systematic organization and use 
of space; their techniques of classification, examination, assessment 
and correction; their procedures of time-tabling and the regulation 
of prescribed activities; their mechanisms of surveillance over bodies, 
which he finds exemplified in Bentham's Panopticon (Foucault 1977, 
pp.205-209), an architectural prototype 'polyvalent in its applications.' 
Many of the organizational sites within which the technologies of 
disciplinary power operate do not provide the degree and type of 
surveillance afforded by such closed institutions as the prison or 
hospital. Surveillance of the population generally, and in the field of 
child protection on which this thesis is focussed, is dispersed among 
various agents and agencies, a network that encompasses us all. 'The 
judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of 
the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the "social-
worker" judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the 
normative is based.' (Foucault 1977, p.304). But the discursive 
practices of these professional agents are regulated by the 
institutionalised technologies and other extra-discursive elements of 
the sites and organizations within which they operate. 
Foucault maintains that the 'analysis of power relations within a 
society cannot be reduced to the study of a series of 
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institutions ... Power relations are rooted in the system of social 
networks.' (Foucault 1982, p.224). Without falling into a reductionist 
approach, I will argue that the exercise of disciplinary power is 
regulated by formal and informal structures, technologies and rules 
that constitute the organizational sites and institutions within which 
the agents, the judges of normality, operate. By drawing on theories 
of organizational power in the following chapter, I will add another 
dimension to the Foucauldian approach to power relations. 
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Notes to Chapter 1: 
(1) Foucault's concept of discourse and his ideas on disciplinary 
power have rarely been applied to social work. Roj ek et al. (Social 
Work and Received Ideas, (London, Routledge, 1988) have 'found it 
useful to explore social work relations through the prism of discourse 
theory' in their work with students, co-workers and clients. (ibid p.8) 
Drawing on the writings of Foucault and Lacan, they posit that 
'discourse analysis produces a linguisitically grounded model of social 
work. It submits that there are no fixed or original meanings in 
social work. What a term signifies is defined negatively by its 
differences from other terms in the sign system ... The Unconscious 
plays a full part in this process.' (ibid p.137). Discourse analysis, 
they posit, 'is founded upon a particular view of the unconscious ... ' 
(ibid p.123). 
This is a useful but rather limited application of Foucault's complex 
ideas on power relations to the field of social work. 
(2) The 1980s in Britain were politically dominated by the charismatic 
and assertive style of the Thatcher leadership; by her exercise of 
disciplinary power over Cabinet colleagues, the effects of which were 
the resignation of those ministers who resisted the truths of her 
discourses; by her drive to cultivate a dynamic "star" image, and the 
effects of this on her relationships with other "star" players, (Reagan 
and Gorbachov for example) in the field of international political 
relations; by her assertive rhetoric of "enterprise" and "self-
reliance," and the long-term effects of this on the ideology of welfare 
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and on the identity of the individual subject, the recipients of state 
benefits reconstructed as "scroungers" for example. 
(3) Antonio Gramsci argues that 'although one can speak of 
intellectuals, one cannot 
intellectuals do not exist 
speak of non-intellectuals, because non-
There is no human activity from which 
every form of intellectual participation can be excluded:' He 
identifies, however, two 'important' categories of intellectuals, 
'traditional' intellectuals and 'organic' intellectuals. The role of these 
intellectuals is to provide moral and intellectual leadership. 
Traditional intellectuals are those who occupy established positions in 
civil society. They 'represent an historical continuity uninterrupted 
even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and 
social forms.' The most typical category of the traditional 
intellectuals are the ecclesiastics, the moralists, philosophers, 
educationalists, etc. The organic intellectuals are created 'organically' 
by every social group or every new class that comes into existence, 
'giving it homogeniety and an awareness of its own function not only 
in the economic but also in the social and political fields.' (Antonio 
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated 
by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. (London, Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1971) pp.4-9. 
Barry Smart posits that 'although some of Foucault's ideas on 
intellectuals may initially seem to resemble those of Gramsci, there are 
important 
Foucault 
conceptual and political differences.' He argues that 
attributes no leading role to intellectuals; and that while 
they are occupied in the struggles and conflicts around the question 
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of truth, they occupy a secondary place in his analysis. Foucault 
distinguishes between two types of intellectual, 'the "universal" who 
speaks for and is the conscience of the collectivity and the "specific" 
who has a particular expertise in a specialized field of knowledge.' 
{Barry Smart, 'The Politics of Truth and the Problem of Hegemony,' in 
Foucault: A Critical Reader, edited by David Couzens Hoy (Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp.165-166. 
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2. ORGANIZATIONAL POWER RELATIONS 
The discursive practices of the agents of the state are legitimized by 
the statutory powers of the organizations which employ them, through 
which they are authorised to operate disciplinary power over 
subjects. While they are thus privileged as agents, they are 
themselves subject to the institutionalised disciplinary power and the 
regulatory discourses and discursive practices of their agencies; and 
subject also to the institutionalised disciplinary "rules" of civil 
society through which we are all constituted and "organized" as social 
beings. 
Implicit in the notion of disciplinary power is organization, 
encompassing rules, structures, systems and strategies which 
through custom and practice become institutionalised. Foucault's 
focus on the prison and its apparatuses (Foucault 1977) provides one 
extreme example of the ways in which social practices and individual 
bodies become organized and institutionalised. But disciplinary 
power operates within and through a diversity of organizations 'as 
different and varied as the nations and societies of the world. They 
have differing cultures - sets of values and norms and beliefs -
reflected in different structures and systems.' (Handy 1985, p.185). 
As subjects in civil society, we are organized and we organize 
ourselves into a variety of social and work-related groupings, 
organizations and institutions, "freely" subjecting ourselves to the 
norms and the disciplinary practices of both the state and civil 
society; and we discipline ourselves in the way we organize (arrange) 
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our lives. We exist as social beings through our interactions with 
others and by learning the rules and norms, the disciplines, of social 
behaviour, initially within our families, later through our wider social 
contacts, through our schooling and work experiences. We are 
disciplined into social, economic and ideological subject positions 
within already constituted structures and power hierarchies, the 
institutions of the family, the education system, the health and 
welfare services, the law - Althusser's Ideological State Apparatuses 
through which, he posits, we are interpellated as subjects and as 
subjected beings in relations of dominance and subordination. 
(Althusser 1977). 
We are variously privileged or disadvantaged, empowered or 
subjugated, by the culturally defined meanings of these positionings 
and by the resources they command - resources of knowledge, skill, 
wealth, property, alliances, and "traditional" values. So, for 
example, the "head of the household" traditionally predominantly male, 
has historically been a signifier of the power relation between men 
and women, parents and children, boys and girls within patriarchal 
and religion dominated societies; a signifier of power and authority 
and of the ownership of resources, human and material. 
But while the institutions that are always already there exert a 
considerable influence in shaping "reality" in a way designed to 
perpetuate the reproduction of power relations and our subject-
positions, the signifiers of subject-position and their meanings are 
not "fixed." They change over time. Subjectivity and identity are 
always in the process of reconstruction within a complex environment 
of socialisation, historical change, contradiction and struggle. 
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So, in the late 20th century while we are subject to the disciplinary 
power of an increasingly interventionist state, we are at the same 
time witnessing organized struggles against the institutionalised 
structures and disciplinary power of the state and its agents, and 
against the ideologies that inform their discourses and their 
discursive practices. Oppositional forces are challenging the 
discourse of the "traditional" nuclear family for example. Changes in 
the structure of the family, changes in the positioning of family 
members in relation to the "rule of the father" and changes in the 
disciplinary power of parents are coming from "everywhere." In the 
past few decades there has inceasingly been a recognition of the 
rights of children, of the rights of women over their bodies and their 
right not to suffer sexual harassment by men. Ideological struggles 
over sexuality and "family values," and organized counter-ideologies, 
that of the gay movement for example, have achieved some changes in 
the "rules" of social behaviour and the rules of law. Free subjects 
are resisting the disciplinary power of the state and its agents, 
constructing oppositional forces through alliances and organized 
resistance to challenge the received "truths" of the expert speakers. 
The notion of organization implies a coming together of individuals 
whose interests are served, it may be assumed, in one way or 
another, by becoming 'members' (Mintzberg 1983; Clegg 1989) of a 
body (an organization) formed for a specific purpose or for the 
attainment of an objective, the working towards which will be 
regulated by a system of rules. Clegg posits that 'A conception of 
rules is essential to an adequate understanding of power.' (ibid p.18) 
and he argues strongly for 'the centrality of processes of power to 
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organization and of organization to processes of power.' (ibid p.20). 
Although organization theorists such as Charles B.Handy and Henry 
Mintzberg focus on large complex work organizations, Handy finds 
that there are things that are generally true of all organizations 
notwithstanding the 'multiplicity of variables impinging on anyone 
organizational situation.' (Handy 1985, pp.9,13) 
Even a small group may constitute an organization if it is regulated 
by rules that determine eligibility for membership based on 
commitment to a defined objective or "mission;" pressure groups or 
special interest groups for example. Some social groups are 
organized and their practices institutionalised to the extent that their 
rules deny membership to "outsiders." However, any group, insofar 
as the nature of a group essentially entails relationships, is likely to 
encompass informal social rules and a 'multiplicity of force relations' 
(Foucault), not least at the inter-personal micro level. 
The individual interests of the members of an organization may not 
necessarily coincide with the operational goals or the 'mission' 
(Mintzberg 1983) of an organization. For Mintzberg 'mission describes 
the organization's basic function in society, in terms of the products 
and services it produces for its clients.' (ibid p.6); and he 
differentiates between the notion of mission and operational/non-
operational goals (ibid p.6; pp.278-290). He posits 'a theory of 
oganizational power built on the premise that organizational 
behaviour is a power game in which various players, called 
influencers, seek to control the organization's decisions and actions.' 
(ibid p.22). He distinguishes between internal influencers, the full-
time employees of the organization, and the external influencers who 
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are nonemployees ; and he posits a notion of 'stable systems of 
power' formed by 'internal coalitions' and 'external coalitions' of 
internal and external influencers. (ibid pp.26-30). The most powerful 
influencers, he argues, are rewarded by the right to dictate, or at 
least to affect the organization's most important decisions or 
strategies. The most powerful influencers are likely to be, although 
not exclusively, those individuals or groups vested with authority, 
with the "legitimate" power of office or position, and/or the control of 
resources. Office, authority and control of resources each have an 
extra-discursive dimension which structurally or materially as well as 
discursively informs and affects the practices of agents and agencies 
and their positioning in the force field of power relations. 
Mintzberg links mission and membership with ideology in the organic 
development of organizations: 
Typically an organization is founded when a single prime 
mover ... identifies a mission - some product to be produced or 
service to be rendered in a special way - and collects a group 
around him to accomplish it. ... As the organization establishes 
itself, it makes decisions and takes actions which serve as 
commitments and establish precedents that reinforce themselves 
over time. Actions become infused with value. When these 
forces are strong enough, ideology begins to emerge. 
(Mintzberg 1983, pp.152/153). 
As habits and myths become established, an organization acquires a 
distinctive style and character. 'One senses something unique when 
one walks into an office of IBM.' Mintzberg takes what he calls 
'organizational ideology to mean a system of beliefs about the 
organization, shared by its members, that distinguishes it from other 
organizations. ' And he posits that 'The key feature of an 
(organizational) ideology is its unifying power.' (ibid pp.151/152). 
While some degree of ideology can be found in virtually every 
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organization, it varies considerably and some organizations have 
relatively weak ideologies. (ibid p.161). 
The notion of mission and its unifying power is applicable to 
organized groups that do not come within the canon of organizational 
management theory or large institutions. Any organized group 
united in its mission is usually more powerful than an individual or a 
group lacking unity, structure and strategies. For example, when 
parents in Cleveland accused of abusing their children (see chapter 
5) came together with the mission of clearing their names and 
asserting their rights, forming an organized group, constructing 
alliances, using the knowlege-power and the position-power of an 
external influencer, the balance of power among this 'multiplicity of 
force relations' was significantly altered. Initially, individual parents 
were rendered powerless in the face of the knowledge-power, the 
position-power, the disciplinary power and the organized, 
institutionalised power of the experts. (Butler-Sloss 1988). As Clegg 
argues, 'Lacking the organizational resources to outmanoeuvre existing 
networks and alliances of power, subordinated agencies are usually 
able to achieve effective resistance only on the basis of a collective 
organization ... With such collective organization they may be able to 
exploit fissure and division in the ruling ranks.' (ibid p.19). I will 
consider in chapter 5 how the Cleveland parents achieved effective 
resistance by getting organized, setting up their own networks and 
alliances and drawing into their mission the institutionalised power 
and resource power of a Member of Parliament and the media. 
Not all members of an organization involve themselves in strategic 
game-playing directed to the mission of the organization. Self 
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interest is the overriding goal for some of its members. For example, 
self-interest that is directed simply towards the personal goal of 
maximising financial reward for labour time, or to the practising of 
specialised skills as well as financial reward. At the same time, a 
close identification with the ideology and mission of the organization 
may be the motivation for some, or, in some types of organization, all 
of its members, (not all organizations provide financial reward for 
their members). While there are general features common to 
organizations - rules, organizational structures etc.- the "meaning" 
of membership is relative not only to the structurally defined meaning 
of positioning within the organization but relative also to the extent 
to which the individual member identifies with the mission, the goals 
and the ideology of the organization. It is reasonable to assume, for 
example, that a major motivating factor for unpaid/voluntary workers 
is a close identity with the ideology and mission of an organization of 
which they become members, some religious or charitable organizations 
for example. It is equally reasonable to assume that these factors 
are peripheral for some members for whom the meaning of 
membership, while regulated by the rules of the organization, is 
different from that of the "missionaries." 
Individuals perform a complex range of organizational roles - within 
the family, within social groups, professional groups, workplace 
groups etc. Conflicts may arise for professionally qualified and 
regulated individuals between the meaning of membership of their 
professional organization, the knowledge/right/truth power of its 
discourses and discursive practices, and the meaning of their 
membership of the organization which employs them. For example, 
professional social workers employed by local authorities, whose 
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discourses and sense of mission (assuming they have one) are 
directed towards meeting the social needs of disadvantaged 
individuals, operate within an organizational culture which has a 
plurality of functions. Among these functions is the meeting of a 
wider field of social needs directed to community as well as to 
individuals (leisure amenities, refuse collection etc.) At the same time 
the organizational goals are mediated by its political "mission" of 
exercising an efficient and economical expenditure of the taxpayers' 
money and determining the priorities for this limited resource. The 
culture of a local authority is permeated by the 'values, norms and 
beliefs' of a variety of professionals, social workers, accountants, 
lawyers, engineers etc. They may be involved in inter-disciplinary 
power struggles over meaning (the definition of priority needs for 
example) as well as ideological/political power struggles with the 
organizational goals, for example keeping down the level of the 
Council Tax at the cost of unmet needs. 
As their discourses intersect with those of other "expert" speakers, 
the knowledge-power of the human sciences is mediated by extra-
discursive factors; by institutionalised management structures and 
systems, and by the regulation and control of resources both within 
the organization and without - i.e. by internal financial managers and 
by 'external influencers' such as local elected members and central 
government. Their power is mediated also by an inter-disciplinary 
professional hierarchy that has become institutionalised through the 
resource-power of wealthy and historically long established 
organizations like the British Medical Association; and by the 
differential meanings ascribed by popular opinion to professionals as 
"experts," to doctors, health visitors, social workers, etc. 
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Meaning is culturally constructed through the type of perceived 
relational expertise of professional discourses, through the attributes 
and characteristics popularly (Le. by the population generally) 
ascribed to different professionals, and through the action-power 
potential of the various professionals. Doctors popularly have a 
higher expertise rating than social workers. Their relationship with 
users of their services is universal and sought after rather than the 
imposed, often perceived as stigmatising, relationship between clients 
and social workers. But in the field of child protection, the 
disciplinary power of social workers generally is greater than that of 
the doctors. In the first instance they have the discretion to act or 
not to act on suspected child abuse; and they have an enforceable 
right as the authorised agents of the state to institute court 
proceedings. However, while social workers are organizationally 
positioned through the law as the primary actors, the exercise of 
their power rests not only on legitimization through the law, but also 
on agency and inter-agency strategies, and on professional alliances 
within which members are differentially positioned in a hierarchy of 
discourses and discursive practices. There is evidence that the 
discourse of medicine and particularly of paediatrics has at times 
significantly influenced and dominated that of social work in the field 
of child protection. (Butler-Sloss 1988, p.84). 
It is largely through the meaning ascribed to different categories of 
membership that individuals are positioned in organizational force-
fields of power relations. For example the Directors/Chief 
Executive/Chairperson at one end, managers and professionals in the 
middle, manual workers at the other end. At the same time, power 
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relations operate locally both formally and informally at the inter-
personal level and between the 
professionals and non-professionals. 
discursive practices of various 
Clegg argues that 'the nub of 
power resides in the relations of meaning and membership;' (Clegg 
1989, p.237) and that 'The meanings of and membership within the 
categories of discursive practice will be constant sites of struggle 
over power, as identity is posited, resisted and fought over.' (ibid 
p.1S1). External influencers also play their part in this complexity 
of power relations - in the public sector, elected members and the 
local electorate as well as government agencies and watchdog bodies 
like Community Health Councils. 
The power of such external influencers is related to the degree of 
privilege and delegated authority inherent in their structural 
positioning, to the alliances they are able to form and to their access 
to and control of sanctions and resources. Structurally, individual 
members of the local electorate have no privilege of position in power 
struggles over the provision of services, although they are 
"stakeholders" and resource providers - they have an interest, a 
stake, in the services which they are financing (resourcing) through 
taxation. When the stakeholders become organized the balance of 
power may be significantly altered in the field of multiple force 
relations, depending on the knowledge power, the position power and 
the resource power of the alliances that are formed - alliances 
between, say, citizens, Members of Parliament and the media, as in the 
resistance to the poll tax for example. 
position power is not an absolute even when structurally 
institutionalised; but it operates effectively in some fields of power 
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relations, however forcefully resisted, through the institutionalised 
"right" it commands to control resources (resource power). The 
knowledge/right/truth power of specialised discourse intersecting with 
resource/position power is frequently the site of unequal power 
struggles between the managers who control the resources, the expert 
assessors of "need", and the service users (clients) in the public 
sector. Power struggles arise, for example, over the "right" to 
services to meet a child's special "needs" as identified by educational 
psychologists, paediatricians, social workers etc. The resources 
identified by the professionals may not be made available by those 
who control them; or even if they are, the child's parents may not 
agree with the professional assessment or with the type of resource 
that is on offer. The knowledge-power of the professional experts, 
and parents' rights to choice of schools for their children with 
special needs, are limited by the discretionary power of senior 
management office-holders in the education authority who control the 
resources. 
The specialised discourses of experts and their discursive practices 
are organized and structured around their specific beliefs, their 
coded language systems through which their differentiated identities 
are constructed (psychiatrists, qualified social workers, etc.), and the 
professional organizations of which they are members and which 
authorise and regulate them, but within which they do not generally 
work. This gives rise to tensions between the ideology/discourse of 
the professional and the ideology / discourse of the agency within 
which he/she works. For social workers within the public sector, 
who have a dual identity as local government officers, there is a 
tension between the professional discourse/ideology of rights and 
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meeting client need, and the institutionalised discourse/ideology of 
the agency, the "business" of keeping expenditure down and the 
discursive rules through which limited resources are controlled. 
The rules that govern the internal practices of an organization and 
discipline its members are less easily applied to the professionals than 
to the non-professional workers lower down in the hierarchy. One 
example of the strict disciplining of manual workers in large 
bureaucratic hierarchies is the prescription of the number of 
wordsflines per day that word-processing operators are expected to 
achieve and the monitoring of this by supervisors. The practices of 
professionals and their use of time are less easily measured, and less 
easily disciplined by their professional supervisors who share their 
sense of professional mission. But all are subj ect to the 
position/authority power of those who control the resources and 
monitor their use. In the market economy, resource power dominates 
knowledge power. Within the organizations that are themselves 
institutionalised apparatuses of power, those who exercise power are 
themselves subject to power. All are enmeshed in the power 
struggles over resources. 
Within any institution (I will use the term to distinguish large 
organizations with formal structures and constitutions (rules) from 
smaller and informal groupings) identities and subjectivities are 
constructed in the language of its specific organizational discourse, 
through its hierarchy of position-power relations and through 
delegated authority. For example, in a local authority, managers and 
specialists are interpellated as "officers," "advisers" or "consultants." 
In addition, they are "recognised" by their specialised qualifications. 
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Their disciplinary power is both institutionally authorised and 
discursively authorised - a disciplinary power which they are not 
always too happy to recognise; social workers do not like being 
reminded that they are "agents of control." 
Since power is a function of organizational structure and delegated 
authority as well as of discourse, the field of power relations is 
always unstable as the various specialised/non-specialised, 
management/workforce discourses episodically intersect. At all levels 
in the structure, disciplinary power is exercised through the 
accountability of the agents, those who themselves exercise position 
power over subordinates and expert knowledge-power over others. 
The mechanisms of control are institutionalised in the "rules of the 
game," the regulation of resources, the rules that govern systems of 
promotion, etc. A duality of agency regulation and of professional 
autonomy permeates the field of power relations as organizational 
discourses and the specialised discourses and missions of a variety of 
experts and non-experts intersect and sometimes conflict. 
The power relations between health service managers and hospital 
consultants, between consultants and lower-ranking medical and other 
hospital staff working in the NHS, and between NHS personnel and 
government agencies, illustrate the complexity of the 
organizational/discursive field of power relations. Some of the 
players in the game are empowered by the privilege of professional 
position within the organizational structure of their authorising 
bodies, and also by their structural positioning within their 
employing agency which authorises their actions; Directors of social 
services departments for example. It is this privileging of position, 
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together with the knowledge/truth/right power of their specialised 
discourse and their professional network and alliances, that 
constitutes a powerful driving force, sometimes an oppositional force, 
in the multi-directional flow and fluctuating balance of power 
relations. 
Handy distinguishes between power, influence and authority. He 
uses the word influence to mean the use of power, 'keeping power to 
mean the resource behind it' and authority to be used 'when the 
power is legitimate and has some recognized official backing.' (Handy 
1985, p.119). He posits the notion of personal power 'Sometimes 
called charisma ... This power resides in the person ... It can be 
enhanced by his position or by his expert status.' It is 'brittle ... 
elusive fanned by success and by self-confidence and can 
evaporate in defeat.' (ibid p.127). I will argue that it cannot be 
ignored as a factor in power relations, difficult as it is to define or 
measure. I would link it with the energy/drive/force of the 'single 
prime mover,' the 'founding leader' posited by Mintzberg, whose sense 
of mission and drive to action influences and motivates others. The 
person with self-confidence and the ability to inspire confidence in 
others and fire them with the sense of mission - a quality that 
Handy calls 'Magnetism. The invisible but felt pull of a stronger 
force' (ibid p.135) - is something that we have all experienced or 
observed in outstanding political leaders, leaders of religious 
movements, and charismatic entrepreneurs. And we have to consider 
the extent to which the purpose of power is the exercise of power 
itself. John Kenneth Galbraith maintains that 'In all societies, from 
the most primitive to the ostensibly most civilized, the exercise of 
power is profoundly enjoyed ... power is pursued not only for the 
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service it renders to personal interests, values or social perceptions, 
but also for its own sake (Galbraith 1986, pp.216/217). 
Arguably, it is largely motivation and/or the drive to power through 
which individuals achieve the necessary agency position that enables 
them to influence, control or discipline others. 
Clegg argues that 'The two defining elements of any power system 
are agencies and events of interest to these agencies.' (Clegg 1989, 
p.213). The issue of agency and agents and subject motivation and 
affect are problematic in Foucault's work on power relations. (Barrett 
1991, pp.152-155). He perceives the exercise of power as intentional, 
'But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of 
an individual subject' or from 'headquarters' or dominant groups. 
While 'there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims 
and obj ectives ... it is often the case that no one is there to have 
invented them.' (Foucault 1979, p.95). Anthony Giddens posits that 
'Foucault's history tends to have no active subjects at all. It is 
history with the agency removed.' (Giddens 1987, p.98. quoted in 
Barrett 1991, p.153). However, while there are movements within the 
culture of a society that seem to come from no specifically identifiable 
source, it is arguable that one cannot talk about strategies through 
which power is exercised other than that it is exercised through 
'agency,' the instrumentality of agents. 
I have argued that disciplinary power is a rule-governed system 
exercised by privileged agents through the institutionalised rules, 
systems and structures of organized agencies and by the individual 
drive to achieve position power, as well as through the discourses 
and discursive practices of their specialised disciplines; that 
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motivation, drive, charisma and leadership are extra-discursive 
elements in the force field of power relations together with 
organizational/structural position, delegated authority, control of 
resources and access to sanctions; that these are sometimes in 
conflict with the discursive practices of the specialised disciplines 
which are at times in conflict with each other; and that in an 
unstable field of force relations, the power of the specialised 
disciplines is eroded by the resource power (control of resources) of 
agency managers and the state, by external or internal influencers, 
and by the market ideology. 
In the following chapters I will consider the application of these 
findings to the 'mission' and the power of the various agencies and 
agents - the specialised disciplines, the employing organizations and 
the 'external influencers' - in the field of child protection in the 
public domain; and I will consider whose interests are being served in 
their oppositional power struggles. I will analyse the ways in which 
organizations and agencies are enrolled, and common relations of 
meaning and membership are positioned within a relational field, the 
ways in which 'Certain fixtures of meaning are privileged, certain 
membership categories are aligned with those meanings.' (Clegg 1989, 
p.225); the ways in which internal and external alliances and coalitions 
are formed and the ways in which authorised agents and agencies 
intrude into the private spaces of "the family." 
To provide the background against which to analyse the contemporary 
power struggles in the field of child protection, I will discuss in the 
next chapter the historical development of the intervention of the 
state in the family and the changing construction of childhood. I will 
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introduce the discussion with an overview of Foucault's concept of bio 
power, the regulation of the body of the subject through surveillance 
and techniques of normalization, a form of disciplinary power which 
operates not only in such specialised institutions as prisons and 
hospitals but which is a form of power to which all children are 
subject through the state apparatuses of primary health care and 
compulsory education. 
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3. THE STATE AND BIO-POWER 
The intervention of the state in the family, and the development of 
what Foucault calls 'bio-power,' the regulation of the body of the 
subject through the apparatuses of the state and through the 
discursive practices of the human sciences, has a long history. 
Foucault associates this with the development of capitalism and the 
interest of capitalist societies in maximising the economic usefulness of 
bodies (individual subjects) and, to this end, regulating the health 
and fertility of the population. He links the disciplining of the body 
at the local and micro level with the operation of power on a broader 
scale. In this context, the family as the agency responsible for the 
reproduction of the labour force and the rearing of children becomes 
an instrument of political control, its child-rearing practices regulated 
through the apparatuses of the law and through the disciplinary 
power of authorised agents of the state. Foucault argues that the 
subjectivity of subjects is gradually and progressively constituted 
'through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, 
desires, thoughts etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its 
material instance as a constitution of subjects.' (Foucault 1986, p.233). 
Sex and sexuality are central to the exercise of bio-power, 'the 
exercise of power over life.' (Foucault 1979, p.133); the disciplining, 
normalization and subjection of the body, an 'individualizing' 
technology of power. Foucault posits the emergence of an 'era' of 
bio-power developing since the seventeenth century, with the 
'explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the 
subjugation of bodies and the control of populations.' He argues that 
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'the old power of death that symbolised sovereign power,' based on 
the right of the sovereign 'to take life or let live,' was now replaced 
by a power to 'foster life,' and to 'disallow it' only in the interest of 
safeguarding society. He associates the new form of power, 'directed 
to the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life' 
with the development of universities, secondary schools, barracks, 
workshops; and with the emergence of demography and concerns with 
problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing and migration. 
New fields of knowledge and the economic and agricultural 
developments of the eighteenth century decreased the 'randomness of 
death,' the threat to populations of plague and of starvation through 
famine. 'Methods of power and knowledge assumed responsibility for 
the life processes and undertook to control and modify them.' (ibid 
pp .135-142). This was the 'entry of life into history' as 'Western 
man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living species in a 
living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of 
life, an individual and collective welfare ... ' (ibid p.142). Knowledge-
power 'became an agent of transformation of human life.' As the 
right to life superceded the traditional right of sovereignty, a 
'proliferation of political technologies ensued' (ibid p.143) concerned 
with the disciplining of bodies and the regulation of population. 
Against this background, Foucault posits the emerging importance of 
sex as a political issue, 'tied to the disciplines of the body' and 
'applied to the regulation of populations, through all the far-reaching 
effects of its activity.' (ibid p.145). In every society, he argues, 'the 
concern with the sexual body' was linked with the establishment of 
bourgeois hegemony, with systems of marriage, procreation, kinship 
ties, transmission of wealth; a 'deployment of alliance.' (ibid p.l06). 
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Since the eighteenth centry, Western societies have developed and 
'deployed' a new apparatus, 'the deployment of sexuality' which has 
reduced the importance of the deployment of alliance, although has 
not superceded it. The two 'systems' connect up; but while the 
deployment of alliance is built around family, the reproduction of 
relations and the 'homeostasis of the social body,' the deployment of 
sexuality has developed through a 'progression away from the 
problematic of relations towards a problematic of the "flesh," that is, 
of the body.' (ibid pp.I06-108). 
Foucault argues that the inter-penetration of the two systems has 
given rise to a 'new tactic of power' in which the family and relatives 
have become the chief agents, with outside support from doctors, 
educators and psychiatrists. (ibid p.IIO). Psychoanalysis, he argues, 
by positing the parents-children relationship at the root of 
everyone's sexuality, has kept the deployment of sexuality coupled to 
the system of alliance. Through the technology of 'confession,' the 
incitement to speak of sex and loosen the hold of silence and secrecy, 
an 'endlessly proliferating economy of the discourse on sex' developed 
in the nineteenth century. (ibid pp.34/35). Sex became 'not only a 
matter of sensation and pleasure, of law and taboo, but also of truth 
and falsehood - sex was constituted as a problem of truth.' (ibid 
p.56). Foucault argues that sexuality 'must not be thought of as a 
kind of natural given ... It is the name that can be given to a 
historical construct' in which sex, the body, knowledge, truth and 
power come together. And it is through sex, 'in fact, an imaginery 
point determined by the deployment of sexuality -that each individual 
has to pass in order to have access to his own intelligibility ... to the 
whole of his body ... to his identity ... ' (ibid pp.I05,155/156). 
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Bio-power operates through disciplinary techniques, through 
surveillance, supervision and intervention, techniques of normalization 
and control. Foucault links the 'knowledge' of sexuality, developed 
through the nineteenth century, with governmental technologies 
articulated in the specialised discourses of the human sciences and 
exercised through their agency; and with the development of 
'pastoral power' and the welfare state. He posits that the modern 
type of pastoral power is derived from the Christian ecclesiastical 
form of pastoral power and its concern with the moral well-being of 
the individual and of the community; but the modern secular pastoral 
power is concerned with 'salvation' and well-being in this world, not 
in the next: 'in this context the word salvation takes on different 
meanings; health, well-being (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of 
living), security, protection against accidents. A series of "worldly" 
aims ... ' (Foucault 1982, p.215). This modern form of pastoral power 
is exercised not only by the apparatuses of the state but in a 
multiplicity of forms and institutions, between individuals and between 
groups. It is a 'tricky combination ... of individualization techniques, 
and of totalization procedures.' (ibid p.2l3). 
Foucault rej ects the notion of power operating only from the top 
downwards, the idea of the state as the primary locus of power, 
'sovereign' power vested in the state. He argues that power is 
everywhere, multi-directional, coming from everywhere and exercised 
in a multiplicity of forms. But he does not discount the state. He 
recognises the importance of the modern state in its political form and 
the increasing centralization of political power in the form of the 
state and its apparatuses. He maintains that 'in a certain way' all 
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forms of power relations must refer to the state 'not because they are 
derived from it; it is rather because power relations have come more 
and more under state control power relations have been 
progressively governmentalized ... in the form of, or under the 
auspices of, state institutions.' (Foucault 1982, p.224). 
Resistance, he argues, is an essential concommitent of power. He notes 
the struggles and 'oppositions' which have developed over the last 
few years; 'opposition to the power of men over women, of parents 
over children, of psychiatry over the mentally ill, of medicine over 
the population, of administration over the ways people live.' (ibid 
p.211). The struggles, he says, are not limited to one country or to 
a particular political or economic form of government. 'They are an 
opposition to the effects of power which are linked with knowledge, 
competence, and qualification: struggles against the privileges of 
knowledge an opposition against secrecy, deformation, and 
mystifying representations imposed on people.' (ibid p.212). 
Resistance and oppositional forces coming from 'everywhere' to 
challenge institutionalised power and the "traditional" ideologies, 
among them traditional familial ideology, are a significant feature of 
contemporary power struggles in our society. The effects of these 
'oppositions' were summed up in November 1992 in an editorial in the 
Independent newspaper: 'It is difficult to recall a time when so many 
British institutions were challenged as fundamentally as they are at 
present. The monarchy, the Church of England, the City, the 
judiciary, schools, local government, Parliament ... the list can be 
extended ... It is as if some tremor were running through British 
life .. ' (Editorial, The Independent, 28.11.92). 
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Challenges to traditional familial ideology, to the power relation 
between men and women and the power relation between children and 
parents are symptomatic of these power struggles. (Barrett and 
McIntosh, 1991). Within the context of structural and cultural 
changes, ideological shifts and new cultural norms, a changing 
concept of the child and the emergent ideology of children's rights 
has found expression in the progressive development of legal 
instruments for the protection of children, most recently in the 
Children Act 1989 which I will discuss below. 
To understand the operation of power and the power struggles in 
society today, the struggles against domination, exploitation and 
subjectivity, we need, as Foucault says, a 'historical awareness of our 
present circumstance.' (Foucault 1992, p.209). He argues that in the 
nineteenth century it was the struggle against exploitation which was 
in the foreground. Nowadays, he says, the 'struggle against the 
forms of subjection - against the submission of subjectivity - is 
becoming more and more important,' although these operate still within 
a context of continuing domination and exploitation. (ibid p.213). 
Before focussing on the contemporary power struggles around the 
parent-child relationship and the subjectivity of the child, I will 
consider the ways in which childhood has historically been 
conceptualised and the changed and changing construction of 
childhood. 
Phillipe Aries, in his study of the historical evolution of childhood 
over the centuries, suggests that childhood is a 'modern invention' 
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stemming from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Childhood 
became associated with ideas of innocence and weakness and with the 
need to discipline children, educate them, and prepare them for life. 
In earlier times very small children were treated as playthings and 
objects of amusement, young children were not differentiated from 
adults. Even in the seventeenth century girls could be married and 
in charge of households by the age of 13 or 14, although the period 
of childhood had by then lengthened more rapidly for boys. The 
reformers, Aries says, were primarily moralists rather than humanists. 
'The great event,' he argues, was the revival at the beginning of 
modern times of an interest in education, a recognition that the child 
was not yet ready for life at a time when a 'positive moralization of 
society was taking place.' The family 'assumed a moral and spiritual 
function, it moulded bodies and souls.' Aries links this 'extraordinary 
development' in the seventeenth century with the modern concept of 
the family, with its desire for privacy and identity. (Aries 1962, 
pp.396/397). He finds the modern concept of childhood and the 
modern concept of schooling originating in the ideas of the moralists 
and pedagogues of the seventeenth century. 
The question 'what is a child?' is, as M.D.A Freeman points out, one 
answered by adults. 'Adults impose their conceptions of childishness 
on beings whom they consider to be children.' (Freeman 1983, p.7). 
There is no absolute meaning of childhood. It is a socially 
constructed concept, the meaning of which has changed and evolved 
over time within different historical contexts, the contexts of different 
cultural norms, societal structures and economies. 
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Freeman develops a discourse of children's rights based on a concept 
of 'liberal paternalism,' with the law as the agency for reform. From 
a lawyer's perspective, he focusses on selected sites of child/family 
dysfunctioning, i.e. delinquency, child abuse and neglect, children in 
care, divorce; and he examines the notion of parental autonomy and 
children's autonomy. He argues that while in the first instance 
parents may be assumed to represent the best interests of the child, 
the recognition of children's rights - their right to be heard and 
involved in any decision-making process about their own lives -
should be inscribed in law. He assumes that the law would intervene 
only in the event of difference of opinion between a parent and child 
over 'matters of gravity or urgency,' which would presumably come to 
attention through the intermediary of a medical or social welfare 
agency. Where it could be shown that parents were not representing 
a child's views, or were representing views not in the child's best 
interests, parents could be overriden by a court. He argues, for 
example, for the intervention of the law over the rights of a baby or 
an older child to medical treatment that may be opposed by the 
parents, the rights of an older child to decide whether or not to 
undergo medical treatment, the rights of a child to be involved in 
decision-making about where and with whom s/he is to live. The 
Children Act 1989 addresses these issues, although it will continue to 
be assumed that in most cases, particularly for younger children, the 
interests of children will coincide with those defined by their parents. 
Freeman, finding Aries' interpretation of the changing attitudes to 
childhood not altogether satisfactory, argues that they can in part be 
explained as a response to changes in the economic organization of 
society consequent upon the emergence of capitalism and the class 
58 
structure. This, he argues, 'had profound effects on the bourgoisie 
and nascent professional class' and explains 'why the change in 
childhood affected boys rather than girls and why its impact was 
greatest in the middle-class ranks of society ... ' (Freeman 1983, p.ll). 
Considerable evidence is provided by Lawrence Stone of how attitudes 
to children have changed from the 'exploitative and authoritarian' 
attitudes of the sixteenth century when children were in total 
subjection to their parents and were subject to the severest 
disciplinary control and punishment; when whipping was commonplace, 
children were expected to kneel before their parents, fathers were 
able to control their sons' occupations and their children'S marriages. 
Among the poorer classes children aged 10 became apprentices, 
domestic servants or labourers. (Stone 1977, pp.166-171). Children 
were regarded as the property of their parents. Stone sees changes 
to a permissive rather than a repressive pattern of child rearing 
beginning among the middle classes in the 1870s, 'spreading to the 
social elite in the 1890s' and "'then, in the 1920s and more 
dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, spreading for the first time to all 
sectors of the population.'" (Freeman 1983, p.16. Quoted from Stone 
1977, p.680). 
Freeman points out that some of the earlier possessive aspects of 
parent-child relationships still persist today and also that changes in 
the relations between parents and children have not been uniform or 
progressive. The Victorian period saw the return of the 
authoritarian father-dominated household, the severe disciplining of 
children and extreme forms of sexual repression. He relates this to 
a revival of 'the Puritan concept of the innate sinfulness of the 
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child. ' Children regarded as the property of their parents were 
used by them for social or economic advantage. Among the wealthy, 
advantageous marriages were still contrived. Children of the poor 
were exploited for their labour. (Freeman 1983, p.1S). An ideology of 
male dominance, parental rights and family stability predominated. 
Social reformers were not always consistent in their views and 
attitudes. For example, Lord Shaftesbury, who was concerned about 
the exploitation of children as factory labour, opposed compulsory 
education which he believed 'infringed the right of a parent to bring 
up his children as he saw fit.' (ibid p.16. Quoted from Pinchbeck 
and Hewitt 1973, vol.li, pp.348-3S8). 
In the 1990s we have come a long way from the cultural norms of the 
"traditional" family and the parent/child relationships of the 
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century; from the 
socialising of children into total subordination to the dominant rule of 
the father, the total subjectivity of the wife to the husband, and the 
unquestioned notion of duties owed by children to their parents. At 
the same time, for many women and children the family remains an 
oppressive institution within a social system 'which consistently 
privileges a male breadwinner and a financially dependent wife who 
takes the primary responsibility for child care.' (Barrett and McIntosh 
1991, p.24). Physical violence towards women and children continues 
and occurs predominantly within the family. Nevertheless, there has 
been the beginning of a cultural shift in the last few decades, away 
from the unquestioned power of parents, and other adults, over 
children, the right to beat them or otherwise harm them, (although in 
1994 smacking children as a form of correction or punishment within 
the family is permissible; the caning of children in some private 
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schools is still the norm and part of the agreed contractual 
arrangement between the school and parents). While the continuing 
idealisation of the traditional nuclear family form persists, together 
with the privileging of the male in the discourses of the state and its 
agencies, in media discourses, and in traditional religious discourses, 
there is a significant move in the 1990s towards a generally more 
permissive society, the acceptance of alternative life-styles, and a 
recognition of the rights of women and children. 
Freeman posits that children today are not only freer than they were 
fifty or a hundred years ago, they have greater autonomy than in 
previous permissive ages. 'Yet remnants of earlier philosophies 
remain and ideas of the child as property rather than person ... are 
still with us.' (Freeman 1983, p.16). Freeman links 'the capacity for 
autonomy' with the concept of children'S rights. He argues that the 
treatment of children as persons with equal rights requires respect 
for their capacity for autonomy as they develop to become rational 
persons. (ibid pp.54-60). 
A notion of 'capacity for autonomy' does not prescribe total autonomy, 
an absolute of power which is an abstraction in relation to any kind 
of social order. The autonomy of adults is limited by what the law 
allows, by personal "resources," and by the cultural norms of the 
various social, occupational and religious segments of society within 
which we experience the world and construct our identities. We all 
live by rules, some of which are mandatory and carry prescribed 
penalties. Others are optional, but pressures to conform are 
considerable, among children as well as among adults. Personal 
resources, i.e. wealth, 'cultural capital, ,(1) physical and emotional 
health, intellectual ability, specialised knowledge, all relate to the 
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individual's potential for autonomy. The degree of autonomy an 
individual can exercise within the power networks that encompass us 
all may be seen as an indicator of the relative power the person 
"has." John B. Thompson posits that by virtue of their location 
within socially constructed contexts, individuals have different 
quantities of and access to resources and that their social location 
endows them with varying degrees of power, a 'capacity which 
enables or empowers some individuals to make decisions, pursue ends 
or realize interests.' (Thompson 1990, p.S9). So, for example, the 
'social location' of free subjects living in poverty, of black people, of 
people with physical disabilities etc. affords them only a limited 'field 
of possibilities' (Foucault) within which to pursue ends and realize 
their in teres ts. 
A child's social location, dependence and lack of 'resources,' and the 
meaning ascribed to childhood in various symbolic forms - through 
the law, the schools, the media, for example - all serve to "position" 
the child and to construct and perpetuate dominant/subjective 
parent/child and adult/child relationships. The discourse of the law 
ascribes both responsibilities and disciplinary power to parents; the 
responsibility to protect and care for a child, to provide for the 
child's health and education; and also to be responsible for the 
financial costs of a child's anti-social behaviour (Criminal Justice Act 
1992). The "rules" prescribed by law, cultural norms and the 
processes of socialisation limit the capacity of children for autonomy. 
Their subjectivity is constructed by the privileged discretionary 
power of adults to formulate the rules, and the power of sanctions 
which adults have over children, who are dependent on them for the 
basic resources of shelter, food and clothing and loving care. 
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Children are subject from birth onwards to the pastoral power and 
the disciplinary power of state institutions and the discursive 
practices of specialists in health, education, psychiatry, and social 
services, concerned with their protection and 'salvation.' Freeman 
argues that 'society's concern for the child is to be seen very much 
in terms of the child's usefulness to society'; that it is focussed on 
protection rather than a recognition of children's rights, and that the 
notion of protection is confused with the concept of rights. (ibid 
pp.18/19). He points out that there are different meanings associated 
with the word "right" and different possible interpretations of its 
usage. For example, there is a difference between the right to be 
cared for and to an environment which safeguards the welfare of 
dependent children, and the right of self-determination - the right 
"'to exercise control over their environments, to make decisions about 
what they want, to have autonomous control over various facets of 
their lives." To decide "what is good for themselves.'" (ibid p.19. 
Quoted from Rogers and Wrightsman 1978, pp.59,61). 
The Children Act 1989 addresses more specifically than any previous 
legislation the issue of children's rights, (2) not only the right to 
protection and to welfare services but also the right to be heard; the 
right of children who are deemed to be of 'sufficient understanding' 
to be involved in legal decision making about their future and thus to 
have some control over their lives; and the right to refuse medical 
or psychiatric assessment notwithstanding the making of an order by 
a court. The rights and the needs of very young children involved 
in legal disputes are to be protected by guardians-ad-litem whose 
function is to attempt to discover the children's views and represent 
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their interests. It is arguable that the objectivity of guardians will 
inevitaply be coloured by the range of personal as well as 
professional discourses they bring to their reading of a child's 
circumstances. As Judith Masson points out in her commentary on tne 
CPildren Act 1989, there is a danger that subjectivity in the form of 
preference for particul&r life-styles might intrude. (Masson 1990, 
pr·10/ 11). 
Recognition of the new status of the child was given by the Secretary 
of State for Health, Virginia Bottomley, in an address to a meeting of 
tl:te li&tional Children's Home in November 1992. 'Over the years, 
cl1ildren's status has ch&nged from being passive victims and 
recipients of services to people with rights as individuals; the right 
to be heard, believed, trusted - &bove all the right to be children.' 
(The Independent, 10.11.92). Nevertheless, the notion of 'sufficient 
understanding' and the 'best interests' of a child are left open to 
adult interpretation and the discourses of developmental psychology, 
social work and the law. There is no objective or scientific way of 
measuring 'understanding' or 'best interests' and a degree of 
subjectivity in any interpretation is perhaps inevitable. The 
discourse of children's rights addresses the power balance between 
children and adults, within and beyond the family; and, as Freeman 
points out, 'the protection of children'S rights may depend on 
infringing parental autonomy and family privacy.' (Freeman 1983, 
p.17). 
The current child care legislation addresses also the privileged 
discursive power and resource power of the specialised agencies. 
For example, the Children Act 1989 reqires local authorities to set up 
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a complaints procedure for consumers (clients), children as well as 
adults, both about the provision and quality of services and about 
the 'placements' of children in the care of local authorities. It 
addresses both the rights of children to protection and the rights of 
children to be involved in decision making about their environments. 
It privileges the power of the law over the power of local authorities 
and their agents, requiring the local authorities to satisfy the courts 
about the precise arrangements for a child that would follow the 
making of any order in the courts; and it requires that the court be 
satisified that in any arrangements made for or involving the child, 
the child's welfare is the primary consideration. (Department of 
Health 1991 (i)(a), p.1; Children Act 1989 Part 1 s.l(I). Section 1(3) 
of the Act provides a checklist of the matters to which a court 
should have regard. Although 'welfare' is not defined, the checklist 
indicates some of the relevant issues to be taken into account. It 
includes 'the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned, 
(considered in the light of his age and understanding);' (s.l (3)(a). 
The notion of 'age and understanding' remains subject to the 
interpretation and value judgements of legal discourses. 
A year after implementation of the Children Act 1989, a few children, 
invoking the ascribed power of the law, exercising the resource power 
of legal aid and legal representation in the courts, won the right to 
live away from their parents through the making of a Residence 
Order. Where such an order is made in favour of a person who is 
not the parent or guardian of the child, that person has parental 
responsibility for the child while the order remains in force (although 
the law imposes certain restrictions on the rights of the substitute 
parent, in relation to adoption, to changing the child's surname, and 
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removing the child from the country). (Children Act 1989 s.12,s.13). 
The child remains subject to adult rules and discourses. Moreover, 
while the child has been heard and involved in the decision-making 
process about how his/her needs can best be met, the decision 
ultimately made by the court may not accord with the child's wishes. 
The court's perception of the child's best interests and welfare takes 
precedence over that of a child or parent. 
For example, in November 1992, a 13-year old child who was in the 
care of a local authority wished to leave the foster home in which she 
had been placed, and return home to her father. Her father appealed 
unsuccessfully in the High Court against an order that had been made 
by the magistrates court on an application by the local authority. 
The girl was told by the High Court Judge 'that she was too young 
to decide her own future.' (reported in The Independent, 7.11.92). 
The Independent reported on the same day that an ll-year-old girl 
had won a court order allowing her to leave her mother's home and 
move back with the couple who had fostered her as a baby. (ibid). 
In each case, and indeed in every case, different factors have to be 
taken into account and an interpretation made of the situation. While 
the outcomes in particular cases are not comparable given the 
uniqueness of each set of circumstances, age does seem to be an 
abitrary indicator of a child's ability to know what is in its best 
interests. 
In terms of the Children Act 1989 a child is a person under 18 years 
of age; but an order placing a child in the care of or under the 
supervision of a local authority cannot be made by a court in respect 
of a person aged 17 or a person aged 16 who is married. (Children 
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Act 1989, part IV s.31(3». The "privileged" status of marriage denies 
the right of "protection" to married people aged 16 that is afforded 
to unmarried people of the same age. Masson points out 'the only 
interventions to protect a wayward older teenager ... would be 
through criminal proceedings or, if the person was suffering from 
mental disorder, under the Mental Health Act 1983;' circumstances 
which Masson sees likely to pose particular problems. (Masson 1990, 
p.68). 
Changes in the legislation reflect major cultural changes and shifts in 
the norms of social behaviour. The last fifty years have been a 
period of unprecedentedly rapid and extensive disruption, change and 
innovation. The development of sophisticated and accessible 
information technology and the expansion of the media have 
significantly and increasingly changed the boundaries between the 
public and the private in the last few decades. It is largely through 
the agency (instrumentality) of media discourses that the debate over 
children's rights and the problematic of child abuse has entered into 
everyday discourse. 
While there is no conclusive evidence on the effects of the media on 
attitudes or on their power to persuade, their power lies in their 
capacity to inform, to enter the private sphere, and to bring events 
and contentious issues into the public arena. (Curran and Seaton 
1990, pp.230/231). Their power lies also in their capacity to inflect 
meaning and influence public understanding through a selective use 
of language and emphasis in their discourses. For example, the 
press, television and radio, from their privileged position of entry 
into the private domestic sphere, have kept the public informed about 
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the workings of the Children Act 1989 through the type of cases 
quoted above. Children have been reported in media discourses as 
"divorcing" their parents. The use of this adult concept, the 
culturally defined meaning of which is to terminate a legally entered-
into marriage contract, was not only inaccurate and inappropiate, but 
it carried connotations of children daring to trespass on adult 
territory and of knowing better than adults what is good for them. 
A sense of moral outrage is conveyed in an article by a newspaper 
journalist commenting on these types of cases: 'no child under 12, 
however intelligent or sophisticated, is in a position to assess its own 
best interests ... no child over twelve is fit to make such decisions 
while in the grip of the social, hormonal and emotional turmoil of 
adolescence ... in the skirmishes of horne life, parents may be nearly 
as much sinned against as sinning The pull of birth and blood 
and genes is paramount.' (Angela Lambert, The Independent 11.11.92). 
I will return to this notion of moral outrage engendered by the media, 
and the effects of the media on power relations, in my discussion of 
the events in Cleveland in 1987. 
There is little, if any, reporting in the media of "good practice" by 
social workers or other professionals. The public is informed only, or 
predominantly, of bad practices. Undoubtedly it is in the public 
interest that these instances are brought into the public arena; but 
this selective one-sidedness has a powerful effect in constructing a 
negative representation of agencies and agents in general. The right 
of agents to be heard is often compromised by the discourse of 
confidentiality. Social workers in particular are victims of this 
negative media bias, both in the reporting of news and in fictional 
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representations, symbolic forms which are 'constitutive of social 
reality.' (Thompson 1990, p.58). 
The power of the media to select and to emphasise through language 
or other symbolic forms derives from its privileged relational 
positioning and its resource power, its technical and technological 
knowledge. This is not to say that all audiences are necessarily 
susceptible to a "preferred" reading of media textsJ3) The 
construction of meaning derives from the reader-spectator jtext 
relationship as the discourse of the text intersects with the range of 
discourses and the particular framework of reference of the 
spectator-reader. Nevertheless it is arguable that the media are 
accorded a high degree of respect and authority through which the 
public are led 'into an acceptance of the biased, the misleading and 
the status quo.' (Curran and Seaton 1990, pp.239j240). The power of 
audiences or individuals to answer back effectively, through letters to 
the press, or phone-in radio programmes for example, is relatively 
minimal. 
Many of the cultural changes in our society and the expansion of 
more permissive cultural norms since the second world war owe much 
to the technological power of the media, the power to reach vast 
numbers of people, to inform and to "educate" through various media 
forms, to disseminate information into the domestic sphere about 
cultural practices that had become, or were becoming, more widely 
practised and therefore "alright;" alternative sexual preferences and 
behaviours for example, parenthood outside of marriage, divorce 
without social stigma. 
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An educated and informed population is in a better position to make 
critical judgements and to question and challenge the institutions 
through which subjectivity is constructed and inequitable power 
relations are perpetuated. Since the second world war, the greater 
accessibility of secondary education resulting from the 1944 Education 
Act (whatever its shortcomings) and the expansion of higher 
education, together with educative media forms, documentaries on 
social injustices for example, have resulted in a generally more 
literate and articulate population. Thompson argues that thanks to 
the development of mass communication, particularly television, more 
individuals than ever before situated in a private domestic setting 









communication.' (Thompson 1990, pp.238-248). 
a wide range of 
information and 
He posits that the 
greater accessibility to information and the 'visibility' of events 
created by mass communication has 'uncontrollable consequences' for 
the exercise of political power. Media-generated information about 
the threatened closure of the mines in November 1992 provides an 
example of effective communication between the miners, the public and 
the state, and of the way in which the public voice can be articulated 
in opposition to the power of central government. 
Through their access to media discourses, and particularly television, 
children today are more generally "knowledgeable" about various 
aspects of adult life. What was formerly private and confined to the 
home has entered into the public arena. Thompson points out how 
through television, children have acquired a means of learning not 
only about events which take place in the public domain but also 
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those in the private domain, 'including those forms of behaviour 
which adults generally reserve for the back regions of the private 
domestic context.' (ibid p.245). Freeman posits that according to 
theories of child development, a child matures in 'competences, 
cognitive abilities and moral capacities' through a succession of 
stages. 'Research shows ... that children under ten to twelve years 
old lack the cognitive abilities and skills of judgement which are 
necessary for them to be able to make decisions about major events 
which could severely affect their lives But while the evidence 
about older children is not so clear, it seems 'that in both moral and 
cognitive development, many reach adult levels between twelve and 
fourteen.' (Freeman 1983, p.46). 
It is questionable how meaningful these 'adult levels' are and what is 
being measured against what in this area of the 'dubious human 
sciences' (Foucault), given the shifting ground of 'morality' and the 
broad range of adult abilities and irrational and violent behaviours. 
While the age of a child may be a useful distinction in relation, for 
example, to the need for adult provision of the basic welfare needs of 
nutrition, food, shelter, etc., it is inevitably an arbitrary and shifting 
concept defined by adults, largely through the powerful agency of 
the state which prescribes the age of 'majority' (the right to vote) 
for example, the age at which children's behaviour is criminalised, the 
age at which consent to abortion or marriage does not require the 
permission of a parent, the ages at which sexual behaviours 
(homosexual, heterosexual) are "legal." 
With access to a proliferation of discourses around sex and sexuality, 
children are more sexually aware, and they are more sexually active 
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at a younger age, than they were fifty years ago. The cultural 
climate generally is more sexually permissive; and at the same time 
the public is more aware, largely through the agency of the media, of 
the extent of sexual exploitation of children and their right to 
protection from this form of exploitation. Children undoubtedly have 
a right to protection from abuse and neglect and forms of violence 
and exploitation, including sexual abuse which positions them as 
sexual objects used for and subjected to the gratification of (usually) 
adults and predominantly male adults. Media discourses reinforce 
public awareness, forming or reflecting public concern, about the 
abuse of children and their right to protection. 
At the same time media discourses are exploiting children in idealised 
"happy family" advertisements which promote consumer products for 
adults and children with financial resources and "normal" happy 
family backgrounds, marginalising the poor and the disadvantaged. 
There is a parallel in this with the way media discourses promote the 
rights of women to protection from sexual abuse and violence while, at 
the same time, women continue to be constructed in various symbolic 
media forms as objects of male desire and domination, representations 
which play a significant part in the way meaning is mobilized to 
sustain relations of domination and the operation of power. 
The impact and after-effects of the second world war had a 
considerable effect on the 'social location' of women, on families, on 
education and welfare policies. The war was a cultural watershed 
through which attitudes to the institutionalised nuclear family were to 
change significantly and the needs of disadvantaged children were 
increasingly to become a matter of public concern and state 
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intervention. Women mobilised during the war to the armed services 
and to work outside the home were increasingly to resist their former 
domestic positioning and subjectivity, notwithstanding the post-war 
thrust by the state to the rebuilding of "traditional" family life and 
the ideology of the sanctity of marriage and woman's place in the 
home. The wartime experience of evacuation had revealed the effects 
on large numbers of children of deep and extensive family poverty 
and related deficiences of parenting. Concerns about the emotional 
and physical well-being of such children led to the post-war increase 
both in welfare provision and the surveillance of families by the state 
through its agencies. (Wilson 1987, pp.126-1S8). 
Elizabeth Wilson points out how changes in the subjectivity and 
positioning of women in society and within the family are related to 
the fluctuating needs of the economy (ibid p.7S), as well as to the 
specialised discourses of child care experts and familial ideology; and 
how this positioning is related to the extent of welfare provision such 
as, for example, the availability of day-nursery places for young 
children enabling women to work outside the home. (ibid p.97). She 
argues also that post-war social work, 'overwhelmingly' based on 
psychoanalytic theory, has played 'an expanding and highly 
ideological role' in reinforcing traditional forms of family life. (ibid 
pp.83/86). While this may be largely true, I would argue that it 
overstates the case in relation to current social work training and 
ideology and is symptomatic of the way that the media (the only news 
is bad news) and other symbolic forms misrepresent social work and 
social workers. 
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Many social workers have disassociated themselves over recent years 
from an extreme positioning within psychoanalytic theory and an 
unquestioning association with the discursive practices of such 
specialised agencies. They may draw on such theories and specialised 
discourses; but their eclectic training encompasses sociological 
theories of, for example, poverty, isolation and oppression and the 
alienating effects of these on individuals. Current social work 
training is greatly concerned with issues of racism, discrimination and 
oppression. 
pathology. 
It is concerned with power relations as well as 
It is also drawing on a more heterogeneous intake of 
students/practitioners from a wider range of cultural, socio-economic 
and educational backgrounds, even if still predominantly white and 
female. At the same time, the users of services are forming alliances 
and pressure groups and are becoming more articulate in resisting 
the power of the professionals and challenging their discursive 
practices. Subjects are resisting the processes of 'normalization.' 
Subjectivity is never completely formed. 
Resistance, like power, comes from "everywhere," articulated through 
the oppositional discourses of free subjects. It operates as a 
counter-force and instrument of change. Resisting the mobilization of 
state institutions to perpetuate "traditional" familial ideology 
through the discourses of the law, the education system, the welfare 
services, and the repeated rhetoric of "family values" in political and 
religious discourses, - the family continuously develops new forms. 
In the early 1990s a significant number of children aged around 13 
are becoming parents. Many young people officially designated as 
children are leaving the family home or the substitute home provided 
by welfare agencies. Young people are finding ways of opposing the 
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disciplinary power of adults. Many of them, lacking "resources, " 
become victims of a social system which protects young people from 
certain types of abuse and injustice but fails to protect them from 
poverty, homelessness and sexual exploitation by adults; a system 
which fails to meet their needs and protect their rights. As Foucault 
posits, while the struggles against forms of subjection and 
disciplinary power have come more into the foreground at this 
historical moment, they operate still within a context of continuing 
domination and exploitation. 
Against this background of cultural change and the continuing 
exploitation and neglect of children, in the next chapter I will discuss 
the professional, legal and institutional discourses of professional 
agents, health visitors and social workers, operating in the field of 
child protection; the legal discourses that empower them to intervene 
in the "private" space of the family, and the ways in which they are 
regulated by agency discourses and by the discourses of the law 
embodied in the rules and regulations of the Children Act 1989. 
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Notes to Chapter 3: 
(1) The term 'cultural capital' is taken from Pierre Bourdieu. (Pierre 
Bourdieu, Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. 
(London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). In the sense in which it is 
used here it refers to such factors as literacy, sophisticated language 
codes, entry into privileged professional and social networks and 
other culturally defined social advantages. In Bourdieu's usage, 
cultural capital is substantially acquired through education, and 
particularly through higher education. 
(2) The Children Act 1989 is a major piece of legislation in the field 
of child protection, inflected towards promoting the rights of children 
although the ambiguities of its language privilege the agents. In 
chapter 6, sections of the Act are analysed to illustrate the ways in 
which it seeks to re-align power relations between professional agents 
and parents/children, 
(3) Stuart Hall posits that meaning is constructed through a process 
of encoding and decoding, which he relates specifically to the 
transmission and "reading" of televisual texts. He argues that while 
the operation of encoding 'in the form of sign vehicles of a specific 
kind' will have the effect of constructing some of the limits within 
which decoding will operate, and will seek to enforce a 'preferred' 
meaning into the work of decoding and reading the text, this cannot 
be guaranteed. He posits three hypothetical positions from which 
televisual discourse may be decoded: a 'preferred' reading through 
the operation of a meta-code, 'dominantly defined and professionally 
signified ... that carries with it the stamp of legitimacy ... it appears 
76 
coterminus with what is "natural," "inevitable," "taken for granted" 
about the social order.' Secondly, a 'negotiated' decoding/reading of 
the text which, while it accords a privileged position to the dominant 
definition of events, makes its own rules and is shot through with 
contradictions. Thirdly, an 'oppositional' decoding/reading in which 
the viewer 'retotalizes' the message within some alternative framework 
of reference. ('Encoding/decoding,' in Culture, Media Language. 
Working Papers in Cultural Studies 1972-79, Edited by Stuart Hall et 
al. (London, Hutchinson in association with the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, 1980) 
pp.128-138). 
David Morley makes the point that viewers may engage in anyone or, 
at different times, in more than one of the processes of decoding and 
constructing meaning from a whole variety of texts in different 
genres, within their own 'frameworks of reference' and 'according to 




PROFESSIONAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSES 
AND DISCURSIVE PRACTICES 
The "private space" of the family, in whatever form, is intersected at 
many points by various "authorised" agents operating within the 
public domain. These agents are privileged by the knowledge/power 
of their specialised discourses; and they are authorised to act by 
their employing agencies which are "licensed" by legal statutes, the 
instruments of state power; Althusser's Ideological State Apparatuses, 
Foucault's complex of apparatuses and institutions with their 
technologies and instruments of control. 
The notion of private space, and indeed the concept of privacy, is 
problematic. Raymond Wacks posits that there is much confusion 
about the whole concept of privacy, and that generalisations about 
the privacy of the family are of limited use, even though privacy 'is 
often characterised, albeit with less precision than rhetoric, as one of 
the central and inevitable ideas of modern democratic societies:' 
(Wacks, 1980 p.176). Mary McIntosh points out 'The pervasive 
definition of the family as private ... As far as society is concerned 
the family is a private unit and what goes on within it is not a social 
concern.' (McIntosh 1984, p.236). She argues that there is a 
'unifying ideology' of the family, that notions of unity and privacy 
exist only in ideology, and that if the family is seen as private, 
differentiated from the 'public concerns of the state' the notion of 
'intervention' becomes problematic. (ibid pp.234-238). Much of what 
goes on inside families is, inevitably, not open to the public gaze. 
78 
But, as McIntosh points out, the state has become increasingly 
interventionist 'even by the very forms of its supports.' (ibid p.238) 
The state has legislated to itself a hegemonic right to intervene - the 
'right to take children into its care if the family is not thought 
adequate.' (ibid pp.234/235); although the first principle is that 'the 
best place for children to be brought up and cared for is within 
their families, wherever possible.' (Department of Health 1991 (ii)(a), 
p.5). The state invests its agencies and through them its agents 
with its power, the power it "has" which is always there even when it 
is not in action - or which, alternatively, may be regarded as always 
already in action; a power that draws on the knowledge (power) of 
the professional disciplines and authorises their disciplinary actions; 
a power that draws on their specialised discourses and contemporary 
truths; not a sovereign power but a hegemonic power, 
institutionalis~d and given material form in the law and in the actions 
of its agents. 
The privacy of the individual and the family is "invaded" by the 
state through its agents - albeit for the protection of the most 
vulnerable in our society even before a child is born. McIntosh 
points out that 'Legal restrictions on parental rights ... can forbid 
tpem even to give birth to their babies without medical supervision.' 
(McIntosh 1984, p.208). And then throughout childhood the 
individual is subject to the 'bio-power' of the agencies of the state, 
to surveillance and disciplining through the health and education 
services and through subsidiary organizations. Privately run 
playgroups, for example, themselves registered and monitored by state 
agencffl~ (local authorities), are expected to be alert to any indications 
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of child abuse or neglect or suspected inadequate parenting and 
report their concerns to "the authorities." 
The concept of "the family" itself in modern democratic societies is 
problematic, needing to be understood in its various contemporary 
formulations, a pluralistic rather than a unitary concept. The 
stereotype of the "nuclear" family comprising two parents of the 
opposite sex and their progeny living together in the family home 
persists in traditional ideology and in political and religious 
discourses. But in practice the family has been reconstructed, has 
reconstructed itself through the autonomous acts of free subjects. A 
wide range of alternative family forms and life styles pervade our 
society - single parent families, foster families, adoptive families, step 
families, childless families, single sex families; families living in bed 
and breakfast accommodation, families squatting, families in sub-
standard housing. 
The private space that any family enjoys, both its size and its qUality 
and its susceptibility to intervention by state agencies, depends 
largely upon its resources of wealth and property and its 'cultural 
capital;' and on the meaning ascribed to its social and spatial 
positioning - e.g the "at-risk" family, the "problem" estate; and on 
the ways in which space is geographically and politically organized so 
that the "chance" of residential location of the family qualifies it 
differentially for local services and strategies of intervention (~g. 
allocation to a social worker), since these are widely disparate 
between different local authorities. 
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The spatial organization of council housing often in small, densely-
packed units, poorly insulated against noise and outside intrusion by 
neighbours and others, sometimes heavily policed, provides little if 
any private space. The residents are more visible to the public gaze 
and more susceptible to surveillance and intrusion by 'a phalanx of 
professionals -' (McIntosh 1984, p.208), health visitors, social workers, 
education welfare officers etc. This contrasts markedly with the 
physical spaciousness of much privately owned housing whose 
occupants are less visible and less vulnerable and whose life-styles 
are likely to be differently interpreted by the agencies of the state; 
although also subject to agency intervention if the children are 
identified as being in need of protection. 
Our society demands the protection of children from abuse or neglect 
by parents or other adults, and believes it to be, or simply accepts 
it, as the ultimate responsibility of the state; a responsibility 
enshrined in the discourses of the law and exercised through the 
surveillance and disciplinary practices of a range of professionals. 
Dingwall et al. suggest that the most important source of identifying 
children in need of protection are health visitors, who have a 
universal non-selective responsibility to monitor the well-being of all 
young children and whose intervention is popularly interpreted as 
non-stigmatising. (An alternative interpretation of their role is that 
of 'policing.' see Donzelot 1980). At the same time, it is the social 
services departments of local authorities that command most of the 
power and resources in relation to child protection. (Dingwall et 
al.1983, pp.12-14). In addition, among the professional agents 
operating in the field of child protection they carry the greatest 
responsibility . 
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Paradoxically, there is a significant difference between the autonomy 
and executive power of health visitors and the greater accountability 
of local authority social workers, which arises from the different 
organizational structures and rules within which they operate. 
Dingwall et ale (Robert Dingwall, John Eekelaar, Topsy Murray) find 
health visitors operating within a less bureaucratic organizational 
structure than social workers and with a greater degree of 
professional autonomy. The power of social workers is limited by 
their accountability to their supervisors, and by the surveillance and 
techniques of control under which the supervisors themselves 
operate. Dingwall et ale argue that local authority social workers are 
held more accountable than health visitors to their supervisors and 
managers, since the latter are themselves directly accountable to 
elected members. (ibid p.110) The power of local authority social 
workers is limited also by the umbrella mission of the organization, 
beneath which different departments and disciplines work towards 
achieving their individual departmental and professional missions and 
compete for limited resources. 
The bureaucratic culture of the organizations within which they 
operate, their rules, systems and management structures, mediate the 
discursive practices of the social workers and other professionals. 
Dingwall et ale argue that while 'Professions are, in effect, licensed to 
create their own normative order Bureaucracies operate within 
rules created by others.' (ibid p.I06) The professional agents 
working within these bureaucratic organizations are subject not only 
to the discursive management rules but also to the politically inflected 
discourse of the organization's "charter." Service delivery is linked 
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with political objectives. Political mission and agency management 
practices impinge on the professional discursive practices of social 
work, including child protection work. Local authority social workers 
are enmeshed in a complex configuration of professional, political and 
organizational discourses, a multiple field of force relations within 
which they carry out their legally ascribed responsibilities and 
operate disciplinary power over subjects. 
The notion of 'the local authority' subsumes a number of professional 
discourses and a range of discursive practices through which its 
work, ascribed by statute, is carried out. The discursive practices 
of the professional agents are always subject to legal discourses and 
the rules of law. Notwithstanding the stereotyped representation of 
social workers having the power to intervene in the private space of 
the family to "take" children into care, it is ultimately only through 
the legal process and the authorisation of a court that this power can 
be exercised; through the power of the law institutionalised within the 
structures and systems of the courts and delegated to authorised 
agencies and acted upon by their agents. Local authority social 
workers as agents of the law are empowered and also regulated both 
by agency discourses and the discourse of the law. 
The Children Act 1989 is designed to help and protect children by 
imposing additional duties and responsibilities on local authorities and 
their authorised agents. They are required 'to provide a range and 
level of services that are appropriate to safeguard and provide 
welfare for children in need in their area.' (Department of Health 
1991 (ii)(a), p.7) At the same time the legal discourse imposes new 
limitations on the powers of the agency and its agents. For example, 
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the former Place of Safety Order, which allowed for removal of a child 
from the care of its parents to a 'place of safety' for up to 28 days, 
with no right of appeal or challenge and without evidence that the 
child was at immediate risk, (Department of Health 1989 (ii), p.60), has 
been replaced by the Emergency Protection Order. This places the 
child under the protection of the local authority for a maximum of 
eight days, with a possible extension of up to seven days if the court 
has reason to believe that the child concerned is likely to suffer 
significant harm in the absence of an extension. An Emergency 
Protection Order may be made only in a 'genuine emergency' when it 
is 'necessary to provide immediate short-term protection.' 
(Department of Health 1991(i)(a), p.51). The Department of Health 
Introduction to the Children Act 1989 spells out the responsibilities of 
the courts, to be satisfied about the specific conditions under which 
an Emergency Protection Order can be made and to give primary 
consideration to the 'welfare principle,' - i.e. that the child's welfare 
is the paramount consideration. Also spelled out are the duties and 
responsibilities of the local authority and its agents to whom an order 
is made; and the limitations on their powers. (Department of Health 
1989(ii), pp.60-68). 
The Act has given courts greater flexibility and clearer guidance in 
deciding what action to take; and the courts do not have to grant an 
order for which an application has been made. (Department of Health 
1989(ii), p3; 1991(ii)(b), p.5). Courts have always had the discretion 
to refuse an application for an order. In my own experience a court 
occasionally did so under the previous child care legislation, even in 
the face of the professional knowledge base of social work, reinforced 
by its own agency legal guidance and supported by other professional 
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discourses, educational, medical, psychiatric, etc. Such occasions, 
however, were rare, perhaps understandably so in the face of 
influential professional discourses and public anxieties reflected in 
media texts about serious child abuse and child deaths. 
The extensive use of Place of Safety Orders by local authorities, 
which could be obtained through a number of provisions under the 
previous legislation, was widely criticised. The Butler-Sloss Inquiry 
noted the 'somewhat heavy-handed' obtaining of a Place of Safety 
Order in circumstances when a firm agreement had been made with 
the parents of the children concerned, and commented that the 
'authoritarian intervention was premature and inappropriate at that 
moment.' (Butler-Sloss 1988, p.12( 44). On the other hand, there was, 
and still is, much criticism expressed in media discourses of the 
failure of local authorities to act to protect children, notwithstanding 
their statutory power to do so. 
The Official Guidance and Regulations relating to the Children Act 
1989 regarding the making of Court Orders (Department of Health 
(1991(i)(a) specifies the circumstances in which an Emergency 
Protection Order may be appropriate (pp.51-63) and stipulates the 
requirement for 'some evidence that the situation is sufficiently 
serious to justify such severe powers of intervention being made 
available.' (ibid p.52, para 4.30). The court has extensive powers of 
direction in the carrying out of such an order (Department of Health 
1989(ii), pp.64-65) and discretion as to its duration, subject to the 
maximum of eight days in the first instance. The Department of 
Health recognises that most, if not all, Emergency Protection Orders 
will be made on evidence provided by a local authority or by the 
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NSPCC and without the court having heard more than the applicant's 
side of the story (ibid pp.63/66). While the Act gives the child, a 
parent and other designated carers the right to apply for a discharge 
of an Emergency Protection Order, such application can only be heard 
at least 72 hours after the order was made (ibid p.66). 
There is clearly a tension between the need to protect a child from 
the abusive power of adults in circumstances that professional agents 
interpret as continuing risk to the child, and the rights of the 
parents or carers to be heard. In this complex area of power 
relations, the discourse of the law continues to define the power 
balance in favour of the professional agents. It prescribes their 
authority and responsibilities; and it accords them the discretionary 
power to interpret, and the discretion to act or not act. At the 
same time it limits their autonomy by making them subject to the 
interpretative and discretionary power of the courts. 
While privileging the agents to act in the interests of children, the 
Children Act 1989 also empowers children and parents in court 
proceedings that concern the welfare of a child. It requires that a 
child should be represented by a court welfare officer or independent 
social worker acting as guardian-ad-litem. It affords parents 'the 
right to immediate legal aid without a means or merit test in all public 
law cases involving applications for supervision, care, child 
assessment orders and, in any emergency, protection proceedings.' 
(Department of Health 1991 (ii)(b), p.8). It requires social workers to 
work in 'partnership' with children and with parents. (Department of 
Health 1991(ii)(a), p.6; 1991 (iii), pp.1/2). Social workers must listen 
to their views and must give parents a say in how their child is 
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cared for, even when a court makes an order placing a child in the 
care of a local authority. It requires local authorities to make 
information readily available about its services and to set up 
procedures through which parents, or other local citizens, will be 
enabled to complain and be heard about the services they get or do 
not get. The discourse of the law prescribes and authorises the 
exercise of power; and the law seeks to set the limits on what have 
sometimes been seen to be social workers' 'extensive powers to make 
draconian decisions on child removal' (McIntosh 1984, p.226) and their 
right to intervene in the private space of the family. 
Through the Children Act 1989, privacy and parental rights are 
mediated by legal constraints which require parents, or other 
caretakers, to be seen to provide a quality of care that will safeguard 
the health and welfare of their children. The law limits the ways in 
which they may chastise their children and the ways in which they 
may educate them. The law prescribes the rights of the state 
agencies to intervene and prescribes their duty to provide services 
for children in need. 
The right of intervention by the state and its agencies in family life 
for the purpose of protecting children has its roots in a series of 
Acts of Parliament: The Children Act 1948, the Children and Young 
Persons Acts 1933, 1963 and 1969, the Children Act 1975, the Child 
Care Act 1980, and the Children Act 1989. The latter, which draws 
together and simplifies previously existing legislation (Department of 
Health 1989(ii), pili) and which came into operation in October 1991, is 
intended to be 'about how we, as a society, believe children should be 
cared for ... It aims to help children in need get the best deal 
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possible, by providing services to their families.' (Department of 
Health 1991(li)(a), p.3). 
'Children in need' as defined in the Children Act 1989 is a new 
concept: children who need services 'to secure a reasonable standard 
of health and development,' which includes children who are disabled, 
(Department of Health 1989 (li), p.2); 'children whose health and 
welfare may suffer significantly without support from social services,' 
(Department of Health 1991(li)(a), p.7). The Act 'strikes a new balance 
between family autonomy and the protection of children,' (Department 
of Health 1989 (li), pili); between parental responsibility, 'the 
collection of duties, rights and authority which a parent has in 
respect of his child' and the 'overriding purpose' of promoting and 
safeguarding the welfare of children. (ibid pp.1/3). At the same time 
it seeks to promote the upbringing of children by their families. 
(ibid p.45). It empowers the local authority to 'step in to protect 
the welfare of a child - but only if the child's family can no longer 
do so.' (Department of Health 1991 (li)(a), p.8). 
The "mission" of the Children Act 1989 may be seen as: the provision 
by local authorities of supportive services to parents and children as 
a "right;" modifying the position/authority power of parents in 
relation to their children, while increasing their resource power in 
relation to certain professional discourses and discursive practices, 
through access as a right to supportive professional knowledge and 
legal representation; modifying the legitimate power of state 
agencies and the discursive practices of the authorised agents; 
increasing the power of children by recognising their rights as 
persons rather than as objects "belonging" to their parents. At the 
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same time the Act increases the rights and the responsibilities of the 
state, and its power to intervene in the care and upbringing of 
children through its designated agencies and their agents. 
Although the local authority has the responsibility for 'stepping in' 
to safeguard the welfare of children and to provide services, other 
agencies and other professionals are more likely to be the source of 
initial concern and identification of children and parents in need of 
protection and the selective services that the Act prescribes; health 
visitors and teachers particularly who are in regular contact with a 
wide range of children. Dingwall et ale found that the most 
important single source of referrals in their study was the health 
care system. (Dingwall et al.1983, p.13). They argue that 'What is 
important about health visiting is that all children are surveyed with 
the implication that they may all be equally in need of protection from 
adult irresponsibility.' (ibid p.232). Health visitors, however, no 
more have a right of access to a child than social workers or any 
other agent. If a parent refuses access, it can be achieved only 
through an order made by a court. It is the law, exercised through 
its agencies, the courts, in the person of its agents frequently lay 
magistrates whose only unifying discourse is the law itself - that 
"has" the power to order access and to delegate that power to the 
professional agents. At the same time, however, the discursive 
power of the professional agents, their discourse of risk, may 
influence a decision for compulsory intervention in the face of refusal 
of access to a child. 
Refusal of access, or non-co-operation with a health visitor, may be 
interpreted by professional agents as cause for concern about the 
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well-being of a child. It may bring into play an inter-professional 
alliance, either formally or informally "through the grapevine," and 
the possibility of compulsory intervention. Dingwall et ale suggest 
that informal communications, through which anxieties can be voiced 
without explicitly formulating a case as one of mistreatment, are a 
familiar feature of professional or 'bureau-professional' work in health 
care. This leaves agents free to act or not to act. (ibid p.114). The 
interpretation of behaviour and 'agency assessments of parents' moral 
character' (ibid pp.77-102), as much as physical symptoms of neglect 
or abuse, may lead to formal referral and intervention by the 
authorised agencies. 
Information derived from health and other agency records regarding 
family history and antecedents held by hospital casualty 
departments, paediatric and mental health departments, health visitors, 
social services departments may be shared by a coalition of 
professionals and interpreted as cumulative evidence of child 
mistreatment. Interpretation of behaviour, attitudes and a range of 
"symptoms" is part of the knowledge-power of professional discourses. 
Some authorities provide detailed and exhaustive checklists of 
indicators thought to be indicative of mistreatment. (Dingwall et 
al.1983, p.31). For example, one outer-London borough has a list of 
about 40 indicators, signs and symptoms which includes a number of 
parental factors such as a poor relationship with the parent's own 
father or mother, an unwanted pregnancy and request for termination, 
poor physical or mental health, marital disharmony, unrealistic 
expectations of a child's behaviour, excessive use of drink or drugs, 
t tc No single factor in itself is necessarily indicative of e c. e . 
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potential mistreatment. The list includes poverty and overcrowding, 
but it is prefaced by the statement that child abuse can occur in all 
social classes. Also listed are specific types of inj uries, repetition of 
injuries, inadequate, discrepant or excessively plausible explanations 
of injury, repeated absences from school or nursery, parents' delay 
in seeking advice or medical treatment, persistent reasons for not 
allowing a child to be seen, a markedly different attitude to other 
children in the home, aspects of the child's behaviour such as apathy 
or withdrawal, failure to thrive where there are good material 
surroundings and there is no medical illness, etc. etc. 
These indicators are known to the professionals whose mission and 
interest is the protection of vulnerable members of the population. In 
areas of uncertainty, the indicators in combination can be used as 
regulators through which an alliance of professionals may corne to 
reach a decision whether to exert their disciplinary power, whether to 
act or not to act. These "rules of the game" are a powerful tool 
that is "owned" by the agents of control. While action may be advice 
and the provision of services, it may be an application to a court for 
one of a variety of orders under the Children Act 1989. 
It is questionable whether the lists of indicators with their "fixtures 
of meaning," the rules of the game to which the professionals work, 
are generally known, or ever made known, to parents. Unless the 
rules are known, the 'partnership' which the Children Act 1989 seeks 
to promote between social workers and parents/families is an unequal 
partnership. Knowledge-power, position-power, resource-power, 
alliance-power, authority all "belong" to the professionals and their 
agencies, to be exercised in relation to 'events of interest' to these 
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agencies. Agency records may contain cumulative evidence of 
concerns about a child. The law accords the right of access to their 
personal records to both adults and children, the right to know what 
is being said about them and their right for information on record to 
be changed if it is incorrect (The Access to Personal Files Act 1987). 
This has gone some way to redressing the power balance, although it 
is subject to restriction if there are 'good reasons' why information 
should not be shared. (Department of Health 1991 (ii)(a), p.12). 
(Right of access to records is discussed further in chapter 8). 
The recording of information by social workers, the need for accurate 
facts and the legitimacy of opinion and interpretation, has long been 
problematic. "Facts" shared by a consortium of professionals 
involved with child protection may lend themselves to different 
interpretations according to the values brought to bear on them and 
the positioning of the participants. Events do not occur in a vacuum, 
interpretations are never value free. Professional judgements made 
about behaviour and about "unco-operative" parents are likely to be 
coloured by the knowledge-base of the professionals and their 
discursive practices as well as by other known behaviours of parents 
and by their social positioning. 
From their study, Dingwall et ale provide examples of the different 
interpretations put on the physical conditions of a family home by 
different professionals - a GP, a health visitor, a detective chief 
inspector, a social worker (ibid pp.55-70); and they suggest that an 
assessment of the 'moral character' of parents, drug-taking, inter-
personal conduct (especially violence between adults) and past 
deviance is central to decision-making in cases of suspected child 
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abuse and neglect. They argue also that there are two 
'institutionalized devices' which enable some professional workers to 
'prefer an optimistic reading of client behaviour' (ibid p.82); 
justifying behaviour in the light of the particular cultural norms of a 
family or local community, and excusing 'deviant' behaviour because of 
impaired 'capacity-responsibility.' (ibid p.86). 
While in some instances this may be the consequence of what they call 
a 'rule of optimism' (ibid pp.79-102), in social work discourse there is 
a "rule" of non-judgemental attitudes towards alternative cultural 
norms and 'impaired capacity;' while legal action and the removal of a 
child from its family is often seen as a last resort. There may be 
difficulty in providing evidence that will stand up in a court; and 
sometimes there is a resource problem if a court order is made for 
the removal of a child from the family home. It was not unknown for 
a care order to be made to a local authority under previous 
legislation and for the social services department then to be unable to 
provide an adequate resource or indeed any resource. There is now 
a quite specific requirement in the Children Act 1989 for a local 
authority to satisfy a court that the making of an order will be of 
benefit to a child, thus making the agency accountable to the court 
and leaving it with less discretionary power over its use of resources 
than under the previous legislation. 
Applications to a court for an order, or entering the name of a child 
on a register, is rarely, if ever, a unilateral action, the operation of a 
single disciplinary power. It is the consequence of a regulatory 
system of decision-making that draws together the discourses and 
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discursive practices of a broad range of disciplines, professional, 
managerial and legal. Specialised knowledge, hierarchical position, 
professional status, are privileging factors that affect power relations 
among the professional agents in a complex field of force relations, 
within which the agents themselves may be involved in power 
struggles and subject to disciplinary power. 
To illustrate the complexity of power struggles among professional 
agents and other interested parties in a specific site in the field of 
child protection, a case study based on the official Report of the 
Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland in 1987 is provided in the next 
chapter. The Cleveland affair is still fresh in mind among many social 
workers but there is evidence that its lessons have not yet been 
learned. The Children Act 1989, which was a direct outome of the 
findings of the official inquiry, seeks to prevent the recurrence of 
mistakes made by various agencies with responsibility for the 
protection of children under earlier child care legislation. 
Following on from this case study, sections of the Children Act 1989 
will be analysed in chapter 6. 
5. 
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A CASE STUDY. 
THE OPERATION OF POWER IN THE FIELD OF CHILD PROTECTION 
IN CLEVELAND IN 1987. 
The Report of the Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland in 1987 
(Butler-Sloss 1988) affords a paradigm of Foucault's idea of power as 
'the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which 
they operate and which constitute their own organization;' (Foucault 
1979, p.92). 
The main focus of this inquiry was the unprecedented number of 
place of safety orders applied for and granted to the social services 
department in Cleveland in respect of cases of alleged sexual abuse of 
children, and the precipitate removal from their homes of a large 
number of allegedly abused children. The basis and the justification 
for the orders was the interpretation by a Consultant Paediatrician of 
a physical symptom as indicative of sexual abuse; an interpretation of 
a sign supported by some medical colleagues but disputed by others, 
and questioned as a reliable indicator of sexual abuse by other expert 
speakers. 
Prior to the implementation of the Children Act 1989, anyone could 
apply to a magistrate for a place of safety order under the terms of 
the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, s.28. Most applications 
were made by social services departments of local authorities. It 
was up to the magistrate to whom an application was made to be 
satisfied that the grounds specified in the Act were met. A 
magistrate could refuse to sign an order if s/he was not so satisfied. 
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There was no requirement that a magistrate to whom an application 
was made should be conversant with child care law or social work 
practice. 
The Butler-Sloss inquiry found that of 276 place of safety orders 
granted to Cleveland social services department between 1st January 
and 31st July 1987, the majority were heard by a single magistrate at 
his/her home during the hours of court sittings. This was 'despite 
a clear understanding between the Clerk to the Justices and the 
Social Services Department that social workers would make these 
applications in the first instance to the full court.' (Butler-Sloss 1988, 
p.173). The inquiry found that the magistrates most often asked were 
those nearest to the office concerned, or retired and therefore likely 
to be at home (ibid p.174). The criteria appeared to be ease of 
access and availability. The social workers were exercising their 
institutionalised position power, their specialised knowledge power and 
a discourse of emergency to approach and, arguably, to influence the 
magistrates, contrary to the rules and discursive practices of their 
agency. 
A place of safety order was designed to give protection to a child 
who was considered to be at risk. It could be made on an ex parte 
application to a magistrate without evidence that the child was at 
immediate risk. (Department of Health 1989 (ll), p.60). An application 
for such an order could be made to a juvenile court or to a single 
magistrate. It was frequently a single magistrate who made the 
order. The applicant had to satisfy the magistrate that there were 
reasonable grounds, as specified in the Act, for care proceedings. 
(Children and Young Persons Act 1969, s.28(1). The magistrate's 
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decision would be based on the information provided by the applicant, 
on interpretation of the facts, on opinions informed by professional 
experience, and by agency and professional discourses. An 
applicant's case could be supported by other specialist discourses and 
by the professional status of experts such as paediatricians. Their 
diagnoses, opinions and interpretations of risk factors could be 
incorporated into and form part of the applicant's discourse of child 
protection. Magistrates were empowered by law to authorise the 
removal of a child from his/her family to a place of safety. The 
operation of this disciplinary power was likely to be influenced by 
the combined knowledge power and "truth" of an alliance of experts; 
and likely also to be influenced by the "always there" power of media 
discourses, if failure to provide the emergency protection applied for 
by authorised agents resulted in serious harm to a child. 
A place of safety order was a powerful instrument in the technology 
of power, discipline and control. There was no requirement for either 
parent or child to be informed in advance of an application being 
made for an order; and the child could be detained in a "place of 
safety" for up to 28 days. There was no right of appeal. Contact 
between the parent(s) and child was at the discretion of the local 
authority and could be limited or totally suspended regardless of the 
wishes of parent or child. A place of safety order was used to 
remove a child from a situation, usually the family home, where there 
was reason to believe the child was exposed to some form of danger 
or abuse. 
Child abuse is a "discovery" of the past few decades. In the early 
1970s it was not the dominant element in social work discourse that it 
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has since become. The overall responsibility for preventing and 
"managing" child abuse as part of their child care function has been 
ascribed by the state to the social services departments of local 
authorities. Public opinion, informed and formed through media 
reports of child deaths and the events in Cleveland and elsewhere, 
hold social workers responsible for protecting children from neglect 
and harm inflicted by adults. The "successes" of social workers in 
protecting children are not newsworthy and do not receive media 
attention. 
The Butler-Sloss inquiry found that there were procedural guidelines 
in Cleveland which provided a structure for professionals 
investigating suspected child abuse. There is no one single definition 
of child abuse. It is a culturally constructed concept which takes 
many forms. Concerns may centre on physical abuse (non-accidental 
injury), sexual or emotional abuse, neglect and failure to thrive, and 
on children living in the same household as known sexual offenders 
(Butler-Sloss 1988, pp.4,1l); also to sexual practices and references 
considered to be inappropriate in relation to the age and immaturity 
of a child. The signifiers and signs are open to interpretation and 
to the meanings ascribed to them by professional agents who are 
charged in law with the responsibility for the protection of children. 
While experts differ in their interpretation and in the weight they 
place on particular signs, (ibid p.189) certain signs and symptoms 
have come to "mean" child abuse. 
The procedural guidelines appeared to have been well understood by 
all the Cleveland agencies involved with child abuse and child 
protection. They included referral to hopital and examination by 
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paediatricians in cases where there was cause to be concerned about 
a child's injuries or general development. Prior to the events of 
1987 there were few cases of sexual abuse in Cleveland and the sexual 
abuse or suspected sexual abuse of young children was rare. (ibid 
p.57). According to police, social workers and health service staff, 
the guidelines on general child abuse procedures worked well and 
effectively. Inter-disciplinary arrangements and joint working 
between the main agencies in response to child abuse were considered 
by the inquiry to be satisfactory; other than in relation to child 
sexual abuse. (ibid pp.11,13). 
During 1985 and 1986 there was some concern about the response of 
the agencies to an escalating problem of child sexual abuse. A 
working party of the Area Review Committee, which was 'the main 
consultative forum for co-ordinating mUlti-agency response to child 
abuse ... ' (ibid p.47) had been experiencing difficulties in gaining 
agreement from all the agencies to revised guidelines. (ibid p.14). In 
June 1986 Cleveland social services department appointed a Child 
Abuse Consultant as part of their programme to give child protection 
a greater priority. (ibid p.14). The Area Review Committee was 
superceded by a newly formed Joint Child Abuse Committee which set 
up a working party, chaired by the Child Abuse Consultant, to re-
draft guidelines and make more suitable arrangements for dealing with 
the special requirements of child sexual abuse. (ibid p.14). 
A Consultant Paediatrician, who had arrived in Cleveland in January 
1987, was appointed chairman of the Joint Child Abuse Committee. In 
her previous post she had seen for the first time the 'phenomenon of 
what has been termed "reflex relaxation and anal dilatation.'" This 
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she had learned from another consultant paediatrician was a sign to 
be found in children subjected to anal abuse. (ibid p.14). The 
specialised knowledge-power of the Consultant Paediatrician and the 
meaning ascribed by her and some of her medical colleagues to this 
sign was subsequently to dominate the discourse of child sexual abuse 
in Cleveland, influence the discursive practices of the agencies 
concerned with child protection, and lead to power struggles among 
the professional agents. 
The Cleveland Child Abuse Consultant supported the interpretation of 
the sign by the Consultant Paediatrician - 'she had no reason to 
doubt (the Consultant Paediatrician's) diagnosis.' (ibid p.S1). She 
'believed in a structured and authoritarian approach to families where 
sexual abuse was alleged and saw the place of safety order as the 
method by which control was gained over that family.' (ibid p.174). 
Following an 'alarming increase in referrals for child sexual abuse' 
(ibid pp.17,19) in May 1987, the Director of Social Services questioned 
the Consultant Paediatrician 'very closely on her diagnostic 
techniques and was satisfied that she was confident of what she was 
doing.' Other doctors present at the meeting did not query her 
method of diagnosis. (ibid p.20). The Senior Police Surgeon, 
however, held strongly to the view that the sign was unreliable as a 
basis for the diagnosis of sexual abuse. He was supported in this by 
other police surgeons and by paediatricians who examined some of the 
children concerned and found no indications of the sexual abuse 
which had been diagnosed by the Consultant Paediatrician and her 
supportive colleagues. 
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In March 1987, the Senior Police Surgeon had not been allowed to 
examine a young child who had on two occasions made contradictory 
allegations about different perpetrators. On each occasion the child 
had been diagnosed by the Consultant Paediatrician as having been 
sexually abused. An arrest had been made on the basis of the first 
allegation which could not be sustained the second time as the child's 
circumstances had changed and the alleged perpetrator had had no 
access to the child. Charges against the man were dropped. A 
request was then made by a Police Inspector for the Senior Police 
Surgeon, who disputed the reliability of the sign as a basis for the 
diagnosis of sexual abuse, to be allowed to examine the child. This 
request was refused by the Consultant Paediatrician. The Senior 
Police Surgeon consulted a well-known colleague who supported his 
stand. It is noteworthy that the child was seen in the first instance 
by a doctor who happened to be a police surgeon and who was 
sufficiently concerned to consult the Child Abuse Consultant. The 
child was seen on four occasions over several months by the 
Consultant Paediatrician and each time the sign was observed and 
interpreted as further sexual abuse. On the final occasion the child 
was living with foster parents, which helped to convince the police 
that their view of the unreliability of the sign had been justified. No 
information is provided in the inquiry report of investigations into 
the circumstances of the child within her family except that the 
mother originally sought advice about the child's vaginal bleeding, 
which was of course a very proper cause for concern and might 
legitimately raise a question about possible sexual abuse. (ibid pp. 
14/15). 
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This confused incident was the beginning of a power struggle 
between professional agents and agencies, a struggle dominated by 
the alliance between two powerful actors driven by the certainty of 
their mission to protect the children, the Consultant Paediatrician and 
the Child Abuse Consultant. 
Between January and May 1987 a considerable number of children 
were physically examined by the Consultant Paediatrician and 
diagnosed as having been sexually abused. In March she diagnosed 
sexual abuse of three siblings, none of whom had made any complaint 
of abuse. This was the first time she had diagnosed sexual abuse on 
the basis of physical signs alone. She asked another consultant 
paediatrician to examine the three children and he agreed with her 
conclusions. Following a request for a second opinion, the children 
were examined by a consultant paediatrician in Leeds from whom the 
Cleveland Consultant had first learned about the physical sign found 
in children believed to have been subjected to anal abuse. Again the 
physical findings were confirmed and the diagnosis of sexual abuse 
was endorsed. 
During May the Senior Police Surgeon for the first time examined 
children found by the Consultant Paediatrician to have been anally 
abused. His findings confirmed his view of the unreliability of the 
sign, and the medical examination associated with it, as indicative of 
sexual abuse. At a meeting of a working party set up by the Joint 
Child Abuse Committee, positions became entrenched. The Consultant 
Paediatrician, some of whose diagnoses had been confirmed by other 
consultant experts, was firm in her viewpoint, which was supported 
by the Child Abuse Consultant. The Senior Police Surgeon was 
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supported by his colleagues who concluded that the police would treat 
the Paediatrician's diagnosis 'with a degree of caution.' Butler-
Sloss comments that 'Each group left the meeting with their 
preconceived ideas reinforced ... ' (ibid p.18). 
Following the meeting, the Director of Social Services signed a 
memorandum on 29th May, the main effects of which were (1) to 
exclude a police surgeon from making a second examination; (2) to 
provide for routine applications for place of safety orders in cases of 
sexual abuse diagnosed by a Paediatrician; (3) to suspend access to 
parents during initial investigations. (ibid p.18; p.65). This 
memorandum was largely the work of the Child Abuse Consultant (ibid 
P .18). Influenced by the expert discourse of the Consultant 
Paediatrician, the Child Abuse Consultant was quite firm in her belief 
in the validity of the diagnosis of sexual abuse (ibid p.82), supported 
as it was by some medical experts, even though it was disputed by 
others. She' did not recognise the importance of the dispute and did 
not inform the Director.' (ibid p.17). 
The Child Abuse Consultant 'occupied a position of some considerable 
importance and influence in a public authority.' (ibid p.83); and 
through her position-power and "consultant" status she dominated the 
discursive practices of the social work agency and even that of its 
most powerful officer, the Director of Social Services. The exercise 
of hierarchical position-power by the Director followed a breakdown in 
communication between the police and social services, and the 
polarisation of the two agencies over the meaning of the sign and its 
reliability as a signifier of sexual abuse. 
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The expert knowledge-power and status-power of the Consultant 
Paediatrician, her self-confident belief in the truth of the sign, the 
driving power of her "mission, " her alliance with the Child Abuse 
Consultant, predominated in this inter-professional power struggle 
between expert speakers whose common interest was the protection of 
children. The specialised discourse of the Consultant Paediatrician 
whose findings were of the most serious forms of sexual abuse (ibid 
p.84) was powerful enough to lead the Director of Social Services to 
say in a television interview that 'he had no alternative but to act on 
the diagnosis of the paediatrician.' (ibid p.21). In this force-field 
of power relations between expert speakers, a new "knowlege," a new 
"truth" of a particular and widespread form of sexual abuse of 
children, hitherto unsuspected within the agency, predominated. 
The Director's memorandum requiring routine applications for place of 
safety orders 'where the consultant paediatrician is of the opinion 
that there is medical evidence of sexual abuse' (ibid p.65) was a new 
development in the technology of power. It promoted throughout the 
agency a generalised "truth" of suspected child abuse based on the 
controversial medical interpretation of the sign. It overruled agency 
and professional discursive practices of investigating and taking into 
account individual family environmental factors and other relevant 
matters before removing a child from its family, unless the family 
situation was clearly identified as putting the child in danger. It 
marginalised parents and children and constructed parents as likely 
abusers. It disempowered social workers by its prescriptive and 
limiting formulation and language and it contravened their discursive 
practices of consultation and liaison between agencies. The rules of 
social work discourse were re-defined and the discursive practices of 
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the agency were re-constituted through this exercise of privileged 
hierarchical position-power. The specialist medical/paediatric 
discourse, operating in an alliance with the specialist social work 
discourse, dominated the discursive practices of the social work 
agency. The alliance dominated not only the lay discourse of 
parents but also the expert medical discourse of specialist police 
surgeons and other medical experts. The operation of disciplinary 
power, the removal of the children from their families, was legitimized 
through the law and the statutory power of the courts. Authority-
power, position-power, status-power, knowledge-power, the missionary 
drive of the 'single prime mover' (Mintzberg 1983), needed the 
ultimate power of the law to protect the children from what the 
expert discourse had interpreted as a severe form of sexual abuse. 
Western culture is preoccupied with sex, with sexuality, sexual 
relations and the sexual functioning of the body. As Foucault posits, 
'It may well be that we talk about sex more than anything else.' 
(Foucault 1979, p.33). Sexual discourses have proliferated since in 
the late nineteenth century Freud discovered the "truth" of infant 
sexuality and posited the link between the early life experiences and 
sexual fantasies of childhood and the sexual development of the adult. 
Attitudes towards the sexual behaviours of children and towards 
sexual relations between children and adults change over time as, at 
different historical periods, behaviours are re-interpreted and 
cultural norms are re-constituted. Sexual references, sexual practices 
that earlier this century could not be openly spoken about, have 
become part of everday language and experience, disseminated 
through a wide range of media discourses. The sexual abuse of 
children, particularly of very young children, is a recently discovered 
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truth. Since about 1984 many professionals have become aware of 
the need to recognise the existence of child sexual abuse, that it is 
widespread and that it occurs among all classes of the population. 
(Butler-Sloss 1988, pp.84,243). It is a truth about which the public 
have been informed and are kept informed through the media, often 
in highly emotive language and symbolic representations. 
Sexual abuse can take many forms; inappropriate touching, 
penetration, exposure to pornographic images, and group practices 
connotated as ritual sexual abuse. 
A definition of sexual abuse by Schechter and Roberge is widely 
quoted and is referred to in the Butler-Sloss report: "Sexual abuse 
is defined as the involvement of dependent, developmentally immature 
children and adolescents in sexual activities that they do not fully 
comprehend and to which they are unable to give informed consent or 
that violate the social taboos of family roles." (quoted in Butler-Sloss 
1988, p.4). 
The Butler-Sloss report notes that while recognition of sexual abuse 
of children is becoming more widespread, the subject undoubtedly 
presents problems for everyone. 'There is an emotional element from 
which no-one is immune' and a 'voyeuristic component arising from 
the universality of interest in sexual matters. ... Most people have 
some understandable unease or distaste for the subject.' (ibid p.ll). 
Investigating and dealing with the sexual abuse of children is a 
particularly difficult area of work for social workers and many other 
professionals, some of whom may themselves have been subjected to 
sexual abuse and suffered its long-term emotional effects. It may 
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impinge on the personal feelings of individuals in relation to their 
own sexuality and sexual identity, as well as evoking the instinctive 
revulsion of most adults to the very thought of sexual abuse of 
children. The inquiry noted how this area of work makes heavy 
emotional demands on professionals. (ibid p.216). 
There is, moreover, a frequent difficulty in obtaining the necessary 
corroborative evidence that will stand up in a court, to be used in 
the interests of protecting a child, when there are no identifiable 
physical symptoms or forensic evidence. Even when symptoms are 
present, a child's accusations against a particular adult countered by 
that person's denial may be difficult to uphold. On the other hand, 
when powerful professionals have interpreted a physical sign as 
abuse, a child's statement that slhe has not been sexually abused may 
be disregarded, as the events in Cleveland have shown. Adults have 
argued that a child may fantasise, that children have sometimes 
altered or refuted earlier accusations, that words may be put into a 
child's mouth (ibid pp.204/205); that allowing a child's evidence to be 
videoed and the video heard in court without the child being present 
to be cross-examined is unfair to a defendant. The language and 
status of adult discourses generally position a child at a considerable 
disadvantage. Against the dominant adult discourses, the child is 
relatively powerless. 
Proven sexual abuse is a criminal offence; but the disciplinary power 
of the police to take action through the courts against alleged 
abusers is regulated by the rules of evidence inscribed in legal 
discourse. It has been a widely accepted practice, and written into 
procedures for social services departments and other agencies 
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involved with child protection, that in investigating suspected sexual 
abuse, social services should work closely with the police. The police 
should be invited to attend case conferences and should conduct or 
be present at interviews with a child and/or parents. 
"Evidence" of 
sexual abuse may not satisfy legal criteria but may, on "a balance of 
probability" lead to a child being entered on the child protection (at-
risk) register; and subject the parents to the disciplinary power of 
the social services department, in order to ensure the provision of 
services to the child. (see case study in chapter 8). 
The physical examination of a child believed to have been sexually 
abused was and is generally undertaken by a paediatrician or a 
gynaecologist or a police surgeon, sometimes with one carrying out 
the examination and another observing. (ibid pp.218-224). Legislation 
prior to implementation of the Children Act 1989 did not require that 
the consent of the child or parent to a physical examination should be 
sought. During the investigations in Cleveland, photographs were 
taken, at the request of the Consultant Paediatrician, of the ano-
genital region of some children without their permission being sought 
and without consultation with their parents. Parents told the inquiry 
that they met with resistance and difficulty when they wished to 
obtain an independent medical opinion. Some were offered a second 
opinion by a colleague of the Consultant Paediatrician who supported 
her diagnosis. They were given no other option, which they found 
unacceptable. A number of parents complained that they received no 
advice from doctors or social workers about their right to another 
opinion. Parents were concerned that the Consultant Paediatrician 
and her colleague appeared not to be prepared to take account of any 
medical history, and that medication or treatment which their children 
108 
had been undergoing was not available or was ignored while their 
children were detained in hospital or placed in foster care. This they 
largely attributed to the paediatricians' concentration on and 
preoccupation with sexual abuse. (ibid pp.36/37). The discourse of 
the sign dominated power relations. Parents were marginalised and 
subjugated to the surveillance and disciplinary power of the experts; 
and senior medical professionals, police surgeons whose expert status 
customarily placed them in a dominant position in hierarchies of 
power, were subjugated by the knowledge-power of the specialised 
discourse. 
Although the paediatric discourse that set in motion the train of 
events in Cleveland was challenged by other paediatricians and by 
senior police surgeons experienced in the field of child abuse work, 
large numbers of children were removed from their homes and 
detained in hospital or placed with foster parents on the basis of the 
truth of the dominant paediatric discourse. Notwithstanding previous 
good working relationships between social services and the police, and 
organizational guidelines for all the agencies involved in the 
management of child abuse - systems, strategies, rules, procedures -
the internal alliances of professional experts developed into a field of 
force relations within which factional power interests over disputed 
truths predominated over the interests of the children and their 
families. Parents and children were denied the institutionalised 
right, limited as it was, to be heard; a right institutionalised in the 
discursive practices of social work. The rights of children and 
parents in all cases of suspected sexual abuse were constituted and 
limited by the alliance of professionals, with their technologies of 
control and 'normalization' (Foucault), their organizational power, and 
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the rules and procedures they themselves constructed and which 
became institutionalised within the organization. Individuals assumed 
to be abused or abusers were positioned as subjects, subject to the 
discursive practices and disciplinary power of the professional 
alliance; a power institutionalised in the law and exercised by the 
professional agents through the agency (instrumentality) of the 
courts. 
Power, as Foucault argues, takes many forms. It is not a "thing" 
that one group or one person owns and another lacks. It acts upon 
the actions of others within relations of domination and subjection. 
But arguably it assumes a materiality in the discourse of the law in 
that it can be "given" to authorise the actions that cannot be 
exercised without that given power. Professionals are "given" the 
power - through the apparatus of the law - to remove children from 
their families. They do not "own" that power but temporally and 
locally, at a certain time and in a certain place, the power to act 
upon the action of others is transmitted and received as the agents 
are empowered by the privileged status of the law. 
The power of discretion vested in the agencies under current 
legislation is recognised in the official Introduction to the Children 
Act 1989. Magistrates who are authorised to transmit the power of 
the law which separates children from their families, without which 
the power to act cannot be exercised, need always to be aware of the 
enormity of such an action, need always to be testing the assumptions 
on which their actions are based and to weigh the risks of not 
removing a child against the likely harm of doing so. Children need 
protecting from abuse by the bureaucratic practices of professional 
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agencies as much as from abuse or neglect within their natural 
families. 'The Act gives the opportunity to rethink practices and 
unless this is done there will be lost a rare and vital opportunity to 
improve the lot of children.' (Department of Health 1989 (ll), p.l). 
There is much evidence in the annals of child care practice of the 
harm done to children who have been removed from their families and 
failed by "the authorities;" children who have been placed in a 
"bed" that happened to be available and who have experienced a 
succession of unsatisfactory "placements." There is no always-
available supply of placement resources within which the needs of a 
particular child can be met. The knowledge-power of social workers 
and other professional agents who identify the needs of a child is 
regulated by the limitations of agency and external resources. The 
Children Act 1989 requires social workers and the courts to take into 
account the needs and the wishes of children and their parents when 
an application is made for an order; and the courts will need to 
know and to be satisfied about the resources that will be made 
available and the actions that will be taken to meet the needs of a 
child if an order is made. While the law empowers its agents, it now 
sets boundaries around their operations; but it still leaves its agents 
with the discretion to exercise emergency powers in circumstances in 
which it is believed (by the agents) that a child is at risk. The 
following case illustrates the way meaning may be constructed by the 
agents and lead to the operation of their discretionary power. 
In January 1992 parents were accused of suffocating their seriously 
ill five-month old daughter, on the basis of a disputed medical 
diagnosis known as Munchausen by Proxy, a manifestation of which is 
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a non-accidental form of harming a child by an adult in order to gain 
attention from doctors. The parents were cleared only after a post-
mortem examination proved that the child had died of a rare muscle-
destroying disease. According to media reports, while the parents 
were at the bedside of their child a few days before she died they 
were seen by police officers who said they had been told by a 
hospital doctor that the child had been suffocated or smothered. The 
mother was told that they, the parents, would be arrested if they did 
not co-operate. The father was told by a doctor that his other 
children had been taken away by the police. The parents were held 
and questioned at the police station overnight and their home was 
searched. Their other children, being cared for by a child minder 
while the parents were at the hospital, were woken from their sleep 
at home and taken to the police station late at night. 
The sick child died four days later. The next day a child protection 
case conference was held, which the parents attended. The two other 
children in the family were placed on the 'at risk' register from 
which they were only removed in July 1992. From February to July 
the parents lived with the fear that these two children would be 
taken away from them. The father is reported to have said 'We were 
treated like common criminals ... The Police could have done anything 
they liked and did. You would not think anything had been learned 
from Cleveland or Rochdale.,(l) (reported in the Independent, 21st 
August 1992). The controversial medical diagnosis, based on opinion 
and 'an as yet unproven technique' that was disputed by some 
medical experts, had in other cases led to trials and wardship 
proceedings. It subsequently became the subject of a working party 
set up by the British Paediatric Association. The knowledge-power of 
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medical discourse, even when it is controversial, still predominates in 
power relations between expert speakers and those who are subject to 
their surveillance and disciplinary powers. The at-risk register is 
part of the apparatus through which disciplinary power is exercised. 
The maintenance of child protection (or 'at-risk') registers by social 
services departments is a mechanism for the surveillance and 
monitoring of children who have suffered, or who are believed on a 
balance of probability to have suffered, abuse. It is also a mechanism 
of control, requiring parents to co-operate with the agency and with 
the rules of its discursive practices. Failure to co-operate may 
provide grounds for the operation of disciplinary power through the 
courts. Names are usually entered on the register as a result of a 
case conference decision. The attendance and representation of 
parents at case conferences varies widely. The Children Act 1989 
emphasises the importance of 'partnership' between social services 
departments and parents, and the departments are expected to enable 
parents to attend throughout case conferences {other than in 
exceptional circumstances, (Department of Health 1991 (iii), pp.42-44). 
In Cleveland, the inquiry found that in 1987 the practice varied even 
across different areas of the county. Of 175 case conferences on 
child abuse held in Cleveland between April and August 1987, parents 
were not in attendance at any that related to child sexual abuse. 
Within the social services department and other agencies, there was a 
view on the one hand that the presence of parents would inhibit the 
free exchange of information and professional opinions, while others 
believed that parents should be enabled to attend and that the task 
of the conference could still be achieved. The views of parents were 
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sometimes represented to the case conference through a social worker. 
In some cases, however, social work involvement had been only the 
securing of a place of safety order. Parents felt their views and 
circumstances were not being represented, ' ... they felt powerless to 
influence events.' (Butler-Sloss 1988, p.58). 
The discursive practices of case conferences are governed by formal 
procedures. A variety of professionals are brought together, usually 
by the social services department although sometimes at the request 
of other agencies, to exchange information about children who may be 
at risk of neglect or ill-treatment. Data on children and their families 
collected and held on the records of various agencies are shared, 
supplemented by professional observations and interpretations of the 
behaviours of the parents and children. It is a function of the 
chairperson to ensure that all participants who wish to speak are 
given a hearing, and to distinguish between facts and opinions. 
Judgements may be made about parents' lifestyles and moral 
characters, or about deviations from a subjective model of what in 
professional discourse is deemed to be reasonable, responsible 
behaviour; particularly if a family is already known to some of the 
agencies. The expert opinion of one professional, the meaning 
ascribed to certain facts and behaviours, does not always coincide 
with that of another. The discourses and discursive practices of 
different experts - medical, social work, psychiatric, legal, police -
confront each other in this arena of power relations. Decisions, for 
example decisions about entering a child's name on the child 
protection register, are sometimes reached on a "balance of 
probability" and by a consensus or majority of the participants. (see 
case study in chapter 8) 
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The possibility of parents influencing decisions, even if they are 
allowed (empowered) to attend, necessarily depends on the extent to 
which they are dominated/subjugated by the expert professional 
discourses, their specialised language, their privileged status, their 
knowledge power and disciplinary power. For parents, the purpose of 
the case conference may be seen as constructing them as abusers of 
their children and stigmatising them by putting their names on a 
register. Theoretically, the purposes of the register are to provide 
priority services and oversight of the child by social workers in 
consultation with health visitors and schools; to alert agencies 
(hospital casualty departments, GP practices) that the child has been 
abused and is deemed to be at risk, so that special attention should 
be paid - referral made to a paediatrician for example rather than to 
a casualty doctor if a child on the register is brought to a hospital. 
In the event, social services departments, which have the 
responsibility for maintaining the register and co-ordinating the 
services, have often lacked the resources to provide services or 
adquately monitor the at-risk situation, or even to review the need 
to keep the child on the register. It then becomes questionable what 
useful purpose the registration serves. It is seen by many parents 
as threatening, punishing and non-productive. 
At the same time it has to be recognised that the discursive practice 
of surveillance and the authorised power of the agents to act is often 
productive in fulfilling its protective function. Some of the parents 
in Cleveland were grateful to the Consultant Paediatrician and her 
colleagues for identifying sexual abuse that had not previously come 
to light. (ibid pp.39,40). At least one mother who gave evidence to 
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the inquiry approved of the taking of a place of safety order 
because her husband, the suspected perpetrator of abuse, had 
threatened to remove the child. (ibid p.41). 
This possibility, of a child deemed to be at risk being removed and 
his/her whereabouts then being difficult to trace, was sometimes used 
as a justification for a place of safety order. Another possibility that 
could have influenced an application for an order was of the child 
being "got at" and threatened with unwelcome consequences if s/he 
made or persisted with allegations of abuse. It is not unknown, and 
within my own experience, for children to retract. Many children 
who have been subject to sexual abuse are put under pressure from 
many sources not to tell, to 'keep the secret.' (ibid pp.6/7). The 
issues are often not clear cut and require the exercise of judgement 
based on knowledge, skill and experience and the weighing up of 
risks. Mistaken judgements occur in other professions; among 
doctors and other health professionals, for example. In the field of 
child protection, public reprobation, given voice through the media, 
has been heaped on the heads of those authorised to act to protect 
children who have failed to do so; but it is most frequently focussed 
on social workers even when other agents have been involved. 
Malcolm Hill points out that 'in the Cleveland affair virtually all the 
criticism for the making of so many place of safety orders in a short 
space of time was directed at the social workers. The role of the 
Magistrates in granting all those orders was barely touched on.' 
(Hill 1990, p.20S). 
Earlier public enquiries had been critical of social workers, among 
others, for failing to act promptly to secure the protection of 
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children. (Department of Health 1991 (iv). The "failures" of social 
workers in particular had been widely publicised through the media. 
Public awareness of children at risk and children in need of 
protection had been heightened through media discourses, 
particularly during 1986/87 through publicity given to the discourses 
of the NSPCC and Childline. Through their selective focus, the media 
had been, and are, largely responsible for the construction of social 
workers as scapegoats. In this climate social workers and their 
managers in Cleveland were anxious not be seen to fail children by 
leaving them in situations of risk; (Butler-Sloss 1988, p.84). These 
external influencers can be seen to have played a part in shaping the 
discursive practices of the social work agency. 
The Butler-Sloss report quotes Mr.Justice Hollis on the dilemma faced 
by social workers: 
"The Social Services, of course, always have a thankless 
task. If they are over-cautious and take children away 
from their families, they are pilloried for doing so. If 
they do not take such caution and do not take a child away 
from its family and something terrible happens to the child, 
then likewise they are pilloried; so it is a very difficult 
position they find themselves in." 
(Mr. Justice Hollis, quoted in Butler-Sloss 1988, p.85). 
The power to act to protect children from abuse is 'embodied in the 
state apparatus and in the formulation of the law' (Foucault). It is a 
power to which we are all subject within a culture and ideology that 
recognises the inequality of the power relations between the adult 
subject and the child. It is a power given to the agents whose 
mission is to protect but it is a power which may be abused. In 
Cleveland it was abused when place of safety orders were obtained 
even when a parent had agreed to co-operate with investigations, 
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when children were removed from their beds at night and from their 
families without the circumstances justifying emergency intervention 
of this kind, when children were subjected to intimate examinations 
and photographs without their consent when no allegations of abuse 
had been made, when parents were not told what was happening to 
their children and were denied access to them. Some parents saw 
the place of safety orders as a threat, to achieve the wishes of the 
doctors or social workers. (ibid p.40). The parents and children were 
powerless against the diagnostic gaze and disciplinary actions of the 
professionals. 
Even when the exercise of authorised power is productive in fulfilling 
its protective function, it always operates in a context of non-
egalitarian force relations within which the child, the parents, and 
sometimes an alleged abuser outside of the family, are subject to the 
dominant discourses, the specialised language and the discursive 
practices of an alliance of professionals who are privileged by their 
knowledge of the rules of the game and the strategies and 
mechanisms through which power can be exercised. They not only 
know the rules but they have also the privileged discretionary power 
to interpret them. Re-constituting the rules, and the organization 
of a strategic alliance around these new rules, was a significant 
feature of the operation of power in Cleveland. 
According to Foucault, where there is power there is resistance. But 
for a time the opposing forces seeking to resist the power of the 
dominant discourse and discursive practices of the organized strategic 
alliance - The Consultant Paediatrician and her medical colleagues 
together with the Child Abuse Consultant and the Director of Social 
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Services - were fragmented and relatively powerless. Resistance 
came not only from parents. There were doctors who disputed the 
reliability of the sign as evidence of sexual abuse; and doctors in 
different parts of England had been questioning the basis of the 
diagnosis since November 1986. (ibid p.137). Hospital nurses were 
overwhelmed by the large numbers of children for whom the hospital 
was providing a 'place of safety' and expressed their concern that 
the hospital resource was being misused by children who were not in 
need of medical or nursing care - an effect of the position-power and 
resource-power of the Consultant Paediatrician who admitted children 
to hospital without the proper admission procedures being observed. 
(ibid p.126). Senior police officers who supported their medical 
colleagues over the unreliability of the sign expressed concern also 
about the unusual source and nature of referrals coming to them for 
police involvement (ibid p.93). Magistrates expressed concern about 
the unprecedented number of contested applications for interim care 
orders - which could be made under existing legislation at that time 
(Children & Young Persons Acts 1963 and 1969) - following the expiry 
of place of safety orders, if the local authority had not had enough 
time to prepare its case for care proceedings; and magistrates were 
concerned also about the disputed medical evidence which they were 
having to consider in relation to these applications and by the refusal 
of access to some of the parents. These various concerns were not 
organized into an effective resistance. 
Some social workers sought to resist the demands of a paediatrician 
for an immediate place of safety order, especially when it meant 
rousing children from their beds at home and removing them to 
hospital late at night. One social worker who was told (instructed) 
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by a staff nurse that the paediatrician 'wished two children to be 
made the subject of place of safety orders' thought it was 
unreasonable to proceed with this at 10.30 p.m. She was told 
(threatened 1) by the paediatrician 'that she would have to take full 
responsibility if she chose not to act.' (ibid p.68). No power of 
discretion or reference to her professional discourse or discursive 
practice was allowed to the social worker. The memorandum from the 
Director of Social Services had "given" that power to the 
paediatricians. 
The children were powerless to resist surveillance and physical 
examinations at any hour of the day or night, sometimes woken from 
their sleep in hospital to be intimately examined. Not only were their 
rights as persons disregarded but their precipitate removal from their 
families and the physical examinations to which they were subjected 
when no complaints of abuse had been made arguably constituted 
child abuse. Children who were being sexually abused were made 
'double victims' (ibid p.7) by being precipitately removed from home 
rather than being protected by the identification and exclusion of the 
abuser which might have resulted, at least in some instances, from a 
thorough investigation of the circumstances. 
Some individual parents resisted the disciplinary power of the expert 
professionals through their own knowledge-power (knowledge of the 
channels open to them) and material resource-power (money). They 
consulted solicitors and were then able to achieve an independent 
second medical opinion. Some parents with legal advice arranged for 
their children to be made wards of court in order to obtain a second 
medical opinion, invoking the resource-power and authority-power of 
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the higher courts. Wardship was extensively used by Cleveland 
County Council in 1987 although they had not used this higher 
juridical power in previous years. In one instance, when the 
Juvenile Bench of the magistrates court refused to make a care order, 
the local authority made the children wards of court; an exercise of 
power unknown to or unavailable (because of cost) to many parents. 
The power balance began to shift as parents became organized and 
constructed alliances with 'external influencers.' Their 'collective 
organization' formed a basis for 'effective resistance. ' (Clegg 1989, 
pI9). The parents formed themselves into a support group with the 
assistance of a local clergyman and were encouraged to formalise their 
complaints and to develop appropriate strategies. The clergyman 
became the co-ordinator of the group and their public spokesman. He 
used the power of the media to publicise their cause. An article he 
prepared on behalf of the group was published in The Guardian. He 
used the privileged status-power of external influencers, inviting two 
Members of Parliament to meet with some of the parents to hear their 
complaints. Parents spoke directly to commentators in the press and 
on television, expressing their distress and anger. Public and media 
interest was intense both locally and nationally. Butler-Sloss 
comments, 'The press of course had a responsibility to cover the 
story and it was a story which justified and indeed required to be 
reported.' (ibid p.169). The media played a powerful role in the 
development of events in Cleveland. 
Media discourses served to displace the sense of moral outrage away 
from the "unthinkable" of adults using children'S bodies for sexual 
gratification, and on to the paediatricians and social workers 
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represented as threatening to societal values and the family. They 
were premised in media discourses as taking children away from their 
parents on the basis of a distasteful and questionable diagnosis. 
Social workers, periodically constructed in media texts as the 'folk 
devils' in the centre of a 'moral panic,(2} were positioned as 
scapegoats for society's anger and fear at what was understood as an 
attack on parents and the institution of the family. Some media 
discourses focussed on the Child Abuse Consultant and the Consultant 
Paediatrician, representing them as aggressive women using their 
power to deny the rights of parents, rather than as responsible 
professionals seeking to protect the children. It was not the 
perpetrators of sexual abuse on babies and young children who were 
being constituted in media discourses as the folk devils but the social 
workers and the paediatricians; and the problem was defined in 
terms of an attack on family life on the basis of a dubious diagnostic 
technique. 
According to some media accounts, it was expected that the technique 
would be discredited in the report of the official inquiry. In fact, it 
was not. The inquiry was of the opinion that 'undue weight' was 
given to the sign by the paediatricians (Butler-Sloss 1988, p.165) and 
that it was 'elevated from grounds of "strong suspicion" to an 
unequivocal "diagnosis" of sexual abuse.' (ibid p.243); but it did not 
discount anal dilatation as a possible indicator of sexual abuse. One 
of its recommendations was that consideration should be given to 
'inquiring into the significance of the phenomenon of anal dilatation.' 
(ibid p.247). 
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Meaning is constructed in the way language is used to define a 
problem. While much of the media, and the M.P. who raised the issue 
in the House of Commonms, defined the problem as injustice to 
parents and an attack on family life, the inquiry defined the problem 
as the sign used as proof rather than as an indicator, alongside other 
indicators, of possible sexual abuse. It is noteworthy that the 
Report of the inquiry constructed the issue that needed to be further 
addressed as the "management" of child sexual abuse rather than the 
causes or prevention of child sexual abuse. 
The media are potent external influencers with the technological power 
to bring "stories" in various textual forms to the public at large, 
using the professional expert power of language and imagery, and the 
privileging power of selectivity, to campaign and give prominence to 
certain aspects of a story. The inquiry found that the comprehensive 
coverage by the media was 'for many understandable reasons, to some 
extent one-sided' and that the media became a factor in the 
continuance of the crisis. (ibid p.169). The inquiry recognised that 
media people, reporters, commentators, editors, 'cannot be immune 
from their own feelings and prejudices.' and that sexual abuse 
presents particular problems for them as for everyone. (ibid p.168). 
Media discourses have campaigned in recent years over various 
injustices perpetrated against citizens by the actions of powerful 
agents, among them social workers with their power (authorised by 
the courts) to remove children from their families. The media brought 
the crisis situation in Cleveland to the attention of the wider public, 
often inflecting meaning by their one-sided emphasis on the 
powerlessness of the parents. The media continued to keep the 
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matter before the public throughout the inquiry and later through 
their comments on the Report. The ways in which the media 
constructed negative images of the Consultant Paediatrician and the 
Child Abuse Consultant, and inflected meaning through references to 
aspects of their personal lives, is critically analysed by Beatrix 
Campbell in her account of the inquiry and related events. 
(Campbell 1988). 
The privileged position power of other external influencers was a 
decisive factor in this force-field of power relations, notably one of 
the Members of Parliament whose attention was drawn to the 
complaints of the parents by the local clergyman with whom the 
Parents' Support Group had formed an alliance. The M.P. exercised 
his privileged power of access to other M.Ps. and to the Minister of 
State for Health, and his privileged access to the media. He had the 
drive to mount an oppositional power in this 'multiple and mobile field 
of force relations.' (Foucault 1979, p.102). Extra-discursive factors 
of media technology and the drive of a 'single prime mover' 
(Mintzberg 1983) joined with media discourses to change the balance 
of power. A climate of moral outrage developed as the public became 
aware of the events in Cleveland as represented in media discourses; 
representations in which the parents were generally positioned as the 
victims of an excessive operation of power by paediatricians and 
social workers. 
Parents complained to the M.P. about the allegations of sexual abuse, 
the removal of their children under place of safety orders, the denial 
of access, the lack of consultation and the fact that they often did 
not know what was going on. The M.P. became aware that the 
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diagnostic technique of the Consultant Paediatrician was being 
challenged and that sexual abuse was being diagnosed on the basis of 
the disputed technique and in some instances on the sole evidence of 
the sign; and that this diagnosis was being followed automatically by 
a place of safety order. He was concerned that children were being 
removed from their homes without a full assessment being made. He 
was concerned that children attending hospital for routine medical 
matters were being examined for sexual abuse. His concerns were 
brought to the attention of the House of Commons and he provided 
detailed case notes on a number of the families to the Minister. 
The inquiry report notes that not all the information provided by the 
M.P. was accurate and some was misleading. (Butler-Sloss 1988, 
p.167). Beatrix Campbell has challenged not only the accuracy of the 
M.P's information but also the motivation for his intervention which, 
she argues, was based largely on personal and political self-interest. 
(Campbell, 1988). 
On the 9th July the Minister announced in a statement to the House 
of Commons the setting up of a Statutory Inquiry. 
The parents, having organized themselves, developed effective 
strategies and alliances with external influencers through whom their 
domination by powerful professionals became a matter of public 
concern. 'Enormous concern was voiced not only by parents of the 
children involved but also by nurses, police, Members of Parliament 
and, through the medium of the press, the public both in Cleveland 
and nationally.' (Butler-Sloss 1988, p.1). The privileged position and 
status-power of Members of Parliament, the power of the media to 
inform and influence, and the moral outrage of public opinion entered 
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into this arena of power relations. The knowledge-power of the 
specialised medical discourse through which new truths and 
subjectivities were constructed was effectively challenged. In this 
field of multiple force relations the discourse of the rights of parents 
and children was 'a point of resistance and a starting point for an 
opposing strategy.' (Foucault 1979, p.101); a strategy that became 
institutionalised in the Children Act 1989. 
In the next chapter sections of the Children Act are analysed to 
identify the ways in which the discourse of the law now seeks to 
protect the rights of children and parents, linking the rights of 
parents with their responsibilities and moderating the power of the 
professional agents. 
126 
Notes to Chapter 5: 
(1) Presumably a reference to the investigation into alleged "ritual" 
sexual abuse in Rochdale in 1991. See Dennis Howitt, Child Abuse 
Errors. When Good Intentions Go Wrong. (Hemel Hempstead 
Hertfordshire, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992) pp.155/156. 
(2) The notion of folk devils and moral panics is taken from Stanley 
Cohen. (Folk Devils and Moral Panics. The Creation of the Mods and 
Rockers (London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1972). Cohen posits that 
'societies appear to be subject every now and then to periods of 
moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons 
emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and 
interests.' A 'gallery' of 'folk devils' is constructed. The media, he 
argues, 'have long operated as agents of moral indignation ... their 
very reporting of certain "facts" can be sufficient to generate 
concern, anxiety, indignation or panic.' (pp.9-16) 
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6. THE CHILDREN ACT 1989: 
THE RE-ALIGNMENT OF POWER RELATIONS. 
(Note: In the language of the Act, a "child" is a person who has not 
reached eighteen years of age). 
The Children Act 'seeks to protect children both from the harm which 
can arise from failures or abuse within the family and from the harm 
which can be caused by unwarranted intervention in their family life.' 
The tension between these two objectives, 'The Welfare Balance' 
(Department of Health 1989 (ll), p.5) is a tension which 'the Act seeks 
to regulate so as to optimise the overall protection provided for 
children in general.' These statements exemplify the underlying 
intentions of the Act, to address the rights of children and protect 
them from neglect and ill-treatment by external agencies as well as 
within their own families; to address the power imbalance between 
professional agents and families; and to control the use of legal 
instruments by the local authorities. The legislation 'realigns the 
balance between families and the State ... (and) also adjusts the 
relative power and responsibilities of local authorities and the courts.' 
(Masson 1990, p.6). 
The Butler-Sloss inquiry found that under the legislation in force in 
1987 some local authority social services departments were relying 
heavily on the use of place of safety orders in their child care 
practice. (Butler-Sloss 1988, p.57) At the same time there was general 
uncertainty expressed to the inquiry about the use and powers of a 
place of safety order and 'a difference of opinion among social 
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workers as to its meaning and the extent of control it gave them over 
the child.' (ibid p.174). While the discursive practices of some social 
workers in Cleveland were founded on this uncertain legal knowledge-
power, their specialised professional knowledge influenced the 
magistrates to issue the place of safety orders. It was these orders 
which empowered the social workers to act, to remove children from 
the care of their families. 
The actions of the statutory agents and the courts have to be 
understood within the context of the 'structure of feeling,(l) and the 
cultural climate of the time; a climate of general sexual 
"permissiveness" but uncertainty over the boundaries of sexual 
behaviours; and the feeling of moral outrage voiced through media 
discourses over child deaths and over the recently discovered truth 
of sexual abuse of young children - outrage directed towards the 
statutory agencies held responsible for protecting children as well as 
towards the abusers. The media act as indirect external influencers, 
their discourses affecting privileged professional agents as well as 
building up public opinion. 
The statutory agents, social workers who dominate the power relation 
between themselves and families/children, are privileged by their 
knowledge of the law, by their statutory position as agents of the 
law, and by access to its agents in the courts. They are privileged 
by the specialised knowledge of their discipline and by the 
specialised language of their discourses which only they are 
authorised to speak; and by their alliances with the specialised 
knowledge of other disciplines, paediatrics in particular. They are 
privileged by the authority of their agency and by their legally 
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ascribed power of surveillance, their professional "gaze." Yet, it is 
ultimately through the privileged power of the law exercised by its 
agents in the courts that social workers are empowered to remove 
children from their families. So, however inappropriately social 
workers in Cleveland (and elsewhere) may have applied for place of 
safety orders, sometimes 'an automatic response ... to certain sets of 
facts.' (Butler-Sloss 1988, p.228), it was the magistrates who 
empowered them. 
The Children Act 1989 seeks to regulate the practices of the 
professional agents and the courts through the discursive "rules" set 
out in the series of handbooks issued by the Department of Health. 
These are designed to provide guidance for managers and 
practitioners and to promote an understanding of the principles of 
the Act. (Department of Health 1989 (ii), p.(iii). The regulations set 
boundaries around the power of the professional agents and impose 
specific responsibilities on the courts and their agents. 
The Act is concerned with the welfare of children in their families, 
with children 'looked after' by a local authority, (Le. 'in care' 
through the making of an order, or provided with accommodation by 
the authority for a continuous period of more than 24 hours); with 
children living away from home; with juvenile offenders; with court 
proceedings involving children in private law disputes between 
parents and public law disputes between a local authority and 
parents. It amends previous legislation regarding children's homes, 
community homes, voluntary homes and voluntary organizations; and 
it makes provision with respect to child minding and day care for 
young children. 
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The Act covers a broad range of concerns relating to the welfare and 
upbringing of children. It 'brings about radical changes and 
improvements in the law and provides a single and consistent 
statement of it.' It leaves the courts and local authorities with wide 
scope for discretion and the opportunity to rethink practices; and 
'unless this is done there will be lost a rare and vital opportunity to 
improve the lot of children.' (Department of Health 1989 (ll), p.l). The 
detailed guidance provided by the Department of Health for the 
agencies and the courts was designed to help them 'steer a safe path, 
to understand the Act as a whole and not to lose sight of underlying 
principles.' (ibid p.iii) 
Within the broad canvas of this wide-ranging legislation, what follows 
will focus on these underlying principles and in particular as they 
relate to the concept of 'children in need' as Part 111 s.17 (10) of the 
Children Act 1989 defines it. This category includes children with 
disabilities and children suffering or at risk of abuse or ill-treatment. 
The Act requires every local authority, as a 'general duty,' to provide 
an appropriate range and level of services 'to safeguard and promote 
the welfare of children within their area who are in need; and ... to 
promote the upbringing of such children by their families ... ' (s.17 
(l)(a)(b). As the discourse of the law intersects with the discourse 
of social work and other professional discourses, it seeks 'to achieve 
an appropriate balance between the state's powers and those of 
individual parents.' (Masson 1990, p.39) 
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Judith Masson in her commentary on the Children Act 1989 points out 
that 'There is no definition of Welfare for Part 111 ... (and) Even 
when there is agreeement about children's needs there may be no 
duty on the local authority to satisfy them. For example s.17 ... does 
not require local authorities to take on an income maintenance role ... ' 
although there is '... considerable evidence that poverty is associated 
with poor health, poor educational attainment, employment problems 
and reception into care for children.' (Masson 1990, p.39). 
Local authorities are required by law to act in the interests of 
children who need services to secure a reasonable standard of health 
and development, including children with disabilities. In terms of the 
Act, 'health' means physical or mental health; 'development' means 
physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development. 
(s.17(10,11). It is as the agents of the law that local authorities 
have a 'general duty' to provide a range and level of services which 
are 'appropriate' to the needs of children in their area. 
Masson comments that 'What services are provided and the numbers 
they can serve would seem largely to be left to the local authority ... 
It will be extremely difficult to show that services are not 
appropriate.' (Masson 1990, p.39). The professional agents retain 
the discretionary power to make the rules, to interpret need and to 
determine what is appropriate; and the level of services provided 
remains subject to the limited resource-power of the agency and to 
the control of resources by the state. 
Schedule 2 of the Act requires that local authorities 'must take 
reasonable steps to identify the extent to which there are children in 
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need in their area'; and through the provision of services, prevent 
children in their area suffering neglect or ill-treatment.' (Department 
of Health 1989 (li), p.4S). Masson observes that 'The duties in Sched. 
2 Pt 1. are largely qualified, i.e. that the local authority shall take 
reasonable steps or make such provisions as they consider 
appropriate.' (ibid p.39); and she argues that even slight impairments 
may be significant for a child's long term development. (ibid p.41). 
In the discursive language of the Act, 'harm' means ill-treatment or 
the impairment of health or development. 'Ill-treatment' includes 
sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment which are not physical. The 
question of whether harm suffered by a child is 'significant' turns on 
the child's health or development 'compared with that which could 
reasonably be expected of a similar child.' (Children Act 1989 s.31 
(9)(10); s.10S). A 'similar child' is not defined. This begs the 
question of the way in which the notion of similarity is to be applied 
and how a 'reasonable standard' of health and development is to be 
defined. For example, is the health and development of a child 
living in poverty in bed and breakfast accommodation, or in sub-
standard housing in a run down inner-city area, to be measured 
against a child of a similar age living in a financially secure and 
well-housed family in a prosperous suburb? Masson observes 'It is 
not clear how reasonable is to be judged: by the standards of the 
area, by national standards, or by the standards appropriate for a 
developed nation.' (Masson 1990, p.41). She points out that some 
authorities may accept lower standards in relation to certain groups 
such as travellers, which may contravene the Race Relations Act 1976. 
The Department of Health Guidance and Regulations, Volume 2, states 
'The child's needs will include physical, emotional and educational 
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needs according to his age, sex, race, religion, culture and language 
and the capacity of the current carer to meet those needs.' 
(Department of Health 1991 (i)(b), p.5). Drastic measures and a wide 
range of resources will be needed to provide the necessary services 
to remedy the well documented ill-effects on the health and 
development of children marginalised by their ethnicity and those 
living in poverty and insecurity. 
The Act specifies the range of services local authorities must provide 
'as they consider appropriate' for children in need who live with 
their families, including services to disabled children to minimise the 
effect of their disabilities and 'to give such children the chance to 
lead lives which are as normal as possible.' (s.17 (10)(11); Department 
of Health 1989 (li), p.46). The Act requires local authorities to take 
'reasonable steps' through the provision of services to reduce the 
need for court proceedings; and they may take disciplinary action 
only through an order made by a court and only when a court is 
satisfied that the explicit conditions for making a specific order have 
been met. (Department of Health 1989 (li), pp.45-46, 60-71). 
The legislative discourse is prescriptive of the duties it imposes on 
its agents, the local authorities, including a general power of 
surveillance in order to identify children who are in need of services; 
but it leaves a wide margin for interpretation and the exercise of 
discretion, and consequently for the way in which an agency will 
exercise its legislative powers. The Act is a discourse of 
'reasonableness;' reasonable standards of development, the taking of 
reasonable steps and the provision of appropriate (reasonable) 
services. While the Act is specific in defining "health" to mean 
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physical and mental health, and "development" to mean physical, 
intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development, it leaves 
open to interpretation and a variety of readings the notion of a 
'reasonable' standard of health and development, and what constitutes 
an 'appropriate range and level of services.' Given that local 
authorities operate within limited resources and that their statutory 
duties extend to all age-groups of the population and a variety of 
needs, rationing of resources is inevitable. It is then questionable 
to what extent local authorities may realistically be able to provide an 
'appropriate' range and level of services for all children 'in need' 
within their families, however restricted the definitions of 
'appropriate' and 'need.' 
The reading of 'need' and 'appropriate' depends on the position and 
interest of the "reader" - parents and children as self-interested 
subjects; resource holders/rationers-providers seeking to satisfy a 
range of sometimes conflicting organizational interests; elected 
members regulated by party-political interests and sometimes 
motivated by self-interest as well as by the mission of "service." 
While the Act seeks to regulate a more egalitarian interaction between 
professionals and users of services, promoting 'partnership' and the 
rights of children and of parents, the ambiguity of its language 
threatens this "reality." Its discretionary element and the wide scope 
it leaves for interpretation privileges professional discourses. But the 
discursive practices of professional agents remain subject to the 
privileged position-power and resource-power of agency managers and 
policy makers who prioritise and ration resources. These other 
interests intersect with the specialised knowledge-power of the 
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professionals who read and interpret the signifiers of need and 
"know" what action is appropriate to meet that need. 
Various interest groups may interpret both the text of the Children 
Act 1989 and the provision of services by its agents in different 
ways. For example, what in the spirit of the Act is intended by local 
authority agents to be 'sympathetic support and sensitive 
intervention' (Department of Health 1991 (i)(b), p.6) may be 
experienced by parents and/or children as interference and 
stigmatising, and as threatening to their cultural norms - "travelling" 
families or some ethnic groups for example; groups who are grossly 
under-represented among professional agents and policy makers, and 
over-represented among social work clients. 
While there is a specific duty for local authorities to take account of 
the race, religion, culture and language of a child in need 
(Department of Health 1991 (i)(a), p.l) and for 'full consideration' to 
be given to the views of parents and children (Department of Health 
1991 (i)(b) p.lS), there is an overriding duty imposed on parents to 
co-operate with the local authority. If the language or behaviour of 
parents is interpreted by the professional agents as being 
'uncooperative' (Department of Health 1989 (li), p.7), the Act empowers 
a local authority to apply to a court for a Child Assessment Order. 
Failure to co-operate, for example by refusing access to a child about 
whose safety or well-being there is professional concern, can lead to 
an application by a local authority or 'authorised person' for a Child 
Assessment Order (s.43), which may be effective for up to seven days. 
The applicant, not the court, must have 'reasonable cause to suspect 
that the child is suffering, or is likely to suffer significant harm.' 
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Masson comments 'It would appear that there is a duty to investigate 
every allegation unless it is thought to be unfounded, or the harm 
suggested is not significant.' (Masson 1990, p.106) 
The discourse of the Act seeks to promote the rights of the child to 
exercise choice and discretionary power. For example, a child of 
'sufficient understanding to make an informed decision' may refuse to 
submit to a medical or psychiatric examination or other assessment 
(s.43 (8). 'However, it is not exactly clear what a young person must 
understand in order to establish that he has the maturity to refuse 
an assessment.' (Masson 1990, p.94). The indications are that 
discretionary power and the power to interpret seems likely to remain 
the prerogative of the professional agents and the courts. For 
example, in July 1992 an anorexic girl aged 16 was medically treated 
against her own wishes following a ruling by the Court of Appeal. 
The case received wide media coverage. 
Outside observers are likely to interpret social behaviours and 
standards of health and development according to their own social 
and cultural norms and ideological discourses. Families receiving 
social work services are stigmatised by some outsiders as inadequate; 
by others they are seen as socially disadvantaged. A working party 
set up in 1980 by the National Institute for Social work, under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Peter M. Barclay, found that 'the public very 
generally feel that social workers are for "people of a certain kind", 
people who cannot fend for themselves, people often who are 
unpopular with their neighbours.' (Barclay 1982, p.149). The Children 
Act 1989 positions social services departments as monitors of all 
families with children, with a generalised duty to identify children in 
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need in their area, to provide services appropriate to their needs, 
and to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children, not only 
'those of a certain kind.' The Act 'recognises that children are best 
brought up within their families wherever possible.' (Department of 
Health 1991 (ii)(a), p.4); an ideological position based on the concept 
of 'the value of the natural family' with which some social workers, 
and some other professional agents, would not necessarily agree. As 
Masson points out, 'it is well established that the views of individual 
social workers (and their managers) differ, particularly in relation to 
the value of the natural family and the consequences of entering local 
authority care.' (Masson 1990, p.39). 
While their knowledge-power may privilege social workers in their 
direct relations with users of services, their power is limited by the 
constraints of their agencies. They are subject to the rules of the 
agency and the disciplinary power of their managers. (as evidenced 
in the case studies in chapters 5 and 8). Within the agencies there 
is often disagreement over interpretation and diagnosis; and the 
agents are caught up in inter-disciplinary professional power 
struggles, ideological power struggles and struggles over access to 
limited resources. 
The agencies that are required by law to provide the services to 
children in need and their families are subject to the control of 
resources by central government. The power of the state both to 
legislate and to control the level of resources limits the power of the 
agencies and their professional agents, the social workers, to provide 
the 'appropriate' services. It is questionable whether within their 
limited resources local authorities will be able to, or will necessarily 
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give priority to, identifying, let alone meeting, the needs of all 
children in their area. While the Act proposes a hegemonic strategy 
of partnership between parents and professional agents, and of co-
operation between local authorities and other agencies, resource 
allocation at one level is determined within and among the agencies 
through power struggles between different interest groups - social 
work, health care, education, housing etc. At another level, the 
agents in direct relationship with users of services, children in need, 
frail elderly people, people with physical disabilities etc., are 
competing for 
another level 
scarce resources for their 
resources are controlled 
individual clients. At 
by central government 
restrictions on local authority spending and on government allocations 
to various services. The resources on which the provision of 
services depends are controlled and administered by bureaucratic and 
compartmentalised state agencies, within which different departments 
operating from a more or less privileged power base, often related to 
what is politically fashionable, debate what is 'reasonable' and compete 
for their share of the financial cake. 
Some local authorities, for example, may consider the provision of 
daycare (provided by social services departments) for the children of 
families living in temporary bed-and-breakfast accommodation 
(provided by housing departments) to be an 'appropriate range and 
level of service,' and to provide for a 'reasonable' standard of health 
and development. Many families living in such circumstances, as well 
as many social workers, health workers and outside observers -
sometimes for different reasons - would not agree. Each local 
authority, and each department, has the privileged discretionary 
power of managing its available resources and of determining its 
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priorities in what is an inevitable rationing system. But the state has 
an overriding power to control what is available - control of the 
receipts held by the local authorities from the sale of housing stock, 
for example - and consequently to limit the power of the local 
authorities. Users of services may be involved in 'partnership' with 
the local authorities through organized group consultations with the 
professional agents over the provision and "quality" of services, and 
their views may be 'taken into account;' but the local authority 
managers exercise their privileged position-power to make policy 
decisions about the overall allocation of their limited resources -
about the provision of different types of daycare, about charging for 
services, etc., about which "client groups" will get what; while their 
power to provide services is overridingly dominated by government 
policies and resource-power. 
The Children Act 1989 achieves a small dilution of professional 
privilege rather than partnership. The concept of partnership 
signifies a power equilibrium, not necessarily between equals, but at 
least with an element of choice for both partners. The choice 
available to potential users of services depends on the professional 
interpretation of 'need' and their privileged power to differentiate 
between choice and need. Unwilling users of services have no choice; 
professional agents are privileged by the power ascribed to them as 
agents of the law to intervene in the lives of children and families 
without their consent. The knowledge-power of professional agents, 
their discursive practices and alliances, their resource rationing 
power, their legalised surveillance/disciplinary power, their 
interpretative and discretionary power, position them in a relation of 
privilege/disadvantage with individual users or potential users of 
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services; services over which the authorised agencies have control, 
which they ration and which they may impose on reluctant recipients. 
Moreover, since the law requires parents to be co-operative with its 
authorised agents, agencies have the privileged power of recourse to 
the courts if they interpret behaviour as 'uncooperative.' 
Agencies, moreover, have a local monopoly of services, allowing for no 
freedom of choice for users. While choice on the open market is 
limited by what providers make available and by the purchasing 
ability (resource-power) of consumers, it is possible for customers in 
the market to make choices about where they will take their custom 
and purchase, or not purchase, the available services or commodities 
of which they perceive themselves to be in need. No such choice is 
available to local authority 'customers,' who have access only to the 
services of the local authority within which they live, or who are 
disadvantaged by the local lack of services for which they perceive 
themselves to be in need. As the Barclay Report notes, 'The agency 
is usually a "monopoly supplier" and market forces cannot operate.' 
(Barclay 1982, p.187). While the agencies have been ascribed the 
power to identify children in need, they have also the discretionary 
power to interpret need and to determine the services that will meet 
such need. Many "clients" are unwilling recipients of services, 
however much they may euphemistically be termed customers or 
partners, having no freedom of choice whether to enter or not to 
enter into consumer or partnership relations, under threat of being 
interpellated as uncooperative subjects. Moreover, through social 
disadvantage or through disability, clients of social work agencies 
may be in a poor position to fight for their rights (ibid p.187); 
including their right to be heard, to identify the needs of themselves 
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and their children, and to make choices about available services. The 
exercise of choice is an exercise of power. 
The choices available to the professional agents are not unlimited; 
they are subject to the discourses of the law, the surveillance of 
their managers and the management control of resources; and the 
Children Act 1989 seeks to regulate the autonomy of professional 
agents through its discursive rules and guidelines. It constructs a 
re-alignment of power relations through a re-positioning of state 
agents in relation to each other, the social services departments and 
the courts, making the professional agents more accountable to the 
courts; and it re-positions the agents in their relations both with 
parents and children. It requires that the views of children should 
be heard and taken into account in any matters concerning their 
welfare. It recognises the rights of children and the "truth" of 
children as persons, and it seeks to empower them in relation to 
adults. The Act requires the agencies, local authorities, to provide 
procedures for considering representations and complaints about the 
discharge of the agency's functions, by or on behalf of any child who 
is 'looked after' by the local authority or is a child in need of 
services as prescribed in the Act. The Act seeks to make 
'responsible authorities,' local authorities, voluntary organizations and 
registered children'S homes providing residential care, more 
accountable; and 'envisages a high degree of co-operation between 
parents and authorities in negotiating and agreeing what form of 
action will best meet a child's needs and promote his welfare.' 
(Department of Health 1991 (i)(d), p.74). The Guidance and 
Regulations on Residential Care spell out in detail the requirements 
for responsible authorities to set up procedures for 'representations' 
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about availability, delivery and nature of these services, and to set 
up a complaints procedure; and thus seeks to empower the users of 
the services and interested parties. (ibid pp.74-87). 
While there is no regulatory body, similar to the General Medical 
Council for example, to discipline a professional social work 
membership, and protect "clients" from bad social work practice, the 
discourse of social work is premised on such values as respect for all 
persons, compassion and understanding, justice and equality, and on 
recognising the powerlessness of many individuals to resist the 
intervention of social workers into their lives. (Barclay 1982, pp.145-
148; 187-189). The legal discourse as it is embodied in the Children 
Act 1989 complements these values by requiring social workers in 
exercising their power to balance the perceived risks to children 
within their own families against the damage done to family life, and 
in particular to the children themselves, by unwarranted intervention; 
the type of intervention and disciplinary action that has been much 
criticised, in Cleveland for example. (Butler-Sloss 1988). Certain 
interventions in themselves arguably constitute abuse - such actions 
as social workers taking children from their beds at an early hour in 
the morning when the risks are not immediate and cannot justify such 
a draconian exercise of power. 
Notwithstanding the realignment of power relations inscribed in and 
prescribed by the Children Act 1989, social workers will need 
continually to be aware of the way they exercise authority-power and 
professional/position power, if the 'rare and vital opportunity' to 
redress the power imbalance is not to be lost. They will need also 
to be aware of the privileging power of the legal and bureaucratic 
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superstructure within which they operate; and aware of how their 
own personal discourses impinge on their interpretations and value 
judgements; aware of the limitations of social work taught 
predominantly by white middle-class academics, and of social work 
practised within white dominated bureaucracies with a 
disproportionate representation of white males at the top of the 
management structures of many social services departments. They 
will need to rethink practices, as the Department of Health Guidance 
and Regulations propose (Department of Health 1989 (ti), pI), and to 
'let go' of some of their power while recognising the considerable 
discretion and privilege they will still retain. 
The Department of Health recognises that a wide scope for discretion 
remains in the way the Act is implemented. (ibid p.l). The Guidance 
documents are themselves framed in discursive language that is open 
to interpretation, the use of words like 'need' and 'reasonable,' as in 
'Reasonable parental care is that care which a reasonable parent 
would provide for the child.' (ibid p.6). 'Reasonable' is a relative 
term that is culturally defined, changes over time, and begs a 
question about what is unreasonable. There is no absolute standard. 
Social workers have long had to make judgements about "minimum 
acceptable standards," standards that some observers would interpret 
as not providing for a reasonable standard of health and development 
or even as bordering on neglect. The Department of Health 
recognises that 'a standard of care which would be reasonable for a 
normal healthy child may not be reasonable if the child has special 
needs because, say, he has brittle bones, or is asthmatic or mentally 
disabled.' (ibid p.6); and posits that parental limitations such as low 
intelligence or physical disablement are not relevant to whether the 
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care provided by parents is reasonable. 'What is expected is the care 
which the average or reasonable parent would provide 'and if a 
parent 'cannot cope' because of personal difficulties s/he will be 
acting unreasonably if help is not sought. (ibid p.6). 
There is no definition of the average/reasonable parent, any more 
than there is of a 'similar' child. A reasonable parent is a parent 
who acts reasonably. However, the considerable explanatory and 
supportive detail provided in the Guidance and Regulations makes it 
clear that 'The overriding purpose of the Act is to promote and 
safeguard the welfare of children.' (ibid p.3); and while 'Families 
Matter' and parents never lose their right to have a say in any 
decision-making about their child, and their right to have their views 
heard, 'Children Corne First.' (Department of Health 1991 (i) p.S; 1991 
(li), p.5). 
The Children Act 1989, 'the most comprehensive piece of legislation 
which Parliament has ever enacted about children ... strikes a new 
balance between family autonomy and the protection of children.' 
(Department of Health 1989 (ii), p.iii), a striving for a new balance of 
power relations. It seeks to realign the power relations between 
professionals working in the field of child protection and child care, 
the courts, and families, by its prescriptive and restrictive 
discourses. The Act gives wide powers to the courts to intervene to 
protect children at risk but with the proviso that prescribed pre-
conditions are established (ibid p.5), pre-conditions directed to 
ensuring that the child's well-being and best interests are being 
served. (ibid pp.6-8). It is recognised that the 'necessarily potent 
powers' (ibid p.6) that the Act gives to the courts may 'if 
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misdirected' cause harm to a child by enabling the state to intervene 
when it should not, through the misuse of the range of orders for 
which a local authority may apply and which the court may make. 
The Department of Health seeks to minimise the possibility of the 
inappropriate use of power, whether by social workers or the courts, 
through its detailed Guidance and Regulations. Empirical research will 
be needed to determine how effective this is in practice. 
The Act seeks to empower parents by proposing the notion of 
'partnership' with Social Services Departments and by defining their 
rights - 'Social Services Departments must listen to the views of 
parents for whom they are providing a service and give them a say 
in how their child is cared for.' (Department of Health 1991 (ii)(a), 
pp.6/14). At the same time it imposes on parents the power of the 
law by defining their responsibilities as well as their rights, 
requiring them to provide 'reasonable parental care' and to seek help 
if they are 'unable to cope' because of personal difficulties 
(Department of Health 1989 (il), p.6) or if they are unable to provide 
for their children a 'reasonable standard of health and development.' 
The underlying principle, 'the belief' from which the Act derives, is 
that children are generally best looked after in the family with both 
parents playing a full part, whether the parents are married or 
unmarried, separated or divorced. While acknowledging the 'rights' 
of parents, it emphasises the importance of parental responsibility, 
'the duty to care for the child and to raise him to moral, physical 
and emotional health ... the fundamental task of parenthood and the 
only justification for the authority it confers.' (ibid pI). The Act 
emphasises also the duty of a local authority to return a child being 
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'looked after' to his family, unless this is against the child's 
interests; and to ensure contact with a child's parents whenever 
possible. (ibid p.l) 
The Department of Health urges the need to 'grasp the broad 
obj ectives which the legislation aims to achieve ... the opportunity to 
rethink practices ... ' and expresses the concern that unless this is 
done the opportunity to improve the lot of children, their care, 
upbringing and protection, will be lost. (ibid p.1). The Department of 
Health has made more than a statement of intent. It has provided a 
vast amount of detailed guidance in a series of volumes running into 
hundreds of pages which together are 'designed to bring to managers 
and practitioners an understanding of the principles of the Children 
Act and associated regulations, to identify areas of change and to 
discuss the implications for policies, 
(Department of Health 1991 (i)(a), p.iii). 
procedures and practice.' 
The Department has also 
provided free to parents two small explanatory booklets. (Department 
of Health 1991 (ii)(a)(b) 
For 'policies, procedures and practice' we may read discourse and 
discursive practices. The discourse of rights and responsibilities 
permeates the Children Act 1989 and the accompanying regulations, 
defining the responsibilities of parents and the rights of children; 
setting out the rules governing the discursive practices of authorised 
agencies and the other agencies responsible to work with them. The 
Act requires the setting up of new organizational structures, systems 
and strategies (complaints and representation procedures for example) 
through which it seeks to reorganize the institutionalised power 
balance between the autonomy of families and the disciplinary 
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authority of its authorised agencies. It extends the power of 
surveillance and intervention by the requirement in law for its 
authorised agents to identify and respond to all children in need; 
and it leaves with its agents the power to apply unilaterally to the 
courts for an Emergency Protection Order, which enables the 
immediate removal of a child from its family; and to apply for a Child 
Assessment Order which empowers them to overrule uncooperative 
parents. The discourse of the law embodied in the Act regulates the 
power of its agents as well as the families and individuals over whom 
its agents exercise their disciplinary power; but it leaves with its 
agents wide powers of discretion and interpretation and unilateral 
legal power in the interests of protecting the children. 
In the following chapter I will consider the power of the agents 
within the context of the changing cultural norms and sexual 
behaviours of the 1990s. I will discuss the politics of child 
protection, the concept of children's sexuality and the emergence of 
sexual abuse as a widespread "social problem" rooted in the violent 
power of men. I will discuss the ways in which problems are defined 
in media discourses, the way meaning is inflected to construct news 
as "stories" and the ways in which the media re-construct the 
discursive practices of the agents for public consumption. 
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Note to Chapter 6: 
(1) In The Long Revolution (London, Chatto & Windus, 1961) Raymond 
Williams introduces the notion of 'structure of feeling,' which, he 
argues, is in one sense the 'the culture of a period;' not that it is 
possessed in the same way by all individuals in the community but 
that it is how each new generation 'responds in its own ways to the 
unique world it is inheriting.' It will not appear to have come from 
anywhere but 'it is a very deep and very wide possession, in all 
actual communities ... the lived culture of a particular time and place, 
only fully accessible to those living in that time and place.' 
(pp.48/50). 
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7. THE POWER OF THE AGENTS , 
MEDIA POWER AND THE POLITICS OF CHILD PROTECTION 
Local authority social workers, authorised agents of the law, are both 
the vehicles of power and the objects of power within the site in 
which they operate. The case study in chapter 5 has shown that 
their relational positioning in the Cleveland affair was determined not 
only by the knowledge-power of their professional discourses but also 
by the "rules" of the various power games being played out in the 
site, in which other privileged agents had an interest; and by the 
resource-power of the various players. In a complex field of 
intersecting power games, professional agents exercised power over 
subjects through their specialised knowledge and through the 
strategic and tactical use of other privileging resources - status, 
organizational position, agency and statutory authority, and access to 
the sanctions of the law. And these "powerful" agents were 
themselves dominated by the privileged resource power of other 
players. Resource-power, the privileged ownership of, control of, or 
access to resources, is a key factor in the operation of power. 
Agency authority, the authority of the law, knowledge of the "rules," 
professional alliances, society's recognition of the "right" of agents to 
intervene into the privacy of subjects, are resources that privilege 
the agents. The authority conferred on social workers in the public 
sector through the law, and their 'membership' of an agency that is 
an instrument of the law, their identification with its 'mission' (see 
chapter 2), are resources which legitimise their exercise of 
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disciplinary power. Without the delegated authority of their 
employing agency and its statutory powers, the disciplinary power of 
social workers is limited, notwithstanding their specialised knowledge. 
Social workers in the voluntary sector (Le. those not employed by a 
local authority) may influence the behaviour of subjects through their 
specialised discourse and knowledge resource, and through their 
status as professional experts; but their disciplinary power, their 
power to act upon the actions of others, is mediated by the limitations 
of their resource power. The statutory power of sanctions, for 
example, may be exercised only through the authorised agency 
(instrumentality) of local authority agents. The law privileges its 
appointed agents through the resource of authority and the discretion 
it ascribes to them. 
While on one level, as Foucault posits, power permeates the entire 
fabric of society, coming from everywhere, with no single originating 
source, with no defining essence, and is not, as such, the possession 
of any group or individual; at another level, at the specific site 
where it acts upon the actions of others, it operates in its different 
forms through the agency (instrumentality) of individual subjects, or 
alliances of subjects, who "own," control or have access to resources. 
Children lack the resources to protect themselves from the abusive 
power of adults; and the state and civil society have recognised this 
lack and the rights of children to protection from adult power and 
abuse. The sexual abuse of children has become identified as a 
singular form of the abuse of power by adults; a power which adults 
exercise within the "protective" context of 'an intensive administrative 
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and judicial grid' laid out by the state for the protection of children; 
the context of an 'entire politics for the protection of children' 
(Foucault 1979, p.129). 
The politics of child protection against sexual abuse cuts acros 
divisions of social class, gender and ethnicity. Children from any 
socio-economic or cultural group, boys as well as girls, may need 
protection from parents or other adults, protection from the 
exploitation of their sexuality, a form of adult power which violates 
their emotional trust and physical dependence and which they 
themselves lack the resources to resist. This form of power which is 
predominantly exercised by men has to be understood within the 
wider context of male violence and domination, and the discursive 
positioning of men in the family and in a society in which various 
forms of physical abuse and harassment of women and children are a 
cultural norm. The structural and cultural privileging of men in our 
society is a critical factor in the politics of power, a factor in the 
oppression of children, and a factor in the oppression of women which 
often leaves them powerless to protect their children. 
Jeff Hearn notes that 'many major texts on child abuse, and even 
specifically on child sexual abuse, fail to explore questions of men as 
perpetrators and of men's power in any depth.' (Hearn 1990, p.65); 
and he argues that 'it is necessary and important to confront the 
issue of men's sexual abuse of young people specifically in terms of 
men's violence.' (ibid p.71). 
Unlike physical abuse or neglect, which is more "visible" in families 
who are socially and economically disadvantaged and consequently 
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more likely to be subject to the gaze of professional/disciplinary 
agents, sexual abuse occurs in all social classes. Sexual abusers come 
from all walks of life and all groups in society; and sexual abusers 
are predominantly, although not exclusively, men. (Stainton Rogers et 
al. 1989, p.16). It is comparatively unusual for women to sexually 
abuse children. Lena Dominelli points out that 'Feminist analyses 
have revealed that the majority of assailants are men, ... their victims 
are primarily girl children ... out of 100 abusers, only one is female ... ' 
(Dominelli 1989, pp.298/299). Women may collude with an abusing 
partner on whom they are emotionally dependent, unable to 'suspend 
disbelief' that such a thing could be happening, and/or dominated by 
male physical force. And, as the Butler-Sloss inquiry found, children 
may collude with an abuser for various reasons: sometimes the child 
is threatened by the abuser against the consequences of disclosure, 
coerced to keep 'the secret'; sometimes (with good reason) because 
the child does not expect to be believed by the other parent or any 
adult: often because the abuser is a parent or relative to whom the 
child has a strong emotional attachment. The privileged status and 
culturally ascribed authority of adulthood positions the child always 
as the "other" in adult/child relations. 
While in "traditional" familial ideology and the discourse of "family 
values," the family is seen as a safe place, 'the best place for 
children to be brought up and cared for.' (Department of Health 
1991(ii)(a), p.5); it is also often the place where children are in 
danger from adult power exercised through various forms of violence 
and oppression. At different historical periods, behaviours that at 
one time were socially constructed as legitimate are interpreted at 
other times as violence and cruelty. Behaviours that were the norm 
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even earlier this century, flogging for example, have been redefined 
in contemporary Western language as 'abuse.' Yet, while corporal 
punishment is no longer allowed in state schools, it is still practised 
in some independent schools, and parents are not prohibited from 
physically chastising their children. Even beating a child to the 
extent of causing severe bruising may not be constructed as abuse 
by some agents of the law, privileged to exercise their power of 
interpretation. 
For example, in March 1993, a father who beat his two young children 
aged five and eight with a belt was cleared by a magistrates' court of 
'assault causing actual bodily harm.' (The Independent 20.3.93). The 
children's bruised bottoms had been noticed at school. The 
headmaster had informed the local social services who had contacted 
the police. The defence lawyer declared to the court 'There is no law 
in this country preventing parents from punishing their children.' 
The magistrates accepted that the father's behaviour was legitimate 
punishment. Parents, then, are legally and culturally positioned with 
a "right" to inflict severe physical punishment on their children 
against which their children have no redress in law. There is a law 
that prohibits the physical abuse of children; but in this instance the 
father's behaviour, in the particular circumstances of the children'S 
disobedience, was interpreted by the magistrates as justifiable 
punishment rather than abuse. In the discourse of the law the 
parent's right to chastise his children by physical violence was 
justifiable (reasonable) behaviour. In the professional discourses of 
social work and other child protection disciplines, severe bruising on 
a child caused by this type of action, whatever the circumstances, 
would be construed as non-accidental injury constituting child abuse. 
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Meaning is constructed in contextual discourses that determine how 
behaviour is to be interpreted, not in the behaviour itself. 
In the nineteenth century child-rearing was based on the discourse 
of parents' absolute rights in relation to their children, and their 
right to inflict punishments that today would be consensually 
interpreted as physical abuse. The severe physical punishment of 
children was seen as good parenting and was believed to be for the 
child's own good, even in families where there was love and affection. 
(Stainton Rogers et al 1989, p.13/14). Steve Taylor, discussing the 
way sexual abuse is constituted in contemporary society, argues that 
'Children have been savagely beaten, neglected and sexually exploited 
for centuries without people even feeling that it was wrong, let alone 
categorizing such behaviour as abuse. Child abuse is thus a product 
of social definition ... a social construction whose meaning arises from 
the value structure of a social group ... ' (Taylor 1989, p46). Complex 
economic, demographic and social factors contribute to major shifts in 
the values that fundamentally affect power relations, such as those 
between adults and children. 
Among different social and ethnic groups in contemporary society, in 
different family configurations, children are variously disciplined to 
conform to differing cultural norms and value systems. Among some 
social groups the threat, or infliction, of physical punishment is 
regarded by parents as a legitimate means of protecting their 
children from the harmful influences of the wider "permissive" 
society, the dangers of drugs and under-age sex, for example; and 
among some ethnic groups it is seen as a means of protecting their 
culture from contamination and erosion, as the younger generation is 
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perceived to be "at risk" of socialisation into the dominant societal 
norms that conflict with their traditional cultural values. The 
difficulties for parents of "controlling" their children caught up 
between conflicting cultural norms and values, and for children 
caught up between parental and peer group pressures, have brought 
many ethnic minority families under the surveillance of social workers. 
Societal norms and legal discourses require parents to control the 
behaviour of their children and to exercise disciplinary power over 
unacceptable behaviour. The meaning of various behaviours and the 
limits of deviation from what is "acceptable" are defined by adults. 
Parents have both the right to control their children and the 
responsibility to do so. If according to legal discourses they are 
seen to fail, they are subject to the disciplinary power of the law and 
its agents. While the discourse of social work and the discursive 
practices of social services departments seek primarily to maintain 
children within their families, the discourse of the law requires social 
workers, as its agents, to operate disciplinary power over children 
who are beyond the control of their parents; if all else fails by 
removing them from their families and placing them in corrective 
environ men ts. However, neither the discourse of the law nor the 
specialised professional discourses and discursive practices of the 
human sciences social work, psychiatry, psychology have 
succeeded in effectively disciplining and controlling the behaviours of 
certain "disruptive" or "disturbed" children. 
In the unequal power relation between children and adults, a "child" 
is subject in law to the authority /power of the parent until s/he 
reaches the age of eighteen (unless married). While there may be a 
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moral obligation as well as a legal requirement to exercise "control" in 
order to protect children from the consequences of behaviours that 
are dangerous to life or threatening to the interests of others, or 
that are defined (subjectively) by parents as inimical to a child's best 
interests, the reality is that many children and young people are 
resistant to the disciplinary power of parents. In an age of rapidly 
changing social and sexual norms, of 'flux' and uncertainties, we have 
not yet found a way either to control or to protect children within 
the family. Our understanding of childhood is full of contradictions 
and fails to take account of the earlier physical and sexual 
development of children, their intellectual development, and their 
right to be involved in negotiating the rules and limits of behaviour 
and the sanctions if those limits are contravened. 
The social definition of childhood, and children's sexuality, have been 
reconstructed at different historical periods. A proliferation of 
professional discourses have periodically re-interpreted childhood 
and children's sexuality and have realigned the boundaries of what 
sexual behaviours are permissible for young people. Precocious 
childish sexual behaviour that was tolerated with amusement in 
earlier centuries was re-interpreted in the eighteenth century in a 
'new regime of discourses.' Sex was reconstituted as 'a constant 
danger,' particularly to children, requiring the vigilance of doctors, 
parents and educational institutions. The health of the population as 
labour power and as wealth became the concern of the state and of 
medical, psychiatric and pedagogical discourses; a phase in the 
historical discontinuities in the construction of childhood, which 
Foucault links with 'the emergence of "population" as an economic and 
political problem:' Since the eighteenth century, he argues, the sex 
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of children and adolescents has been 'an important area of contention' 
as differential meanings have been ascribed to 'dangerous' sexual 
behaviours. (Foucault 1979, pp.2S-3S). 
The boundary between what is interpreted as permissible behaviour 
and what is not permissible is contentious and constantly shifting. 
Through the last few decades children have been increasingly exposed 
to media discourses on sex and sexuality and to visual demonstrations 
of intimate sexual behaviours that in the first half of this century 
were confined to adult discourses and the privacy of adult bedrooms. 
"Under-age" sex, although prohibited in law, is widely practised and 
has become a cultural norm. Schools are promoting the use of 
contraceptives, unthinkable even a decade ago. Pregnant schoolgirls 
today are allowed to attend school. Earlier this century they were 
likely to have been detained for years in mental hospitals, and even a 
few decades ago were likely to have been hidden away by their 
parents while they had a termination or gave birth to a child who 
was immediately placed with an authorised agency for adoption. 
Sexual discourses have historically privileged male hetero-sexuality 
and male sexual behaviours. Even during the earlier decades of the 
twentieth century, while male adultery and promiscuity continued to 
be a cultural norm, as it had been for centuries, women who had 
sexual relations and gave birth to children outside of marriage were 
positioned in the male-dominated discourses of medicine and 
psychiatry as both bad and mad; and the male-dominated discourses 
of the law prescribed that these dangerously mad/bad women were to 
be incarcerated in lunatic asylums, in which some women spent most 
of their lives. Oppositional power coming from the "women's 
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movement," and from the knowledge-power of late twentieth century 
women, is partially and gradually reconstituting this culturally 
defined gender-power and the rules governing sexual behaviours. 
As women have acquired resources of knowledge, information, literacy 
and communication skills and increasingly entered into the 
professional disciplines, they have resisted and challenged gender 
inequalities. But sexual harassment and other forms of sexual abuse 
and the objectification of women persists and is institutionalised in 
their societal and organizational positioning. The privileged 
structural/cultural position power of men still predominates in power 
relations between men and women. 
There are some parallels between the oppression of women by men 
and the subjectivity of children in adult/child relations; but it is 
simplistic to try to understand the oppression of children solely in 
the context of men's domination of women. Male power and the 
oppression of women is in itself a more complex issue than simply 
male physical violence and the structural positioning of women per se. 
The discourses of black feminists, unwaged women, women exploited in 
poorly paid waged work, mothers living in poverty, have premised 
issues that differentiate their experiences of oppression from those of 
privileged white, educated and relatively wealthy middle-class women; 
women privileged by their resources of property and cultural capital, 
dissatisfied with their institutionalised role as child rearers and their 
structural disadvantage in the world of career-type work. 
The subjectivity of children is constituted first in their physical 
dependency on adults and particularly mothers during infancy; and 
on their structural positioning in language as "dependents" rather 
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than as persons with natural and unalienable rights. Within the 
family, whatever its configuration, the subjectivity of children is 
perpetuated in the ideology of parents' rights of possession in 
relation to their children. Mothers as well as, perhaps more so, than 
fathers are possessive of their children; they play a significant part 
in the socialising of children into traditional or alternative societal 
roles; and mothers as well as fathers "use" their children as objects 
in marital disputes. Mothers exploit their children's bodies and their 
children'S "innocence" through various media forms, television 
advertising for example. Jenny Kitzinger argues that innocence is a 
sexual commodity and that the notion of childhood innocence is a 
source of titillation for abusers. (Kitzinger 1988, pp.79-80). The 
meaning of childhood innocence is itself problematic, particularly if 
childhood is defined as extending to the age of eighteen, an age when 
large numbers of children have long been sexually active. 
Through the continual processes of change and the 'endlessly 
proliferating economy of the discourse on sex' (Foucault 1979, p.35), 
new meanings and changing cultural norms have reconstituted the 
rules regulating what sexual behaviours are permissible in 
contemporary western society. While there is evidence that many 
children in their early teens are having the experience of sexual 
in tercourse, the meaning of sexual behaviours between children is 
constructed differently, both in professional discourses and in the 
language of everyday speech, from sexual behaviours between 
children and adults. In professional discourses, social work, health 
care, etc., a problem is seen to arise from the relative powerlessness 
of children in their relations with adults, their physical and emotional 
vulnerability, their dependency and limitations of language and 
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articulation. Very young children do not understand what is 
happening to them, they do not know the "meaning" of their sexuality 
or have the resource of language to resist or to speak of it. Even 
older children have difficulty in articulating their experiences and 
feelings of violation; and they fear, and have reason to fear, that 
their statements will not be believed in the face of adult denial. 
Sexual behaviour among adolescent children is associated with peer 
group pressure and experimentation. Although not universally 
condoned, it has become widely accepted as a reality in contemporary 
Western societies. Sexual relations between adolescents provoke a 
moral outrage in popular discourse only occasionally; for example in 
February 1993 when an incident in which a schoolgirl was raped by 
one of her peers received considerable media coverage - an example 
of media power creating a popular 'structure of feeling' through the 
transmission of information into the public domain. (media power is 
discussed in greater detail below). An assumption of mutual consent 
to experimentation between adolescent children takes no account of 
the privileging of masculinity in discourses of sexuality; the ways in 
which boys are generally socialised into stereotypical macho-male 
models, reinforced by media use of female bodies for pornographic 
display, and the cultural norms of male sexual behaviour which 
positions females as sexual obj ects. The power relation between 
adolescent boys and girls may be different from that between children 
and adults; but it is not an equal relation. 
While sexual behaviour among young people is not generally 
constituted in popular discourse as abuse, the sexual exploitation of 
young children and babies, which became publicly visible in 1987 
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through the Cleveland Inquiry, excites considerable moral outrage in 
the media and among the public. Child sexual abuse within the 
family, which in popular discourse is constituted as the safe haven 
for children, is regarded as shocking to the point of disbelief. Often 
in investigating suspected sexual abuse there is no physical evidence, 
only a child's words or observed behaviour against the denial and 
disbelief of adults. Interpretations of verbal and behavioural signs 
by professional workers may lead them to believe that a child has 
been sexually abused; but their power to act to protect the child 
and "discipline" the abusing adult is limited by the discursive 
practices of the authorised agencies, the social services deparments 
which are themselves limited by the rules of legal discourses and the 
rules of evidence. 
The interpretation of signs and the language of "evidence" may differ 
among the professionals who are charged by the state (with the 
hegemonic acquiesence of society), with responsibility for the 
surveillance and protection of children - social workers, teachers, 
the police, paediatricians and other health professionals. These 
differences often emerge in a case conference, an inter-disciplinary 
forum for the exchange of information where professional discourses 
intersect and may conflict. Each input of information constitutes a 
text and a specialised discourse reflecting the ideological positioning 
of the speaker. For some professionals, for example, the ideology of 
family values within marriage predominates; for others the ideology of 
children's rights predominates over parents' rights and traditional 
familial ideology. Disagreements over interpretation of evidence, 
professional self-protection, ideological bias and "personality" clashes 
may lead to inter-professional rivalry and cloud the issues over the 
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"best interests" of the child. Each agency has the discretionary 
power whether to act on the recommendations made by a case 
conference. I have, for example, known a unanimous case conference 
"decision" overturned by local authority senior professionals when the 
risk to the life of a baby was deemed by the chairperson to be 
unacceptable, in circumstances when the interests of the parents were 
seen to have predominated over the rights of the child (A study of 
a case conference is provided in chapter 8). 
The local authority as an agent of the state has the primary 
responsibility and the statutory power to institute legal proceedings 
for the protection of a child. It may be a point of disagreement in a 
case conference whether the best interests of a child would be served 
by removal from the family home. Paediatricians, educational 
psychologists and psychiatrists have, in my experience, sometimes put 
pressure on social workers to initiate care proceedings in 
circumstances that do not accord with the professional discourses of 
social work and the discursive practices of their departments, which 
have tended to favour the child's natural family if at all feasible 
against the limited alternative options. Social workers know well that 
the "matching" of a child to an appropriate placement is a frequently 
unattainable although desired outcome of receiving a child into the 
care of the local authority. Too often, particularly in an emergency 
when a child's safety demands immediate removal from the family 
home, a child has had to be placed in an available approved "bed," 
wherever that might happen to be and whether or not it met the 
child's "needs." The history of ill-matched fostering placements 
breaking down, and children's experiences in overstretched and 
inadequately staffed children's homes is well documented. Countless 
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children who have been removed from their families into the "care" 
system have suffered the insecurity of a succession of alternative 
accommodations. Many of them have become the homeless young 
people on the streets of the inner cities. 
Where a risk is interpreted as so great that a child's life is believed 
to be in danger, or there are grounds for believing that a child will 
suffer serious physical harm unless moved without delay from the 
source of severe danger, the rules of their employing agency and 
their professional discursive practices require that social workers 
must seek the empowerment of a court to protect the child by 
removing her or him to a safe place. However, if the evidence is 
interpreted differently, a court may refuse an application for an 
order. While bruising, fractures or broken bones may provide 
evidence of physical abuse (although not always conclusively, as 
alternative explanations may emerge on further investigation), 
evidence of sexual abuse and the immediacy of continuing risk is more 
difficult to establish. The "discovery" of the anal dilatation sign 
offered the possibility of providing evidence that sexual abuse had 
occurred and was of recent origin, thus with a risk that it was likely 
to con tin ue. 
Although the recognition of child sexual abuse has only in the last 
two decades become prominent in professional discourses and entered 
into the public domain, it is not a new phenomenon. The anal 
dilatation sign was not new when it was observed and interpreted by 
the paediatricians in Cleveland in 1987. As long ago as the late 
nineteenth century social workers in the United States were familiar 
with child sexual abuse, its most common form being incest. (Gordon 
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1988, p.57). American research had started long before a paper on 
the anal dilatation test was published by two paediatricians in 
England in The Lancet in 1986 and work on the significance of the 
physical sign had been going on in various parts of this country. It 
had long been regarded in forensic pathology as strongly suggestive 
of buggery. It was not controversial as a physical indicator of sexual 
abuse until it was applied in the field of paediatrics. (Campbell 1988, 
pp.21-35). 
In the absence of a physical sign, certain behaviours, emotional 
disturbance, precocious sexual knowledge and overt sexual behaviour 
in young children are likely to be interpreted in professional 
discourses as indicative of sexual abuse. Some forms of sexual abuse 
leave no physical mark. Unlike the identification of abuse when 
physical injury is evident and cannot be accounted for as accidental, 
the "truth" of sexual abuse is often difficult to establish. It 
frequently happens that there is no indisputable evidence. The 
evidence of a child is disputable. 
During the 1970s severe forms of discipline which resulted in 
observable physical injury, together with serious neglect and 
emotional rejection, (although these were more difficult to establish), 
were defined as 'child abuse' and became classified as a social 
problem. The language of child abuse entered the professional 
discourses and discursive practices of social workers, doctors, health 
visitors, educationalists. Organizational structures, case conference 
and registration procedures, were set up by local authorities. Inter-
disciplinary local Review Committees were instituted to monitor 
procedures. All children were to be under constant surveillance, 
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subj ect to the professional gaze in the home or at the clinic by the 
health visitor; at the GP's surgery; at school or playgroup. If they 
attended casualty departments of hospitals, children'S names were to 
be checked against an at-risk register. The meanings of certain 
behaviours and certain signs were to be constructed by those whose 
knowledge-power authorised them to speak the specialised language of 
professional discourses 
paediatricians, the police. 
doctors, social workers, health visitors, 
In the interests of protecting the children, parents who were 
suspected of deliberately injuring, "neglecting" or "rejecting" their 
children were to be subject to the disciplinary power of social work 
and other professional discourses and discursive practices. This 
disciplinary power prescribed a new identity for such parents and 
children as unwilling "clients" of the social services department. 
Parents not yet proven to be abusers often complained they were 
made to feel guilty of abusing their children by the language, 
attitudes and (discursive) practices of some professionals. Parents 
found themselves positioned subjectively in relation to the privileged 
institutionalised position of the professional speakers in whose 
specialised discourse the "problem" was constructed. Parents and 
children became classified as a "case," the subject of a confidential 
file record to which they had no access; and the subject of 
discussion and exchange of information and opinions among the 
professional agents, initially without the right of being heard. Child 
abuse work became a priority for social services departments. 
Although an occasional case of sexual abuse emerged, usually of an 
older child, the recognition of sexual abuse of children as a 
widespread phenomenon emerged only later. 
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It was not until the 1980s that the sexual abuse of young children 
found a prominent place in professional and juridical discourses. In 
1987 two paediatricians provided evidence that boys as well as girls, 
and even babies, were victims of forms of sexual abuse. (Stainton 
Rogers et al 1989, p.16). The Cleveland inquiry found that 'sexual 
abuse occurs in children of all ages, including the very young, to 
boys as well as girls, in all classes of society and frequently within 
the privacy of the family.' (Butler Sloss 1988, p.243). Once the 
awareness of child sexual abuse spread into the public consciousness 
and entered into everyday discourse, more and more adults and 
young people disclosed their experiences of sexual abuse in childhood. 
The incidence of child sexual abuse cases increased in social services 
departments. Parental care had not protected children from this form 
of adult power, which more than any other form of child abuse or 
neglect excites most media attention and public outrage. Nor had the 
surveillance of the agents or the professional discourses of the 
experts served to protect the children. Their disciplinary power does 
not "work" on subjects except by their acquiesence or through the 
sanctions-power of the law. 
The children involved in the investigation of the severe form of 
sexual abuse indicated by the sign of anal dilatation in Cleveland 
ranged in age from under one year to adolescence. Until the 1980s it 
was generally believed that incest was usually a sexual liaison 
between a father or stepfather and his teenage daughter, -' a 
transgression of taboos, maybe but not all that far beyond the 
bounds of decency.' (Stainton Rogers et ale 1989, p.16). The incest 
taboo assumed a new symbolic form as very young children were seen 
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to be the objects of male sexual desire and adult power, against 
which the disciplinary power of the 'entire watch-crew' (Foucault 
1979, p.98) of educators, social workers, health visitors, doctors, had 
failed to protect them. Incest, conceptualised as a form of sexual 
behaviour that threatens the stability of the social order, is 
prohibited both in the cultural norms and received moral codes of 
Western societies and in juridical law. Foucault argues that 'If one 
considers the threshold of all culture to be prohibited incest, then 
sexuality has been, from the dawn of time, under the sway of law and 
right.' (ibid pp 109,110). In Freudian terms, the violation of the 
incest taboo is the violent expression of prohibited and repressed 
desires, as 'The instincts in the id press for immediate satisfaction at 
all costs ... ' (Freud 1962, p.111) 
From the accounts of adults in recent years of widespread childhood 
experiences of sexual abuse, it is evident that the moral law, the law 
of right, the legal instruments of the state, and the disciplinary 
power of the state apparatuses have failed to protect the body of the 
child from the power of men. Fathers, step-fathers and male relatives 
and friends have been identified as the exploiters of 'the dangerous 
and endangered sexual potential' of children. (Foucault 1979, p.l04). 
The power they exercised was not 'knowledge-power' but male adult-
power exercised over dependent others who lacked the resources to 
resist, a power that subjugates women as well as children. 
Male adult-power is enshrined in the discourses through which men 
maintain a privileged cultural position in our society. In traditional 
familial discourse male adult-power is built around the symbolic form 
of "the father," the dominant member of the family, the godhead to 
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whose authority women and children are subject; and it is built 
around the mythicised symbiotic relation between the family organism 
and the social, 'the belief that the family is crucial to social order 
and well-being.' (Rojek et al 1988, p.87). In political and economic 
discourses the man is positioned as head of the family and as the 
wage earner on whom women and children are financially dependent; 
men are positioned as the primary workforce; the interests of men are 
promoted in the Trades Unions and in the major professions. In the 
politics of gender relations, women are constructed subjectively as 
wives and mothers, people with biological functions and special 
nurturing qualities that preclude them from equal participation with 
men in the worlds of work and public affairs. In the politics of 
representation, it is men who are predominantly selected to represent 
"the people" in the Unions and in Parliament. In the politics of 
selection and preference, institutionalised male power continues to 
dominate the major professions and higher levels of the state 
agencies. Psycho-analytic discourse constructs images of women as 
weak and hysterical, subject to the dominance of 'the father' and 
subjugated to the symbolism of 'penis envy' and to the male sexual 
drive. While the discourse of childhood disciplines children to the 
general dominance of adult authority, children together with women 
are subject to male power, both the symbolic and real authority of 
the father. 
The problematic of the power relation between adults and children 
and the intervention of the state in this power relation has changed 
through the centuries. (Aries 1962, Stone 1977, Donzelot 1980». 
According to Donzelot, the increasing intervention of the state into 
family life and the regulation of childcare by the state began in the 
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early nineteenth century, influenced by the specialised knowledge-
power of medical discourses concerned with poor standards of hygiene 
and the abandonment of babies. Medical discourses were concerned 
also with the danger of the 'self-abuse' of masturbation which 'caused 
a range of physical and mental problems including insanity!' Parents 
were warned against these dangers. This "truth" led to practices 
that, as Rex Stainton Rogers points out, we would define today as the 
abuse of children - 'castration, clitorectomy and other surgical 
interventions to control masturbation.' (Rex Stainton Rogers, 1989 
p.24). 
The problemisation of children's sexuality began with the "discovery" 
by Sigmund Freud of children as sexual beings and the positing of a 
new "truth," the Oedipal phase of children's psycho-sexual 
development. The surveillance of infantile sexuality through the 
mechanisms of the state, Foucault argues, began from this particular 
point in time with the definition of children as '''preliminary'' sexual 
beings,' and the revelation that children 'are prone to indulge in 
sexual activity' which, both "'natural" and "contrary to nature" ... 
posed physical and moral, individual and collective dangers;' (Foucault 
1979, p.104). 
What was conceptualised in Freudian discourse in myth, and as the 
fantasy of unconscious infantile desires (Freud 1962, p.12S), the 
resolution of which was a natural stage in "normal" human 
development, has been re-constituted in feminist discourse as the 
sexual exploitation of children's bodies by adults, particularly men, 
for their own pleasure. Dominelli argues that Freud reconstructed 
and trivialised women's accounts of incestuous behaviour as 'fantasies 
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rooted in their unconscious desire to have sex with their fathers'; 
and that 'helping professionals' who endorse the Freudian 'insights' 
have 'silenced the voices of those who have been abused 
Gender power was ignored by Freud in his reconstruction of women's 
experiences. Dominelli maintains that 'Like Freud, experts drawing 
on psychoanalytical approaches ignore the significance of gender in 
incestuous relationships, the power emanating from the subordination 
of women to men ... and the impact of the power relations inherent in 
adult-child relationships.' (Dominelli 1989, pp.292/293). 
The concept of child sexuality has been constructed and 
reconstructed in the specialised discourses of 
privileged by their ownership of qualifications and 
expert speakers, 
knowledge which 
confer on them status and authority, through which contemporary 
truths are constructed and "normality" is defined. Over time, these 
truths are reconstructed and normality re-defined, as each society 
produces its own 'regime of truth,' centred on its 'scientific' 
discourses and dominated by 'the status of those who are charged 
with saying what counts as true,' (Foucault 1980 (ii), p.131). These 
reconstructions, these 'new domains of understanding,' are, as 
Foucault posits, historically discontinuous. Now, in the last decades 
of the twentieth century, the specialised knowledges of the human 
sciences, particularly the medical sciences of paediatrics and child 
psychiatry, have identified the widespread sexual abuse of children 
and defined a new type of adult; not the "inadequate parent" but the 
abusing adult and the collusive parent who must be subjected to the 
disciplinary mechanisms of power vested by the state in its agencies 
and its agents - the agents who are the 'vehicles' of power. 
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Foucault, arguing against studying the operations of power within the 
context of social class and the domination of the bourgeoisie, posits 
that what we need to do is identify the agents responsible for the 
functioning of the mechanisms of power, the 'real agents,' who 
constitute 'the immediate social entourage, the family, parents, doctors 
etc.' (Foucault 1980 (i), pp.100/101). Although it is argued by some 
critics that the issue of agents and agencies and subject motivation 
are problematic in Foucault's work and that his history tends to have 
no subjects (Barrett 1991, Giddens 1987), he does not exclude agency 
and agents in his discourses on the operation of power. While he 
maintains that it is 'often the case that no-one is there' to have 
invented the aims and objectives of power, he recognises individuals 
as both constituted by power and 'its vehicles.' Power can never be 
'appropriated as a commodity' by an individual since it has no 
essence; yet it is always individuals who are in the position of 
exercising power as its vehicles. The issue of individuals, agents, 
being in the position of exercising power and having 'the status of 
those who are charged with saying what counts as true' is crucial to 
understanding the operation of power. It is the individual who 'acts.' 
But in the process of acting, the individual agent who is the 
instrument or vehicle of power is caught up in a mesh ('net' 'chain') 
of power networks. And what counts as true is always open to the 
challenge of other expert agents who posit an alternative 'truth.' 
The professional agents who function and act within the state 
apparatus to exercise disciplinary power over subjects are not 
autonomous. They are the vehicles through whose "agency" 
(instrumentality) the hegemonic consent of the population to the 
disciplining of those who transgress certain behavioural norms is 
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carried out. The rules that govern social behaviour, and the very 
fact that there are rules, essentially derives from the fundamental 
need of any society for a form of social order and from the self-
disciplining of individuals to conform, more or less, to the consensus 
about what constitutes contemporary norms. Subjects are disciplined 
by the need to be "accepted" within their social groups and by the 
interpretations placed upon social behaviours within that milieu. Peer 
pressure to conform is very strong among all social groups and is a 
spontaneous disciplinary force through which social behaviour is 
largely regulated. We are disciplined as much, or more, by the 
"self" that seeks for structure and order in everyday life, and by 
the social norms with which we feel comfortable, as by the 
disciplinary power and the influence of the discourses of those 
charged with saying what counts as true. Within the 'social 
entourage' of the family, the rules to which adults, and children, 
conform are most likely to be the implicit rules that govern the social 
norms of their particular sector of society and their particular 
experience of "reality." 
Professional agents may have the status of those who are charged 
with saying what counts as true, but their truths may be overriden 
by the greater status power of their political masters. While 
professional agents may be in the position of exercising power in 
their inter-personal relations with users/receivers of services, they 
can act only within the framework of Parliamentary law; and they are 
regulated by the rules and procedures of the institutions (state 
agencies) which employ them. It is only through their positioning as 
the authorised agents of these institutions, that are part of the state 
apparatuses through which Parliamentary law is implemented, that 
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individual agents are able to exercise disciplinary power over 
subjects. They themselves are subject to the greater status power, 
resource power, and sanctions power of the state in the form of the 
law, and they are answerable to the elected representatives of the 
people. The interventions of local councillors and Members of 
Parliament in power struggles between the statutory agencies and 
individual subjects over the provision of services are common. The 
status power of elected representatives requires the statuory agencies 
to account for their actions. For example, inquiries and letters from 
M.Ps. and councillors are (must be?) responded to promptly. At the 
same time, however, the agency managers are familiar with the rules 
and tactics of this power game. They know how to construct meaning 
in their reponses, designed to protect themselves and their agents 
from criticism or disciplinary action; a tactical manoeuvre with which 
some of the agents may not agree but which they do not have the 
resource-power (agency position and authority) to overrule. 
That the discursive "statements" of professional agents count as 
truths derives from their status as experts and professionals. They 
symbolise the status of the academic institutions that have trained 
them and authorised them to speak the specialised language of 
professional discourse, conferring on them through their qualifications 
the status of experts, owning the resource of a specialised knowledge. 
This knowledge and their expert status, together with their agency 
position are privileging resources which "position" agents in a 
dominant relation with subjects. But the agents can act against 
subjects who transgress certain rules of social behaviour only within 
the parameters of the law, the rules which the law prescribes as 
within the bounds of the agents' authority; and only within the limits 
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of the sanctions the law allows them - for example, the degree of 
physical restraint that the law allows social workers to exercise over 
young people, a sanction that changes from time to time. 
The knowledge-power of professional agents is subject to the 
authority power the law ascribes to them. A paediatrician, an expert 
speaker who has specialised knowledge, status as a consultant and a 
senior position within the hierarchy of a medical institution, may 
articulate the truth of child sexual abuse and use resources of status 
and position to exercise disciplinary power over parents by detaining 
a child in hospital against the parents' wishes; but the parent has 
the legal right, the power, to remove the child from that place, or 
from any place, unless a court has made an order preventing this. 
The disciplinary power of the paediatrician cannot be legitimately 
exercised without such an order. But parents must have the 
necessary knowledge of the law to exercise their legal right, 
otherwise their attempts at resistance will be ineffectual, dominated 
by what they "recognise" as the knowledge/status-power of the 
consultant. If the parents have the resource of this particular 
knowledge, the paediatrician may be "disciplined" by the oppositional 
knowledge-power of the parents. Similarly, a social worker, even with 
consultant status, cannot exercise disciplinary power to detain a child 
against the wishes of the parents without the authorisation of a 
court. The exercise of this form of disciplinary power is governed by 
the rule of law. Although the magistrates suffered little criticism for 
their role in the Cleveland affair, it was after all the magistrates, 
exercising the power of the law, who made the orders for the removal 
of the children. 
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Notwithstanding the knowledge-power of professional agents and the 
influential truth of their discourses, they are able to exercise power, 
to "act," only insofar as the law and agency legitmacy, and their 
positioning and status in the organizational hierarchy of the agency, 
allow them to act. The disciplinary power of agents operates within a 
context of organizational rules and is mediated by the domination of 
more privileged agents. The specialised knowledge that informs the 
discourses of professional agents, their knowledge-power, is only one 
of a mUltiplicity of privileging resources that interact in the complex 
field of force relations. 
The Consultant Paediatrician in the Cleveland case, for example, 
operated within an organizational context legitimised as an agency of 
the state, the National Health Service, which constituted her as its 
agent and ascribed to her a privileged hierarchical position, the 
privileged status of a consultant and the privileged resources of 
autonomy and discretion. To this she brought the highly-rated 
discourse of paediatrics and a specialised knowledge of a form of 
child sexual abuse that could be identified by a physical sign. While 
the new truth of the physical sign was both endorsed and disputed 
by various expert speakers, in the local site in which she operated 
she dominated the power struggles over this disputed truth. 
Resistance came initially from other expert speakers, the police 
surgeon and his senior colleagues, rather than from parents and 
children who "freely" subjected themselves to the status-power and 
the legitimate bio-power of a paediatric expert over the bodies of the 
children. In the power struggle between the discourse of the police 
that interpreted the sign of anal dilatation as a dubious indicator of 
sexual abuse, and the discourse of the Consultant Paediatrician in 
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which the meaning of the sign was the truth of sexual abuse, the 
discourse and the missionary drive of the Consultant Paediatrician 
were the dominant forces. Her specialised knowledge-power and her 
status as one who was charged with saying 'what counts as true' 
drew her into an alliance with the Child Abuse Consultant who 
believed in the truth of the diagnosis and in the paediatric discourse 
of emergency action to protect the children. Both the Consultant 
Paediatrician and the Child Abuse Consultant believed not only in the 
truth that the children identified by the sign had been recently 
sexually abused but also that they were at risk of the abuse 
continuing unless they were removed as a matter of urgency from the 
situation in which the abuse had occurred. These truths of abuse 
and continuing risk and the discourse of children'S right to 
protection constituted the meta-discourse. It dominated the 
oppositional discourses of the police surgeon and his 
influenced the Director of Social Services into the 
allies. It 
responsive 
discursive practice of authorising emergency action to protect the 
children. Privileged by his hierarchical position and status in the 
organization, by the legitimacy of the organization as an agency of 
the state and of the law, the Director exercised his disciplinary 
power. 
It was through the pro-active drive and positive belief in the truth 
and right of their discourse, through their 'missionary' drive, that 
the Consultant Paediatrician and the Child Abuse Consultant, in a 
powerful alliance, exercised disciplinary power not only over parents 
and children but also over the knowledge-power and re-active 
(resistance) power of the police surgeons, and over other experts who 
disputed the truth of the sign as a reliable indicator of sexual abuse. 
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The effect of this forceful and charismatic alliance between two 
privileged agents in conflict with other powerful players was that the 
inter-agency power struggle became increasingly personalised. 
Professional values and priorities were forgotten as 'the interests of 
the children became completely submerged.' (Butler Sloss 1988, p100). 
Power struggles over truth and the certainty of meaning, and 
personality clashes between individual agents all of whom had the 
privileged status of those who are charged with saying what counts 
as true intruded into professional discourses and dominated the 
force-field of power relations. 
The Child Abuse Consultant held a privileged and high status position 
comparable within her own agency with that of the Consultant 
Paediatrician; but her power to act was contingent on the meta-
discourse of the latter and the true knowledge-power of her expert 
diagnosis based on the evidence of the sign. Social work does not 
have this diagnostic expertise, although it has borrowed the medical 
language of 'diagnosis' and 'treatment' in its discourses and 
discursive practices. The power of the Child Abuse Consultant 
rested in part on the knowledge-power of the Consultant Paediatrician 
and her discourse. Moreover, the Child Abuse Consultant was more 
accountable within the bureaucratic structure of her organization than 
the Consultant Paediatrician was within her organizational milieu. 
Even as a "consultant" she needed the position power of the Director 
of Social Services to authorise place of safety orders as a standard 
discursive practice. The truth and right of the discourses of these 
two Consultants, together with their status/position power and the 
resource power of their personal drive dominated other powerful 
players. The meta-discourse influenced the Director of Social 
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Services, to whom the Child Abuse Consultant was organizationally 
accountable, and the elected members to whom the Director was 
accountable, to accept the truth of the Consultant Paediatrician's 
diagnosis. 
The Child Abuse Consultant exercised disciplinary power over her 
social work colleagues so that they acted on the instructions 
authorised by the Director of Social Services. Driven both by a 
belief in the true discourse of the Consultant Paediatrician and a 
strongly motivated commitment to the rights of the children to 
protection, she operated disciplinary power over her subordinates. 
The social workers, whose professional discourse and discursive 
practices required them first to investigate allegations of abuse and 
consult with other professionals, were subject to the authority-power, 
knowledge-power, hierarchical position power and status power of the 
Child Abuse Consultant. Seen by parents and observers as powerful 
agents who removed children from their homes and the care of their 
parents, within the organizational context the social workers were 
relatively powerless as they were subject to the disciplinary power of 
the Child Abuse Consultant. The rules of the institution which 
employed them required them to follow the instructions of senior 
"officers. " 
Organizational discourses and professional discourses, sometimes in 
conflict, were among the factors in the struggles between the various 
players, whose employing agencies ascribed to them the right to 
exercise disciplinary power within a structure of rules, systems and 
priorities, features of all organizations through which the boundaries 
of individual autonomy/power are defined. (see chapter 2). For the 
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police, the rules and discourses that govern their disciplinary actions 
require evidence that will stand up in a court. For social services 
departments the rules that govern action, in various contexts within 
which children are perceived to be in danger, are largely 
discretionary and based on a balance of probabilities. The discourses 
of social work require that account must be taken of a range of social 
factors, physical and emotional symptoms, attitudes and statements, 
and the degree and immediacy of harm to which a child is deemed to 
be exposed. 
For the Child Abuse Consultant the balance of probability, based on 
her view that sexual abuse is "'essentially the misuse of power by an 
adult aginst a child,'" was that in any investigation the adult 
concerned 'was likely to continue to misuse and exploit that power.' 
(Butler-Sloss 1988, p81). Her specialised knowledge about the 
problems of child sexual abuse together with the truth of the 
'phenomenon of anal dilatation,' her privileged status/position in the 
agency, her power of sanctions through the resource of place of 
safety orders, enabled her to act. Her knowledge-power, position-
power, sanctions-power, alliance power were interdependent resource 
elements which, together with the discourses of child sexual abuse 
and the right of the child to protection, predominated in the power 
struggles with the police. Her drive and sense of mission, like that 
of the Consultant Paediatrician, played a significant part in this field 
of force relations, leading her forward 'at a faster rate than the 
Police were prepared or able to go.' (ibid p.82). 
Among many social workers, managers and practitioners, with whom I 
have discussed the events in Cleveland in 1987, it was the way in 
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which power was exercised to remove children from the care of their 
parents through the use of place of safety orders, sometimes taking 
children from their beds at night, when the immediacy of risk had not 
been established, which caused most concern and criticism. This 
mechanism for the exercise of disciplinary power has been superceded 
by the Emergency Protection Order in the Children Act 1989. The 
way this resource is used will still depend on the discretionary power 
and discursive practices of the empowered agencies, the social 
services departments of the local authorities and their agents. It is 
through these 'real agents' and their resource-power that the 
mechanisms of disciplinary power are able to function. 
Resource-power falls into a number of categories, some of which 
overlap and which may be both discursive and non-discursive, 
premised in discourse and operating through discursive practices but 
legitimized and acted upon organizationally and structurally by agents 
through status, position, delegated authority, discretion. The 
knowledge-power of expert speakers, the 'serious meaning' of their 
discourse and its relative professional ranking, is one type of 
resource. But clearly it is not the only resource operating in the 
field of power relations. To distinguish between discursive and non-
discursive resources is not useful in understanding the operation of 
power. 
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Some resources are arguably non-discursive, information 
and communication systems for example which are 
technological resources available to privileged agents; also such 
material resources as money, property, labour-power, accommodation. 
But they are activated through ideology and in discursive practices. 
Charisma and missionary drive are resources through which individual 
subjects exercise power; but 'mission' is inevitably founded in the 
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language and thinking of discourse, ideology operates in discursive 
practices, and charisma is a discursive cultural construction. 
Knowledge-power is not the exclusive possession of expert speakers. 
Knowledge is accessible to non-expert individuals who exercise the 
power of personal drive to inform themselves and construct alliances 
with individuals or groups who own or have ready access to expert 
knowledge groups like Parents Against Injustice for example. 
"Expert" knowledge-power is increasingly being resisted in the last 
decades of the twentieth century by a literate and articulate 
population with a will to know and with access to resources through 
which oppositional power may be effectively directed against the 
knowledge-power of the professional agents. These resources include 
Members of Parliament, the media, and oppositional alliances such as 
the Parents Rights Group, Parents Against Injustice, The Voice of the 
Child in Care, etc. whose own resources are knowledge of the law, 
knowledge of the 'systems,' and knowledge of the rules of the game 
and how they may be challenged. Individual drive is a resource that 
is owned by and exercised by free subjects. Used collectively, it 
may effect a shift in the force field of power relations from 
power/resistance to power/power. The events in Cleveland called up 
more than resistance. Through the intervention of external 
influencers who owned or had access to a range of resources, the 
struggle developed into a loose alliance of oppositional powers. The 
"drive" of the Consultant Paediatrician and the Child Abuse 
Consultant was countered by the oppositional drive of other 
interested parties. 
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The analysis of the text of the Butler-Sloss report has identified a 
'multiplicity of force relations' operating in this particular site, in 
which individuals became both the instruments and the objects of 
power. Social workers who were the legitimately empowered agents 
(instruments) of the law and their employing agencies, authorised to 
remove children from the care of their parents, were also objects of 
the authority power of their managers. Their professional discursive 
practices were subj ected to the position power of the Child Abuse 
Consultant and the Director of Social Services. 
This dual positioning of social workers is not unique to the Cleveland 
situation but is often not recognised by their critics who construct 
them as all-powerful. Social workers as well as parents and children 
may be caught up in the playing out of a complex power-game, 
caught between the expert discourses and discursive practices of 
organizationally more privileged players managers, consultants, 
paediatricians, police surgeons, magistrates, MPs, the media; a power-
game in which the power-knowledge and truths of specialised 
professional discourses intersect with the discourses of management, 
with discourses of gender and with the discourses of the law; a 
power-game in which the media play a significant role in their 
function of serving 'the public interest.' The events in Cleveland 
entered the public domain through the media and through the 
complaints made by parents to their Members of Parliament, the state 
officers whose privileged status power gave them access to the 
national media and enabled them to bring the matter to the attention 
of the House of Commons. Privileged forms of power, media power 
and the status power of Members of Parliament, entered into this 
complex field of power relations. The power balance was changed by 
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the intervention of privileged 'external influencers.' A 'moral panic' 
was constructed around social workers and paediatricians as the new 
'folk devils' threatening the institution of the family and thereby the 
whole social order. 
Exercising the hegemonic authority and influence accorded to Members 
of Parliament by virtue of their privileged status power, one of the 
local M.Ps. became deeply involved in the events in Cleveland. He 
made several visits to the hospital where he saw not only parents but 
also the District Manager of the local Health Authority. He was able 
to speak several times with the Director of Social Services, with the 
leader of the County Council and local councillors, and with the 
General Manager of the regional Health Authority. He 'became caught 
up in the media attention being devoted to Cleveland.' He became a 
resource for the media. He was able to hold a press conference. He 
appeared on television. He was able to speak with the Police Surgeon 
and with the Deputy Chief constable to confirm that child sexual 
abuse guidelines had not been operative. He was able to gain access 
to information about the affairs of families and to present to the 
Minister of State for Health a file containing his observations and his 
interpretations of these matters, and to present the "truth" of his 
inquiries in a way that favoured the perspective of the parents. His 
intervention was instrumental in engaging the power of the Minister 
in the setting up of a Statutory Inquiry. (Butler-Sloss 1988, 
pp.163/164). The power of the state in the form of its major 
institution was brought to bear on the knowledge power and 
disciplinary power of the expert professionals, through the agency 
(instrumentality) of the elected representative of the people exercising 
his status power and privilege as a Member of Parliament. The 
184 
hierarchical position power and the status power of the Consultant 
Paediatrician and the Child Abuse Consultant which had dominated 
this field of power relations were in turn dominated by the higher 
status power and parliamentary privilege power of the M.P. 
Status and institutionalised privilege are major resources in power 
relations. The media are privileged by ease of access to individuals 
with status, and by access to the "true" statements provided by 
individuals with status power; privileged by technological resource 
power through which their discourses can reach vast and diverse 
audiences; by expert power through which media professionals are 
able to select that which is "newsworthy" and construct meaning 
through the various forms and emphases which they employ to bring 
"s tories " to specific audiences. The media have become 
institutionalised in modern societies, a central feature of everyday life 
through which we receive our information and which influences the 
way we construct our understanding of the world. Media technologies 
have reconstituted the boundaries between private and public life. 
The media are able to turn the private lives of individuals into public 
events and bring them as news stories into countless homes. As in 
no earlier historical period, information and messages can be made 
available to audiences widely dispersed in time and space. (Thompson 
1990, p.238). The media are able to bring their news stories to 
greater numbers of subjects than ever before in history. Through 
the technologies of message construction, specialised language use and 
graphic forms, the media transmit information selectively and 
persuasively to discrete audiences. The language and style of 
different newspapers, different radio and television channels, are 
addressed to different sections of the reading/listening/viewing 
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public, not only to inform but to influence and reinforce. 'The media 
define for the majority of the population what significant events are 
taking place, but, also, they offer powerful interpretations of how to 
understand these events.' (Hall et ale 1978, p.57). 
It was through the power of the media that the private affairs of 
families in Cleveland became public and that the meaning of these 
events was constructed and the problem defined primarily as an 
infringement of the rights of parents and a fundamental attack on 
family life. Beatrix Camp bell argues that the definition of the 
problem in Cleveland for most of the media was 'not society's crisis in 
confronting sexual abuse, but the tragedy of innocent parents 
wrongly accused.' (Campbell 1988, p.210). (1) A sense of moral outrage 
was engendered, not against the perpetrators of sexual abuse but 
against the way power was exercised by the social workers and 
paediatricians whose exercise of power had been directed to the 
protection of the children. 
Reported first in the local press, the Cleveland "story" was 
subsequently covered comprehensively for weeks by television, radio 
and the national press. The official inquiry found that 'The effect of 
the Press generally, was to underline and increase the importance of 
the story' and to assist the M.P in his efforts to place the crisis in 
the public domain. The report notes the 'danger of the media, even 
by accurate reporting, assisting in a degree of hysteria among the 
public, both locally and nationally;' (Butler-Sloss 1988, p.169). Not 
only was anxiety raised locally, that taking a child who needed 
medical attention to be seen by a paediatrician at the Middlesbrough 
General Hospital might lead to the child being removed from the 
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parent with an allegation of sexual abuse (ibid p.169); the anxiety of 
parents about the possible consequences of seeking medical attention 
and subjecting their children to the medical gaze spread beyond the 
boundaries of Cleveland. It was voiced by parents elsewhere, to 
social workers and health visitors, and even among professional 
workers themselves. The panic was increased by mythical accounts 
of conspiracy among professional workers, initiated by individuals 
with status power and privilege power and disseminated through the 
media. For example, the M.P.'s accusation, made under Parliamentary 
privilege, that the Consultant Paediatrician and the Child Abuse 
Consultant had "'conspired and colluded'" to deny access to the police 
in sexual abuse cases, was reported in all newspapers (Nava 1988 
p.11S), reinforcing public anxiety and the sense of moral outrage. 
The powerful technology of 'inflammatory headlines' reinforced the 
construction of a "'scandal'" that the media themselves were largely 
responsible for promoting. (ibid pp.106,112). 
Thompson argues that what he calls the 'mediazation' process not only 
endows events with the status of 'publicness' but also changes the 
nature of events themselves. (Thompson 1990, p.242). It is not only 
the visibility and publicness that changes the nature of the events 
but also the language and selectivity of media discourses through 
which meaning is constructed and a 'structure of feeling' built up. 
Media discourses may be seen to reflect public opinion but they 
largely create it, through the power of their technologies of 
production and distribution, and through the specialised language of 
their discourses addressed to selected audiences. Editorials that 
claim to be expressing the public's views, through the use of such 
language as "most people believe," or "the public believes," a 
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technology that Hall et al. refer to as taking the public voice, is 'the 
point where the media most actively and openly shape and structure 
public opinion.' Creating and re-presenting public opinion, the media 
'play a critical mediating and connecting role in the formation of 
public opinion, and in orchestrating that opinion together with the 
actions and views of the powerful.' (Hall et al. 1978, pp.63/64). 
Forming, reflecting and reinforcing public opinion, the media in their 
reporting of the Cleveland story constructed what Hall et al. term (in 
the context of a different crisis) a 'spiral of amplification' and a 
'mediating link betwen the apparatus of social control and the public.' 
(ibid). 
Reviewing the press on the events in Cleveland, Mica Nava notes 
how, faced with the conflicting professional discourses of the various 
experts involved in the events in Cleveland, media discourses were 
themselves often confused and contradictory. And 'a phenomenon 
which had hitherto been kept a family secret as a consequence of 
media attention, grew over a period of weeks to occupy a position of 
prominence in public discourse and popular consciousness.' (Nava 
1988, p.103). 
It is largely through media discourses that the expert knowledge and 
the disciplinary power of the professional agents, their serious 
statements and truth claims, have been opened up to widespread 
public scrutiny and debate. But at the local and micro level, in their 
inter-personal relations with subjects, the privileged discursive 
practices of the professional agents predominate. 
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The operation of power at the local level, where the privileged 
professional discourses and discursive practices of social work agents 
intersect with institutionalised agency discourses and with the 
discourses of the law, is analysed and discussed in the next chapter. 
An inter-disciplinary child protection case conference is analysed to 
illustrate power relations between professional agents and subjects 
and among a range of professional agents. Through this analysis I 
provide an insider's view from my own experience of the hierarchy of 
discourses, the hidden agendas and the power games that permeate 
this arena of power relations. 
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Note to Chapter 7: 
(1) For a feminist reading of the events in Cleveland in 1987 see 
Beatrix Campbell, Unofficial Secrets. Child sexual Abuse The 
Cleveland Case. (London, Virago, 1988). 
Also Feminist Review No.28 (January 1988) 
Although there were undoubtedly underlying agendas of male/female 
power relations operating in both directions among the professional 
agents and other interested parties, gender issues were not the most 
significant feature of the Cleveland affair - other than the overriding 
issue that the sexual abuse of children is known to be perpetrated 
predominantly by men. Until the intervention of the clergyman and 
the Member of Parliament the dominant players, the Consultant 
Paediatrician and the Child Abuse Consultant, were both women; but 
the fact that they were women was coincidental. Their operation of 
disciplinary power was contingent on the knowledge/truth of their 
professional discourses, their privileged institutionalised status, and 
their alliance with the Director of Social Services, not on their 
gender. And it was through Parliamentary privilege, not gender 
power, that the M.P. was able to constitute an oppositional force. Even 
though, as Mica Nava posits, the Press 'controlled the parameters of 
the meanings' that were produced, and transformed the Consultant 
Paediatrician into 'a symbol - a standard bearer of feminism,' (Nava 
1988, p.116), these were peripheral issues against the serious and 
complex issue of the power relation between professional knowledge-
power privileged by the enforceable right of authority, and the rights 
of children and the rights and responsibilities of parents. 
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8. POWER RELATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL _ 
THE DISCOURSES AND DISCURSIVE PRACTICES OF SOCIAL WORK (1) 
Among the 'real agents' responsible for the functioning of the 
mechanisms of power, those who Foucault posits 'we need to identify' 
and 'investigate,' (Foucault 1980 (i), p.100) are social workers in the 
public sector employed by local authorities. Not only are they 
privileged by the specialised knowledge and status of their 
professional discourses, which positions them in a dominant relation 
with subjects; they are additionally privileged by their status as 
agents of the law which authorises them to exercise disciplinary 
power over subjects, some of whom may be unwilling users of their 
services. 
Social work can be subsumed within the general category of the 
human sciences and, as it operates in the public sector, among the 
range of state apparatuses through which disciplinary power is 
exercised. However, while social workers are represented as "having" 
and exercising considerable power both over subj ects who transgress 
certain social norms and over scarce resources (day care, residential 
care, support services, for example), there is an ambiguity about 
social work as a science, as a profession and as a source of 
disciplinary power. 
There is no single unitary text that "is" social work. It encompasses 
the language and meanings of a range of professional discourses from 
which its body of knowledge and expertise is derived - sociology, 
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social history, psychoanalytic theory, psychology, the law and the 
justice system. Like the other "human sciences" its scientific base is, 
as Foucault posits about the human sciences generally, indeed 
dubious. While the discursive practices of local authority social 
work are informed by a range of theories and methodologies (Roberts 
and Nee 1970; Rojeck et al 1988), and are regulated by rules and 
procedures, its methods follow no strictly prescriptive formulae. Its 
outcomes are not precisely measurable against validated criteria. The 
language of its discourses is descriptive and qualitative rather than 
rigorously specific. Through its discursive practices, addressed to 
the provision of services, social work is in a relationship with people, 
and people are not ciphers. People have feelings, and people's 
"needs" are not only for services but also that their feelings, their 
emotions, should be understood and respected. The discourses and 
discursive practices of social work encompass understanding 
interpersonal relationships and "working with" feelings. Social 
workers too have feelings, not least about the political power, 
institutionalised in the organizations which employ them, which 
dominates their professional discourses. This requires them to 
prioritise and ration resources and so marginalise the people into 
whose lives they intrude to assess their "needs," which they are then 
unable (do not have the resource power) to satisfy. When individuals 
feel angry and powerless through the refusal of services for what 
they perceive to be their legitimate needs, and blame the social 
workers, the social workers too may have feelings of anger and 
powerlessness. 
New legislation, such as the Children Act 1989 and the NHS and 
Community Care Act 1990, is not deemed by central government to 
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require the level of financial resourcing that the service providers 
themselves estimate as necessary in order to implement the 
legislation's declared intention of responding to assessed need. While 
the agents necessarily exercise control (power) at the local level over 
the deployment of resources, the specialised knowledge that informs 
their estimate of requirements is dominated and overruled by the 
political power of governments and finance managers. Not only is 
rationing inevitable, but the rationing systems of social services 
departments are not to be made explicit. According to a study 
financed early in 1993 by the non-political Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation just prior to the implementation of the NHS and Community 
Care Act 1990, guidelines issued by the Social Services Inspectorate 
warned Directors of Social Services that if they told clients the 
services they needed and then were unable to provide them, they 
could face legal action. Their suggested advice was that they should 
record unmet choice instead of unmet need. (The Independent 30.3.93). 
Thus a new language use, fraught with ambiguities over the meaning 
of need and choice, was forced into social work discourse to protect 
the providers of services and to confuse and mystify the people 
wanting/needing services. 
As customers/consumers we all have to measure our wants against 
our financial resources. If our resources are insufficient to satisfy 
all that we want, we have no legitimate option but to make choices, 
distinguishing those things that we deem to be essential to our 
personal definition of an acceptable quality of life, our needs, from 
those that we believe to be desirable but not essential, our wants. 
The difference between "needs" and "wants" is the difference between 
those things we categorise as essential and those things we would 
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like to have, would choose to have, if our resources would allow for 
this after our essential needs have been met. There is an 
indeterminate boundary between needs and wants; and "essential 
needs" and "quality of life" are subjective notions open to 
interpretation and the vagaries of contemporary cultural norms. 
The majority of individuals owning the resource power of surplus 
money, or credit, beyond what is required to satisfy basic essential 
needs - food, clothing, shelter and warmth - have the choice to 
determine for themselves how they will provide for an acceptable 
quality of life. As customers with financial resource power we have 
the right and the discretionary power to shop selectively both for 
our basic needs and our wants, to the extent that our resources will 
allow; and to take our custom where we believe we will get the best 
value and the best service for our money. Parents with financial 
resource power may, for example, choose to buy selected daycare for 
their young children, defining their own need and their children's 
need and operating the power of free choice. Parents who lack 
financial resource power are dependent on the definition of need by 
social services agents and on the limited daycare provision of the 
local authority. 
Through the machinery of the law, the state has recognised that 
certain individuals, children and adults, have a "need" for, and a 
right to, a range of health and social services provided by the state 
through its agencies. So there are 'children in need,' children who 
need services provided by the state, 'broadly defined as children 
whose health and welfare may suffer significantly without support 
from social services, and children who have a disability.' (Department 
of Health 1991 (ii)(a), p.7); and there are frail elderly people and 
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adults with disabilities who have particular physical and emotional 
needs and who have a right to public services to enable them to live 
as independently as possible in their own homes; and there are the 
carers of these people who are recognised as having a need for, and 
a right to, support from the public services to enable them to 
continue their caring role (without which the costs to public funds 
would be vastly greater) - the concept of caring on which the NHS 
and Community Care Act 1990 is premised. But individuals who 
believe themselves to be in need of such services have no unqualified 
right to receive services or to specify the extent to which services 
should be provided in order to meet their needs. The "welfare 
state," through its benefits system and its provision of public 
services, has recognised an obligation to those of its citizens with 
special needs; needs which outstrip their personal resources of ability 
and money and who consequently are unable to provide for 
themselves those things which are essential to an acceptable quality 
of life. But the right to define need, to define what is an acceptable 
qUality of life and what is essential to achieve it, is determined in the 
last instance not by those who need the services but by the agents 
of the state, 'those who are charged with saying what counts as 
true,' operating discretionary power through the apparatuses of the 
local authorities. 
The institutionalised position power of the agents, however, is itself 
limited by the rules of the organizations through which they operate. 
While the agents carry with them in their relations with subj ects the 
authority power of their agencies, the agents are themselves subject 
to the disciplinary power (the operational rules) of their employing 
organizations. Exercising their authority and professional knowledge 
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power over subjects in the assessment of "needs," the power of the 
agents to provide the services to meet those needs is limited by the 
rules and procedures that regulate the discursive practices of the 
organization. The legislation requires that those who need services 
shall participate in the assessment of their needs; but they are 
subject to the hidden rationing power of the agencies providing the 
services. At the interface between the applicant for services and the 
social worker/agent of the organization, the social worker is 
privileged by professional knowledge and by agency authority, and 
by knowledge of the discursive practices and language of management 
discourse through which services are rationed. The professional 
assessor of "needs" knows and must take account of the management 
discourse and the rationing power of those who control the resources. 
The provision of service will be determined partly by the professional 
discourses of the social worker agent operating in a power relation 
with the applicant, but overridingly by the resource-management 
discourse of the agency which dominates the professional discourses 
of its agents, and which regulates the provision of services. 
Unlike free customers seeking services who can exercise their power 
of choice to take their custom elsewhere, the "customers" and would-
be users of local authority services, if dissatisfied, have nowhere else 
to go. They are subject to a "professional" assessment of their 
needs, sometimes by non-professional ("unqualified") agents, and 
denied the power to assess their needs for themselves. Indirectly, 
they are subject to the institutionalised power of the organization, its 
rules and procedures and its discursive practices, (which dominate 
also the professional discourses of the agents). The 
customers/consumers of the personal social services in the public 
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sector do not have the power of freedom of choice about where they 
will shop or about who will serve them. They can receive services 
only from a specified location in the constituency where they are 
resident. They will be "served" by an agent not of their choice but 
to whom they will be "allocated." The consumers of personal social 
services do not have the right, or the power, to determine their own 
needs or how those needs will be met. 
So, for example, daycare provision for young children is a "need" 
articulated by significant numbers of parents, as well as by health 
visitors and social workers. Since the daycare resource in the public 
sector is insufficient to meet the demand, the service can be provided 
only to a limited number of potential users on the basis of priority 
need assessed by professional agents. The reality of need 
experienced by parents who are refused the service is thus denied. 
The agents who ration the service are likely to be "recognised" as 
powerful arbiters of "who gets what;" but the discursive practices 
through which their rationing power operates - admission panels, 
organizationally prescribed priority criteria - set boundaries around 
their discretionary power. The knowledge and position power of the 
agents at one level dominates their relationship with consumers of 
services; but at the organizational level the agents are themselves 
subject to the institutionalised power of the organization; and they 
are constrained by a use of language that re-constructs need as 
"choice. " 
Social work discourse is sensitive to the disempowering effects of 
language, the implicit dependency of "client," the cumbersome 
designation of "consumer," and the ambiguity of "customer." 
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Uneasily enmeshed in the local authority business and market culture 
that has replaced the culture of public service, social work tries out 
the appellation of "users" of services. We are all users/consumers of 
universally provided local authority services. For some of them we 
may even cross geographical boundaries; highways, parks, for 
example. Users, consumers, customers of local authority personal 
social services, however, may not choose where to go for the services 
they need. They may "use" such services through institutionalised 
discursive practices in which they are not involved; through systems 
of definition, of "referral," "prioritising," "allocation," sub-contracting 
out, or re-referring elsewhere if the requested service does not fit 
into the categories that inform the practices of the particular agency. 
They may be denied services, or they may have services imposed 
upon them as unwilling users, i.e. as "receivers" of services. Among 
the unwilling receivers of services are, for example, parents whose 
assessment of their child's needs does not conform with the expert 
assessment of professional agents, parents who will not willingly co-
operate with them. (see case study below). 
The articulated needs of an individual (or family) for personal social 
services addressed to a local authority social services department, 
either directly or through an external agent such as a health visitor, 
are re-constituted in agency discourse as a "referral." Their needs 
and information about their circumstances will be recorded and 
categorised and entered into the organizational system through which 
it will be interpreted and processed. What is experienced by the 
individual or referring agent as an urgent and legitimate need may 
not be interpreted as such by the agents or may not fit into the 
priority discourses of the agency. The need will have to fit into a 
198 
category, be measured against the needs of others and against the 
resources of the particular agency and its priority /rationing/sub-
contracting system. The provision of public services is uneven 
across the country. Response to various types, categories and 
immediacy of need depends largely on the chance of location and the 
political power that dominates local agency discourses and discursive 
practices. The politics of resource management as demand exceeds 
availability cuts into the professional discourses of assessed need. 
A "gatekeeping" system eliminates those requests for services that 
are deemed to be inappropriate to the agency. If a request for 
service is allowed to enter the system as a legitimate referral, the 
citizen will become constituted a client, not yet "served" but to be 
"allocated" to a worker for "assessment." The consent of the client 
to the designated worker is not required. If clients/users/receivers 
of services do not like the worker to whom they are allocated they 
may request a change; but the agency has the discretionary power 
whether to respond to such a request. If the request is refused a 
client has no other available option. Some clients will receive priority 
service; not necessarily in accordance with their own definition of 
the urgency of their need but as defined in the discourses and 
discursive practices of the agency. Social workers, however 
uncomfortable about non-priority clients and those whose self-
assessed needs are not provided for, know only too well that with 
demand outstripping resources, whatever is provided for one person 
inevitably means that some other person will go without. As 
management discourses intersect with their professional discourses, 
their professional practices are mediated by resource rationing 
systems. 
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As in the market generally, the users/receivers of local authority 
services have the right to complain - in accordance with formal 
institutionalised discursive practices set up by the organization 
against which they are complaining. The rules and procedures are 
laid down by the management agents of the organization. In the first 
instance a complaint is likely to be investigated by the agents of the 
organization. The complainants are not free to take their custom 
elsewhere if they do not feel satisfied with what the service 
providers offer or with the outcome of their complaints. They can 
take their complaints further, to an Ombudsman for example who may 
identify maladministration. But if their complaint is that their 
"needs" have not been met, all will depend on interpretation and the 
way that need is defined and distinguished from "choice. " External 
influencers, local councillors or Members of Parliament, frequently 
intercede on behalf of their constituents; but professional agents, 
with their detailed knowledge and "expert" interpretation of the 
circumstances, are skilful in explaining and defending their position 
against complaints. Social workers, housing officers, senior managers, 
legal advisers, may constitute powerful alliances against subjects who 
complain. 
Local authority social workers are caught up in a complex dilemma -
between the discursive practices and culture of their agencies which 
position them as agents of control and rationers of scarce resources, 
their professional discourses which premise the moral and legal rights 
of each individual to have his/her needs objectively assessed and 
met, their professional commitment to the particular individuals with 
whom they are directly engaged, and their own personal interests. 
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Castigated in the media as a so-called "caring" profession that does 
not care, many local authority social workers are involved in in-house 
power struggles over the management of resources and the needs of 
clients who are not being "served;" while, perhaps, mindful of their 
jobs and career aspirations in a climate of "voluntary" redundancies 
and the elimination of posts. 
If people articulating their need for public services feel marginalised 
(put-down) by the agents of social services departments as though 
they were being too demanding and unrealistic in their expectations, 
these agents themselves often feel anger, frustration and despair. 
They know that because of limited resources the legitimate needs of 
people for services will not be met. 
through which they interpret and 
Their professional knowledge 
assess the circumstances of 
applicants for services and define their needs is dominated by the 
rationing power of the resource providers. Organizational rules 
regulate and "discipline" the discretionary power of the agents. The 
resistance of the agents to inadequate resource provision is 
ineffectual, as the only form of power which these workers can 
exercise is to withdraw from the power struggle over resources and 
leave the agency. This unilateral course of action will not be of 
service to those in need. There is a long history in social services 
departments of vacant posts left unfilled for considerable periods, 
sometimes opportunely deleted. And the scarcity power of qualified 
social worker expertise, dominant in the 1970s, has diminished. As 
in the employment market generally in the 1990s, professional workers 
are replaceable and expendable. In the market culture, knowledge-
power is dominated by resource power. The organizational power of 
the resource managers predominates over the professional discourses 
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and specialised knowledge of the agents who exercise power over 
subjects. 
The managers themselves, their professional/management discourses, 
are dominated by the political discourses and resource power of the 
government. Even the combined knowledge power of a majority of 
Directors of Social Services was ineffectual in the power struggle with 
Ministers when they argued the case in 1993 that the Children Act 
1989 already implemented and the NHS and Community Care Act 1990 
about to be implemented were each under-resourced. In Ministerial 
discourse the need they articulated for additional resources was 
interpreted as unrealistic; the under-staffed professionals were told 
by their political masters to get on with it and manage. Their 
"needs" like those of the "users" were subject to the power of the 
centre, the state. 
The power to control resources, ultimately the institutionalised power 
of Ministers of State, is a vital factor in power relations between 
central government and the institutions of local government; and, by 
extension, between the local managers of resources and those 
professions which Foucault perceives as exercising disciplinary power 
over subjects. Notwithstanding the knowledge-power of the 
specialised disciplines and the influence on policies of their 'serious 
statements' and 'truth claims,' the discursive practices of health care, 
education, social work in the 1990s are all dominated and disciplined 
by the discourse of resource management and by the institutionalised 
power of the organizations within which the agents operate. Within 
each service in the public sector, the resource power of the state and 
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the disciplinary power of institutionalised resource management is 
dominant. 
In its contemporary form, social work operates predominantly in the 
public sector through the institution of local government, at once 
empowered and constrained by the authority and the rules and 
structures of public sector management, in an uneasy power 
relationship between professional and local authority discourses. 
With resources under central government control and services having 
of necessity to be rationed, resource power operates at all levels 
across and within the departments of local government organizations 
as political decisions are made about who gets what; at one level, 
decisions about how resources will be spread among different "client 
groups;" at another level, how much each individual user of services 
will get. Social workers employed by local authorities are local 
government officers as well as specialised professionals. They are 
subject to the disciplinary power of the local authority, and they are 
institutionalised within its hierarchical and departmentalised culture 
and its management structures. Caught up in the power struggles 
over resources, their professional knowledge power and their power 
to "act" is dominated by the power of the managers who control 
resources at each level in the management hierarchy. 
The managers and supervisors who exercise disciplinary power over 
social workers by supervising their work and controlling local 
resources, are themselves social workers. They are privileged by 
their specialised knowledge which positions them in a dominant power 
relation with subjects; and they are privileged also by their 
position/status within the organization through which they exercise 
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power over other social workers. They have not "become" managers 
singularly through their resource of knowledge-power but also 
through their personal resources, their drive and the need to achieve 
the status of management. Unlike their peers who likewise own the 
privileging resource of specialised knowledge, they have aspired to 
achieve a structural position through which position power and status 
reinforce knowledge-power. The processes through which individuals 
achieve position and status begin with motivation and the drive to 
satisfy their own needs. 
If the interrelation between knowledge and power is accepted, the 
drive to acquire knowledge, whether or not recognised as such, is a 
response to a need to achieve the power that knowledge confers on 
the individual; the power to gain employment in a chosen field, to 
achieve financial reward for specialised knowledge, to achieve position 
power; and to be able to exercise power over others who lack the 
resource of specialised knowledge, those who do not speak, and may 
not speak, the specialised language of professional discourse. For 
some individuals, the drive to achieve distinctive recognition, status, 
financial reward, is a personal resource through which they achieve 
organizational position power, the 'enforceable right to command 
others.' (Lenski 1986). Through this form of power they may influence 
and exercise control over other privileged professionals, as well as 
directly or indirectly operate power over the users and potential 
users of services. 
Knowledge is one aspect of a complex configuration of power. For the 
achievers of organizational power, the specialised knowledge that 
informs the professional/ideological discourses and discursive 
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practices through which power is operated over subjects becomes 
conflated with the discourses and discursive practices of management. 
When resources are insufficient in the personal social services to 
meet identified need, as in the "real world" they invariably are, the 
managers must reconcile the discourse and ideology of social work 
based on the value of the individual and his/her rights, with the 
conflicting discourse of resource management and the political market 
ideology of "value for money." 
The gap between the political view of the world and the real world as 
individuals experience it widens, as services in the public sector are 
eroded while evidence grows of the enormity and variety of need 
among certain categories of the population; the needs of children 
disadvantaged by poverty or disability, of adults with disabilities, of 
mentally frail people, of physically infirm people, of very old people, 
and of the "carers" without whose unpaid work the "needs" 
addressed to the social services departments of local authorities would 
be even greater. Janus-like, the social workers as managers must 
face two ways. As social workers/supervisors they are guardians of 
the discourses and discursive practices of social work; and as 
managers they are accountable guardians of the purse, dominated by 
the discursive power of administrators and accountants, the 
controllers of resources on which the operation, the putting into 
action, of the specialised professional knowledge-power of the human 
sciences is dependent. 
Control and disciplinary power over professional agents, as well as 
over ancillary workers, is exercised through the institutionalised 
discursive practices of organizations by their appointed management 
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agents. In social services departments these agents are social 
workers who acquire a new identity through their re-positioning in 
the hierarchy as seniors, team leaders, area managers etc.; who 
supervise those lower down in the hierarchy and who themselves are 
subject to the surveillance of more senior managers. Unlike the 
specialised knowledge-power that dominates relations between the 
worker as local authority agent and the client as user or unwilling 
receiver of services, it is the structural position power within the 
organization that is the dominant factor in power relations between 
supervisor and supervisee. In local authority social services 
departments, "supervision" is a form of surveillance that is 
supportive and protective but is also covertly disciplinary and 
controlling, addressed not only to professional discourses but also to 
departmental discourses of resource management, and to agency rules 
and procedures. The supervisor, privileged by hierarchical position, 
by organizationally ascribed status, and by financial reward, shares 
the overall responsibility for the management of the workers "cases" 
within a complex field of power relations. These power relations 
encompass qualified and unqualified social workers, supervisors and 
senior managers as well as clients/users/receivers of services; power 
relations that are over-determined by gender, race and cultural 
positioning as well as by professional knowledge, organizational 
positioning and agency discourses. 
Only rarely are users/receivers of services "served" by social 
services personnel from the same cultural, ethnic, religious 
background. Black social workers are generally in a minority even in 
social services departments serving a local population with a high 
proportion of disadvantaged black people; they are most likely to be 
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supervised by white middle class supervisors; while for black female 
social workers supervised by white males there is an additional power 
dimension of gender as well as race. Organizations with declared 
policies of non-discrimination and equal opportunities are still seen to 
privilege white males in senior management positions in a 
predominantly female workforce. 
The discourse of power relations within agencies as well as between 
workers and clients, has entered into the agendas of social work 
training courses in the 1990s. For many social work students on 
placement in social services departments, particularly black women, 
the power imbalance in the departments where they carry out their 
placement is perceived as a personal and political issue. Not only has 
their training made them sensitive to the power relation between 
themselves and the users/receivers of services; they are aware also 
of the power relation between themselves and the social workers who 
act as their practice teachers, most often white, middle class social 
workers designated to oversee and report to the training colleges on 
the students' work in their placements. They note the power 
relations within the agency that in a predominantly female 
workforce the majority of senior management posts are held by white 
males; that black people are under-represented at all levels within 
the department; that secretarial and administrative posts are 
predominantly staffed by women, and even so, mostly by white women. 
Black students have remarked on the particular anomoly of this type 
of hierarchical configuration in locations largely populated by ethnic 
minority groups.<2) The discourse of institutionalised oppression and 
the discourse of power relations have begun to permeate the more 
traditional discourses that inform the meta-discourse of social work. 
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But the traditional discourses and the "received ideas" of social work 
(Rojeck et ale 1988) continue to predominate; and the structural, 
cultural and institutionalised inequalities in power relations among the 
providers of services as well as between providers and the 
users/receivers of personal social services persist. 
Unlike the users of public local authority services (highways, parks, 
libraries etc.) who are anonymous local citizens, becoming "known" to 
a social services department as a user/receiver of personal services 
re-constitutes an individual or family in social work discourse as a 
client, the subject of a "case." Having been "referred," or self-
referred, made known, to a social services department, having passed 
through the gatekeeping procedure and been accepted (constituted) 
as a client, detailed information about the social environment and 
circustances of the potential user(s)/receiver(s) of services is 
required, to be recorded and constituted as a case file. The source 
of the information in the first instance may not be the client. 
Professional workers in other local authority departments and other 
agencies, some of them state agencies, education departments, health 
clinics for example, are part of the surveillance network that is 
everywhere, always already there. Their power of surveillance over 
the population is unlimited; but their power to act is limited and 
regulated by agency discourses and discursive practices and by the 
law. They are required (disciplined) to inform and co-operate with 
the appointed agencies, the social services departments, in 
investigating situations of risk or "need" as specified in various 
statutes, the Children Act 1989, the National Assistance Acts 1947 and 
1984, the Mental Health Act 1983, etc. 
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A referral through which an individual or family is constituted as a 
client does not necessarily come through an "agency." A referral can 
come from anywhere. Any member of the public may refer, may 
become a referral agent, may provide information about an individual 
or family, even without their knowledge, to a social services 
department which "has" the responsibility and the discretionary 
power ascribed by law to act or not to act. The agents of social 
services departments are singularly privileged by law to act in 
statutorily prescribed circumstances and to operate their professional 
discretion; they are authorised to act upon the actions of others and 
to exercise, as its agents, the ultimate disciplinary power of the law. 
They are privileged by the availability to them of legal agents within 
the local authority, and through their alliances with other professional 
agents. They are privileged by the legally ascribed power of their 
agency which delegates its power to individual agents. This power, 
the authority power of the agents prescribed in law, is always there, 
whether in action or as the capacity for action. 
The professional workers, the agents of the department and indirectly 
of the law, must interpret the referral information and consider 
whether it falls within the statutory responsibilities of the agency. 
The specialised knowledge of their professional discourses and their 
knowledge of the statutes which empower them legitimise the 
interpretations of the agents. If the referral is interpreted as the 
responsibility of the agency, it will be entered into the system to be 
categorised, prioritised and sooner or later allocated, depending on 
the discursive practices of the particular agency and the subjective 
professional reading of the information and perceived degree of risk 
and urgency. The power to act, the authorisation to investigate, to 
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intervene in the lives of even unwilling clients, is a power ascribed 
by the state, through the apparatus of the law, to certain of its 
agents. They exercise the power of the law as its privileged 
instruments. While the statutes prescribe the limits within which the 
agents of the law must operate and thus mediate their power, they 
are "recognised" by users and receivers of services as powerful, 
sometimes too-powerful, agents of the local authority with the right to 
intervene in people's lives. 
Carrying with them the authority of the agency and the authority of 
the law, recognised by subjects as having the 'enforceable right' 
(Lenski 1986) to act, the agents are "admitted" into the lives of 
individuals and families in a power relation determined both by their 
specialised professional knowledge and, primarily, by the authority 
and the status conferred upon them as official agents. 
The agents authorised to intervene in people's lives and acquire 
information about them are not always professionally qualified. Their 
power relation with users/receivers of services derives from the 
status and authority conferred upon them by their agencies as 
persons positioned as agents. They are thereby authorised to seek 
information and to act on behalf of the agency. They may be 
"recognised" as social workers. While unqualified agents lack the 
knowledge-power of specialised training, their common-sense discourse 
is informed by their acculturalisation into the discourses and 
discursive practices of the agency. Through their status as agents, 
their experience of the agency and its discursive practices and the 
discretion the agency allows them in their unobserved interactions 
with clients, unqualified workers are able to exercise disciplinary 
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power and resource-rationing power in their relations with subjects 
who are users/receivers of services. A considerable amount of work 
with elderly clients, for example, living in their own homes, attending 
day centres and in residential care, has historically been undertaken 
by unqualified workers. "Supportive" and "monitoring" work with 
families, even major life changes such as permanent entry into 
residential care, have sometimes been allocated to unqualified workers. 
While the information they acquire is re-constructed into the 
specialised language of 'serious meaning' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982 
p.49) in the professional discourses of their supervisors to whom they 
report, to whom they are subordinate and who exercise position power 
and knowledge power over them, unqualified workers themselves 
exercise status power and knowledge power in their direct interface 
with clients. They exercise discretionary power in the content and 
style of their feedback to their supervisors. 
The information the agents acquire and record about users/receivers 
of services, and the "professional" interpretation of that information, 
constitute the text of a case file. The discursive practice of 
maintaining case files on users and receivers of services is one of the 
control mechanisms through which agents operate the services, 
exercise disciplinary power, and also protect themselves in the face of 
public scrutiny. The case file record is the basis for taking action. 
It may for example provide cumulative evidence for action through the 
courts to protect a child and to constitute an adult as a child-abuser. 
Facts are often open to different interpretations and evidence may 
not be clear cut. Minor bruising on a child, for example, may be 
accidental. Recurrent bruising may be accidental. The circumstances, 
the explanations, the "fit" between the inj uries and the explanations, 
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the child's behaviour, have to be explored and recorded. Not only 
the facts and the interpretation of the facts by the social worker 
agents, but also the specialised knowledge and interpretations of 
other professional agents is often required. Paediatricians for 
example, through their specialised knowledge and experience, are 
better qualified than social workers to assess the nature and extent 
of physical injury and whether an injury is consistent with the 
explanation offered; to interpret injury as non-accidental, that is to 
say as child abuse. A failure to "read" and correctly interpret the 
signs, to record and to take action, can lead to serious consequences. 
Official Inqiries into child deaths through physical abuse or severe 
neglect have sometimes been critical of the failure of social worker 
agents to keep adequate records, their failure to make clear in their 
records the basis on which decisions to act or not to act were 
reached, and their failure to take protective action when recorded 
evidence indicated that such action should have been taken. 
(Department of Health 1991 (iv). 
Information received and recorded in case files in social services 
departments is subject to the Access to Personal Files Act 1987. But 
a great deal of information held on agency files is not available to 
clients. The complex text that comprises a social services case 
record, in addition to information provided directly by a client, is 
likely to contain "information" from a range of other sources, from 
family and social contacts, from concerned or hostile neighbours, from 
teachers, doctors, health visitors, psychologists, psychiatrists, the 
police. While a declared policy of client access to records informs the 
discursive practices of social services departments and should enable 
clients to have access to what is written down about them, control of 
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the content of file records, and ease of access, depends on 
organizational gatekeeping procedures, such as permitted exclusions 
and the requirement for formal written requests for access from the 
clients. 
Even prior to the Act some departments were making extracts of their 
case files available to clients on request; for example, young people in 
care or who had been in care were enabled to read sections of their 
case files, with explanation of exclusions and with "emotional support" 
from a social worker. Certain information, however, was and is 
protected from disclosure. Information recorded prior to 
implementation of the Act need not be disclosed; information that is 
considered by professional experts to be potentially damaging, for 
example information about parents that they do not wish a child to 
know or information that a child does not wish its parents to know, 
may be withheld; and any information provided by "third" parties may 
not be disclosed without the permission of the third party. 
A long drawn out debate among social workers about what should and 
should not be entered onto case files that could be made available to 
clients preceded the Access to Personal Files Act. There was 
concern about opinions recorded as facts and about "judgemental" 
styles of recording that constructed users/receivers of services as, 
for example, "difficult" clients. It had long been the practice of some 
social workers to record in detail their "thinking-through" of complex 
situations, their interpretations, judgements and decisions, the 
professional disagreements over interpretations and opinions, and the 
agency's inability to provide the necessary resources to satisfy 
professionally assessed needs. The social work discourse of respect 
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for the client, which abhors secrecy, judgemental attitudes and 
behaviour, stops short of sharing all this with the client. While it 
extends to "involving" the client in the case record process, social 
workers, privileged by their position-power, retain the discretion to 
decide what is and is not to be recorded and made available. During 
the professional debate on client access to their records it was 
suggested that social workers might keep a second, private record 
comprising working papers that would not be part of the case file 
and to which a client would not have access. It was suggested also 
that clients might be invited to add their own comments to their file 
records; but it is not statutorily required that this facility must be 
made available to them. A person can, however, ask for information 
held on file or computer records to be changed if it is incorrect. 
(Department of Health 1991 (ii)(a), p.12). 
Clients, users and receivers of services constituted as cases, are 
"allocated" to qualified and unqualified workers through the 
discursive procedures of management. The supervisor, team-leader 
or manager (the terminology varies), exercising hierarchical position-
power over professional as well as non-professional workers, has the 
responsibility for ensuring that the statutory work of the agency is 
carried out as far as resources of time and skills will allow, and that 
as much high priority work as possible is allocated. The workers' 
choices are limited by the concept of priority cases and by the 
position power of the supervisor/manager. 
The concept of priority, whether in relation to a constituted case or a 
referral interpreted as an emergency, derives from the discourse of 
risk, the perceived degree of physical injury to an adult or child, or 
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the immediacy of physical or mental deterioration, based on the 
professional interpretation of the available information. An emergency 
referral or priority case may be allocated to social workers jointly if 
the work required appears to be highly complex or likely to put an 
individual worker at risk of physical injury, a not uncommon 
experience for social workers interacting with physically violent 
people or mentally unstable people. Such risk is not often recognised 
in Ministerial calculations of resource requirements or in public 
debates about the "draconian" power of social workers. In non-
urgent circumstances, "priority" is sometimes determined by the 
discursive practice of senior managements giving privileged treatment 
to powerful external influencers, such as M.Ps or local councillors 
intervening on behalf of their constituents. Their status-power 
predominates over the professional knowledge-power of social workers 
who, having interpreted the client situation not as one of urgency, 
are required by management discourses to treat it as such. 
Social workers may "bid" for cases that interest them, for which they 
have particular expertise, and/or which they believe will enable them 
to develop expertise in certain areas of work. However, the 
knowledge-power of the professional worker, dominant in the 
client/worker relationship, is dominated in the organizational context 
by managerial position-power. The supervisor/manager may exercise 
hierarchical position-power to require an experienced worker to take 
on a case that the worker would prefer not to take. This might be a 
case categorised as high priority complex work that must be allocated 
to a worker who has the necessary expertise, which may be in short 
supply. The manager may disallow a worker to take on a case which 
the supervisor defines as too complex in relation to the worker'S 
215 
professional knowledge and experience, or that the supervisor 
considers will overburden the worker's caseload. The discursive 
practice of case allocation is likely to be one of negotiation; but in 
some circumstances, as seemed to have happened in Cleveland in 1987, 
it may become directive, as managers operate organizational position 
power over caseload management. 
The discourse of "caseload" in social work is problematic. Caseloads 
cannot readily be measured quantitively in any meaningful way 
without taking account of the complexity of the intersecting and 
sometimes conflicting dicourses that constitute many of the cases with 
which social workers operate. Managers in social services 
departments have for years grappled with the difficulty of assessing 
caseloads qualitatively. Attempts to measure cases and caseloads have 
had to take account of the complexity and range of a number of 
indeterminate factors: a worker's involvement with interpersonal 
relationships, which are often hostile and violent within the "client 
group" and sometimes directed towards the social worker; the 
assessment and containment of risk, sometimes risk of serious injury 
or even risk to life; the balance of probabilities on which many 
decisions must be taken; legal ramifications, court work and statutory 
responsibilities. While specialist and "voluntary" social work 
agencies work with a limited and selected, often self-selected, range 
of clients, the social services departments of local authorities are 
required by statute to work with unwilling receivers of services, to 
provide a range of services locally to children and families, people of 
all ages with learning difficulties or physical dis ablities , people with 
mental health problems, elderly frail people, people with "social" 
problems. They are also required to accept and investigate referrals 
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from other agencies which might require the exercise of statutory 
powers delegated to local authority agents as agents of the state; the 
investigation of child abuse for example. Social workers in the public 
sector have a complex identity - as "caring" professionals working in 
partnership with users of services; as local government officers 
exercising disciplinary power over subjects, while subject themselves 
to the discourses and discursive practices of their agencies; as the 
instruments through which other professional agents operate 
disciplinary power over subjects; and as agents of the state, subject 
to central government control of resources while exercising authorised 
surveillance over the population. 
Internally in the public sector, social work has developed out of the 
former children'S departments, welfare departments and mental health 
departments, since the implementation in 1971 of the Seebohm Report 
recommendations (Seebohm 1968) for generic rather than separate, 
specialist departments. In everyday practice, the discourses and 
discursive practices of the former departments persist. A great deal 
of "welfare" type of social work is still carried out by workers who 
are not professionally qualified; mental health work has increasingly 
become a specialism requiring specific training in addition to the 
basic professional social work training; and child protection work, 
particularly since the emergence over the past decade of a high 
incidence of child abuse throughout the population, has likewise called 
for additional training programmes and it attracts some of the most 
experienced qualified workers. 
Through the discursive practices of social work departments, certain 
categories of workers are marginalised and exploited even while they 
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operate the legitimate authority power of the agency. Unqualified 
"social workers," those who have not completed a training course 
recognised by the Central Council for Education and Training in 
Social Work (CCETSW), largely carry out the lower status "welfare" 
work with elderly, frail or disabled persons. They may be 
differentiated as "social work assistants" or, in recognition that their 
work is not to "assist" social workers and that they have their own 
cases, they are sometimes known as "social services officers." 
Whatever the distinction in language, they or the work they do is of 
less "value" in that they are paid less than qualified social workers. 
They have historically constituted a significant proportion of staff in 
residential establishments. They have little status or position power 
within the organization. But as local government officers they 
exercise discretionary power and rationing power over subjects who 
request and use services; and they exercise legitimate authority 
power over those whose personal condition and circumstances are 
interpreted by other "experts" as putting them "at risk" - frail 
elderly people whose mental faculties have been medically assessed as 
so impaired as to require them to live under constant surveillance in 
residential care, for example. The interventions of these unqualified 
agents, like the interventions of qualified social workers, may have 
significant long term effects on the lives of many of the subjects 
over whom they exercise agency/position power. 
It is not unknown in understaffed departments, and many social 
services departments are frequently staffed below the official 
establishment levels, for unqualified workers or inexperienced workers 
to undertake complex or high-risk work that has a major impact on 
the lives of individuals and families and may result in permanent 
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changes in their life-styles, such as entering into care. Newly 
qualified, inexperienced workers whose expert "knowledge" is limited, 
and who may themselves be aware of their limitations, may be 
positioned to operate disciplinary power over subj ects who 
"recognise" in them the authority power of the agency, which gives 
them the "right" to intervene in the lives of subjects. These workers 
may not be directly coerced into undertaking complex work that 
affects people's whole future lives; but the culture of the "team," an 
ideology of individual as well as collective responsibility to respond to 
client need, together with the institutionalised power of management 
to "manage" the workload, is a considerable pressure on the social 
workers. 
Social work departments are subject to the pressure, the "disciplinary 
power," of public expectations that they will always respond to high 
risk situations even when their resources of knowledge and expertise 
are already exhausted. Inquiries into child deaths have revealed 
that, under this pressure, newly qualified workers have been called 
upon to work with high-risk cases for which they have lacked the 
necessary expertise and the necessary level of quality supervision. 
(Department of Health 1991 (iv). The difficulties faced by the social 
services department in Cleveland arose partly through the 
unprecedented volume of high risk and complex work coming into the 
department, together with the general lack of expertise in working 
with child sexual abuse. Even for social workers experienced in cases 
of physical abuse there was an additional difficulty in understanding 
and responding to child sexual abuse. (Butler-Sloss 1988, p.73). The 
managers' need to respond to the demand resulted in the deployment 
of inexperienced workers to undertake very complex work. As an 
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agency, the department in the symbolic form of its managers was 
dominated by the disciplinary power of the law that calls for the 
protection of children against abuse; and dominated also by the power 
of public opinion that censures social workers for failing to intervene 
to protect children. The failure in Cleveland was perceived to be in 
its lack of procedures, rules and systems appropriate to the 
particular form of risk; and a failure to ensure that the exercise of 
power intended to protect children from a particular form of abuse 
was not in itself abusive. Because the discursive practices of the 
agency were in this respect inadequate, the operation of disciplinary 
power by its agents contravened 
discourses. But the failure in 
the rules of their professional 
Cleveland arose also from its 
insufficient resource of specialised knowledge and, as a consequence, 
from the domination of its agents by the knowledge-power and status 
power of other professionals, the consultant paediatricians. 
All workers are subject to the institutionalised discursive practices of 
their employing organizations, their hierarchical power structures and 
management discourses which may at times conflict with their 
professional discourses. The work of social services departments is 
specified by statute, while priorities are determined in the 
management discourses of the agency. There is usually some element 
of choice and discretion about the work of a team and the work an 
individual social worker will undertake; but there is no absolute 
freedom of choice. Managers and qualified social workers as well as 
the unqualified are subject to the disciplinary power of the 
organizational rules and the legitimate power of the statutory 
discourses to which the organization itself is subject. But even these 
powers are not absolute. Despite the statutory discourses that 
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require local authorities to identify and respond to children at risk 
and children in need, even "priority" child protection work may not 
receive attention. Eighteen months after the implementation of the 
Children Act 1989, many Directors of Social Services were saying 
publicly through the media that their resource power was insufficient 
to enable children on child protection registers to receive attention. 
In the power struggles between local authorities and central 
government over resources, the power of central government is 
dominant, its power to control and limit resources predominates over 
the specialised knowledge and the experiential discourses of its 
agents. 
It is not only workers who are either marginalised or privileged by 
the discursive practices of social work agencies in the public sector. 
Certain client groups are privileged over others. The discourse of 
child protection enjoys a "status" both in statute and in 
organizational discourses that historically has not been accorded to 
the discourse of "welfare." It not only has the legitimate power of 
high priority work in statutory and departmental discourses but is 
often the preferred work of experienced qualified workers who have 
the knowledge power and status power that enables them to exercise 
a greater degree of choice about the type of work they will do. 
Children and families have historically been the primary focus of 
social work, both among voluntary agencies concerned with rescuing 
children from exploitation and poverty, and state agencies whose 
discursive practices have been directed towards the reproduction of a 
healthy and productive population. Since the setting up of social 
services departments in 1971 with their "generic" workloads, there 
has been a marked preference among workers privileged by 
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knowledge and qualifications to work with children and families rather 
than with elderly, frail or disabled people. 
Historically the former children's departments were more likely than 
welfare departments to be staffed by qualified workers; many of them 
trained under Home Office Regulations and with official recognition as 
Child Care Officers, others with the newer Certificate of Qualification 
in Social Work (CQSW) under the aegis of the Central Council for 
Education and Training in Social Work. (CCETSW). There were some 
qualified and very experienced staff in the other departments and in 
hospital social work departments, particularly at supervisory or 
management levels. Consequently, with the setting up of the generic 
social services departments, internal power struggles broke out among 
trained and experienced workers over newly created senior and 
management positions, as some of the posts at these levels ceased to 
exist with the disappearance of the former separate departments. A 
widespread concern was articulated among all grades that management 
and supervisory posts had predominantly gone to workers from the 
former children's departments. Internal power struggles dominated 
the culture of the new departments in their early months. Different 
discursive practices that workers brought with them were only 
gradually institutionalised into a new culture of standardised systems, 
rules and procedures and reconstituted practices. 
As an example, in the children'S department in which I had worked 
before Seebohm there were very clear rules about keeping detailed 
and up-to-date case-file records, about regularity and format of case 
reviews and about regularity of supervision. File records were often 
the basis of court reports in care proceedings. The cultural norm 
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was to conform with the disciplinary requirements and discursive 
practices of the department. Power operated by "consent" rather 
than by coercion. Following reorganization, many of the workers 
coming from other departments with different discursive practices _ 
sketchy file records for instance strongly resisted the 
organizational norms of the children's department and the disciplinary 
power operated by the new managers, based on the organizational 
systems and discursive practices of the former children's department. 
Some of those who would not conform resigned their posts. Over 
time however, over two decades, new discursive practices became 
established and the culture changed; the rules concerning record-
keeping and case reviews, for example, were less stringently observed 
in some departments. New norms developed, among them during the 
1980s, the permitted opening up of case files to "users" of services, 
no longer interpellated in management discourses as clients but as 
users or customers. New discursive practices and the language of 
professional discourse sought to accomodate the concept of user 
empowerment. In the 1990s the discourse of partnership between 
users and local authority agents holds the promise of a cultural 
change, a breaking-down of the institutionalised barriers between 
"them" and "us," a new and more equal power relation; but the 
agents remain privileged by their ownership of or access to resources 
by their specialised knowledge, their "professional" status, the 
authority of their agencies, their alliances with other professionals, 
their resource of sanctions, the ascribed authority of the law, and 
their knowledge of "the rules" of the game. 
The former Child Care Officers had considerable status power as well 
as the ascribed authority of the law. They were recognised by 
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clients and by the public as "having" the authority power of their 
employing agencies and the sanction power of the courts. The 
potential sanction power of these local authority "officers" and their 
"right" to operate disciplinary power was recognised by a public more 
compliant in the 1960/70s than in the 1990s, more readily dominated 
by institutionalised power. Child Care Officers were privileged by 
this "popular" recognition of their specialised knowledge power, 
specialised status power, and institutionalised authority power. While 
today's social work agents are still privileged over users/receivers of 
services, the "truths" of their professional discourses are constantly 
the subject of media debates, their knowledge, status and authority 
power publicly questioned. Their knowledge-power, which is less 
specialised, is likely to be subordinated to the specialised knowledge-
power of "experts," psychiatrists, paediatricians, psychologists etc. 
Their power relationship with users/receivers of services is being 
challenged by the notion of partnership, and by the formal complaints 
procedures for users of services which local authorities have been 
required to set up. Such procedures, while likely to be dominated by 
the institutionalised power, the discursive practices and the internal 
alliances of the agencies who set them up, are being confronted by 
the organized oppositional power of specialised interest groups such 
as Parents Against Injustice; by a driving force stronger than 
resistance and itself privileged by specialised knowledge and by 
alliances with external influencers such as the media. 
While the ideological base of social work is anti-oppressive and its 
discourses are premised on the rights of disadvantaged and 
oppressed individuals, many of its discursive practices are oppressive 
and discriminatory even over those subjects whose interests it 
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"protects. " The discursive practices of social workers as local 
government agents marginalise certain user groups through rationing 
systems and by over-allocating the resource of specialised knowledge 
to work with children and families. The discursive practices of social 
work managers, themselves predominantly social workers by 
professional training but interpellated as local authority management 
agents, exploit unqualified, underpaid, under-resourced and 
inexperienced workers in the struggle to reconcile the discourses of 
social work "service" with the discursive rationing practices of the 
agency. The professional status of social work is ambiguous as 
unqualified people are allowed to carry out "social work" and as its 
discursive practices are dominated by the institutionalised power of 
the local authority as its employing agency. 
Yet, for all its inter-textuality and contradictions, its indeterminate 
positioning in the network of power relations in which it is enmeshed, 
and the resource limitations within which it functions, the discursive 
practices of local authority social work are directed to the service 
and protection of the most "needy" members of society, those 
individuals who through age or infirmity are rendered "vulnerable," 
marginalised and dependent on others. While its failures receive 
media attention and public censure, its successes are not newsworthy 
and they go unmarked. Because of the individual's right to privacy 
and confidentiality, social workers appear unable to defend themselves 
when a private matter is brought into the public domain through the 
media. According to their discursive practices and the concept of 
confidentiality, it is often that their side of a story cannot be heard 
because it would enable the identification of clients and their families. 
The right of individuals to the protection of their privacy from the 
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public gaze thus mediates the power of social workers and leaves 
them vulnerable to what might be unjustifiable censure and the 
discursive practices of the media, the construction of "stories" and 
the casting of individuals into the roles of heroes or, more usually, 
villains. 
Media stories are not only selective of "facts" but also are presented 
from selected perspectives and expressed in the language and style 
that will appeal to their audiences and readers. When something has 
"gone wrong" and thus is perceived as newsworthy, as in Cleveland 
for example, the media build up a story, construct the main players 
as a cast of "characters," identify a scapegoat onto whom the public's 
anger and guilt can be displaced. In media discourses it is not the 
violent parents, not the failure of society, but "the" social worker 
who is to be blamed; and social work as such is to be held 
responsible for what is society's failure to know how to protect its 
children. On the one hand the media argue on behalf of "society" for 
the rights of the family to privacy and freedom from the intrusive 
power of social workers, and on the other hand expect social workers 
always to be already there and to have the right answers when a 
child is at risk. And yet day by day social workers are having to 
tread a fine balance of possibilities and probabilities; needing to 
weigh up whether, if a child is not removed from a situation that 
appears to put it at risk, it will probably continue to be harmed; or 
whether it will possibly suffer a greater harm if it is removed from 
the risk situation; needing to estimate, because there are no absolute 
certainties in their professional discourses, how great is the risk to 
anyone child within a particular set of circumstances at anyone 
time. 
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In social work discourse "risk" is a key word. In few other 
disciplines, perhaps only medicine and psychiatry, with their much 
longer period of professional training and their professional 
regulatory bodies, are workers called upon to interpret from a limited 
set of facts the nature, degree and immanence of risk to life and 
limb, risk to self and others. "Mistakes," that is to say 
interpretations of the facts that in the event turn out to be 
incorrect, are inevitably made by doctors, paediatricians and 
psychiatrists as well as by social workers. Their discursive practices 
are not informed by exact scientific discourses, the outcomes of their 
interventions cannot be "known" with total certainty beforehand. 
Empowered by specialised knowledge and agency authority, local 
authority social workers are required by statute to investigate 
situations of potential risk and, if necessary, to take such action as 
is determined by their specialised knowledge and the authority of the 
law. In many situations the degree of risk is not clear cut, the social 
worker will have to exercise professional judgement and act, or not 
act, on a balance of probabilities. If the risk is interpreted by the 
worker to be of immediate severe physical harm or life threatening, 
the worker must exercise disciplinary power to protect the vulnerable 
individual and act upon the actions of those who constitute the risk. 
One of the key questions in Cleveland was the interpretation of the 
evidence and immediacy of the risk of continuing sexual abuse. In 
the expert view of the Consultant Paediatrician and the Child Abuse 
Consultant, not only the severity of the harm to which sexually 
abused children had been exposed but also the likelihood of them 
continuing to suffer that harm warranted the immediate removal of the 
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children from the danger; even to the extent of taking them from 
their beds at night to be examined for the physical evidence that 
could be lost through delay. The evidence that was used to justify 
the actions of the social services department in obtaining immediate 
place of safety orders was the evidence provided by the physical 
sign and interpreted by the Consultant Paediatrician as indicative not 
only of sexual abuse but of very recent abuse and thus of continuing 
risk. 
The fact that many of the families were already "known" to social 
services, that is to say were already the subject of official 
surveillance, was part of the "evidence" that made them particularly 
vulnerable to the exercise of disciplinary power. Being known to a 
social services department, becoming a "case," constructs a special 
kind of subjective identity and often an intensification of any 
perceived risk factors. Risk, however, may be interpreted differently 
among different professionals concerned with child protection. It may 
be calculated on the basis of cumulative information from different 
sources, health visitors, teachers, G.Ps., educational psychologists, 
paediatricians, child psychiatrists; and on the construction of meaning 
within each of these professional discourses. It may be calculated on 
the basis of a single event. It is likely to be a calculation rather 
than a certainty. Different interpretations of the evidence of risk 
factors may lead to conflict and power struggles among professionals. 
Inter-disciplinary case conferences are often the site of these 
conflicts and power struggles over interpretations of evidence, over 
calculations of risk and over recommended outcomes. Case 
conferences do not make decisions (other than whether to put a 
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child's name on the child protection register), their recommendations 
are not binding on any of the agencies involved. In the last 
instance, the local authority social workers are the agents who are 
"called upon" by law to act and who are held publicly accountable 
through official inquiries and media reporting if their judgement not 
to act results in the death of a child; or if their judgement to take 
protective action, as in the Cleveland case, is seen to offend citizen's 
rights and/or the discourse of common-sense. While every situation 
is unique, common organizational procedures are carried out through 
the discursive practices of referral, investigation, consultation both 
internal and inter-disciplinary, conference recommendations and 
agency action. 
Although not within the highest priority category of risk to life and 
limb, a referral of child sexual abuse to a social services department 
from whatever source is likely to receive urgent investigation and to 
become the subject of a multi-disciplinary case conference. While it 
is not uncommon for another professional to be involved initially as 
the referring agent, anybody, a parent, relative or friend may refer 
suspected child sexual abuse. Investigation necessarily brings into 
play the specialised discourses and discursive practices of a number 
of professional workers who have 'the status of those who are 
charged with saying what counts as true;' the police, since child 
abuse is a criminal offence which needs the type of evidence that can 
be obtained through the discursive practices of police interrogation, 
evidence that can lead to a prosecution; a paediatrician and/or 
specialist police surgeon who has the specialised medical knowledge to 
diagnose physical sexual abuse; a G.P., health visitor and teachers 
who have "knowledge" of the child and of the family; possibly an 
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educational psychologist and/or a child psychiatrist to whom the child 
has already been referred. While the "management" of child sexual 
abuse, criticised in the Cleveland Report, is the responsibility of local 
authority social workers, its "truth" derives from the specialised 
knowledge-power of other professionals brought together in the arena 
of the inter-disciplinary case conference, usually convened and 
chaired by an agent of the social services department. Here 
professional and agency discourses and discursive practices intersect 
and may be in conflict, within and across the disciplines. 
A case study will be used to illustrate the complexity of power 
relations and the processes at work in an inter-disciplinary case 
conference on suspected child sexual abuse; the way meaning was 
constructed, and the way professional and agency discourses and the 
interests of the various parties intersected and affected the outcome. 
(Although the events referred to preceded the implementation of the 




1. Summary of a Referral and Case Conference on Suspected Child 
Abuse.(3) 
2. An Analysis of Discourses, Discursive Practices and Power Relations 
Among the Professional Agents. 
1. Summary of a Referral and Case Conference. 
The behaviour of Julie A., aged 8, had been causing concern at 
school. Her mother was invited to speak with Julie's teacher and the 
headteacher. She told them there were marital difficulties. On several 
occasions her husband had left home to stay with his parents and 
had later returned to the family home. Mrs. A said Julie was attached 
to her father and she believed his coming and going was upsetting 
the child. Julie had become withdrawn at home. Mrs. A. was finding 
Tom, aged 5, difficult to control although his behaviour at school had 
not been remarked upon. The headteacher suggested that referral to 
the child psychiatrist at the local family centre might be helpful. 
Mrs.A., who gave the impression of being concerned, said she would 
think about it but that she did not believe in psychiatrists. She 
returned to the school two weeks later to tell the class teacher that 
Julie would miss a morning at school as she had an appointment with 
the psychiatrist. 
After seeing Julie on two occasions, the psychiatrist referred the 
child to the social services department on suspicion of sexual abuse 
by the father, although Julie had not made any specific allegations. 
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Mrs.A. had not kept a third appointment. The police were informed. 
After consultation with the psychiatrist, it was agreed between the 
police and social services that the police (C.LD) would interview the 
father. It was not clear whether he was living away from home at 
this time. 
A case conference was convened by the social services department, to 
be chaired by a social work manager. It was attended by two police 
officers, the child psychiatrist, a social worker at the family clinic 
who had spoken twice with Mrs.A., the class teacher and headteacher 
of Julie's school, Tom's class teacher, an Education Welfare Officer, a 
health visitor (who had recent knowledge of the family as Mrs.A. had 
a seven month old baby), together with her manager; the G.P. who 
had known the family for several years, a team leader from the social 
services department (who would have the responsibility for 
supervising the case if social services agreed to become involved, as 
the family lived within the geographical area for which he was 
responsible), and a social worker to whom it might be allocated. A 
social services administrative officer was present to take notes. The 
police, the health visitor, the local authority social workers and the 
managers had frequently met together in child abuse case conferences 
and were familiar with each other's discursive practices and with the 
language of their discourses. The chairperson explained the case 
conference procedures for the benefit of those who had not 
previously been involved. Both Mr. and Mrs.A. had been invited to 
attend for the latter part of the case conference. The family had not 
previously been known to the social services department. 
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By the time of the case conference the police had interviewed Mr.A. 
who denied any form of sexual abuse and dismissed the allegations as 
preposterous and totally unfounded. Although Mr. A. used forceful 
language, the police officer interpreted his attitude and behaviour as 
cautious and defensive. He felt Mr. A. had something to hide but 
there was nothing specific on which the police could act. The 
discursive practices of the police demanded evidence of criminality. 
From limited discussion with Julie, who had been withdrawn and 
difficult to engage in conversation, and her observation of the child, 
the psychiatrist was "pretty certain" (had interpreted) that some form 
of sexual abuse was being perpetrated by the father. She was 
concerned that a third appointment had not been kept. The clinic 
social worker who had spoken with Mrs. A. while the psychiatrist saw 
Julie interpreted Mrs.A'S behaviour as "ambivalent." While she had 
said her husband would "never do such things," she had seemed 
thoughtful and preoccupied. She had been reluctant to discuss her 
relationship with her husband except to say that the last baby was 
an accident. The social worker had offered appointments jointly to 
Mr. and Mrs.A but Mr .A. had not attended. According to the 
professional discourses of the psychiatrist and the clinic social 
worker, Julie was at risk and the father should be required to leave 
the family home and have no unsupervised contact with Julie until the 
matter had been further investigated. 
The class teachers reported on the children's behaviour at school. 
They knew Mrs.A. as an interested and co-operative parent. She had 
never before spoken to them of marital difficulties. Mr .A. had 
attended parents' meetings. Julie's class teacher had noted a marked 
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deterioration in her concentration and that she had withdrawn from 
socialising with the other children. She had interpreted this 
behaviour as "resulting from trouble at home." 
The health visitor had known the family for eight years since Julie 
was born, although she had rarely seen Mr .A. and then only in 
passing. Mrs.A. had not previously spoken to her of marital 
difficulties but had mentioned at times that she was short of money 
as her husband's business was doing badly. She was a capable 
mother and kept a clean but untidy house. (The police officer said 
the house had looked chaotic when he was there). Julie seemed a 
rather "clingy" child, which the health visitor had interpreted as the 
result of Mrs.A. giving all her attention to Tom and the baby and 
perhaps expecting too much of Julie 
The G.P. knew Mrs.A. and the children from their visits to the 
surgery but had met Mr.A. only once. He had never had any 
concerns about the health of the children or about the way they were 
cared for. Mrs.A. had been to see him when the school had expressed 
their concerns and he had reinforced the headteacher's suggestion of 
seeing the child psychiatrist. He wondered how the father could be 
made to stay away from the family home and not see Julie on his own 
if he did not wish to comply. He felt there was "not a lot to go on" 
but at the same time it seemed that something ought to be done. 
The psychiatrist suggested that if the father would not comply, social 
services could take steps through the court to remove the child from 
the family home. The social worker/manager who was chairing the 
meeting explained for the benefit of those present who were not 
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familiar with the procedures what this meant in the legal and social 
work discourses of child protection. The legal discourse required 
that a court would have to be satisfied that this would be in the best 
interests of the child and that the available evidence j ustfied the 
making of an order. Only the making of an order by a court would 
empower the social services department to act. Without a court order 
the social workers did not have the power to remove a child from its 
family. In social work discourse, the removal of the child from the 
family home and the care of her mother would be distressing for the 
child and give her the wrong "message," that she was being 
punished. Encouraging Mrs.A. to give more time and attention to 
Julie and to keep a careful watch when Mr.A. was at home, while at 
the same time persuading the father to stay away, was the better 
option. Also encouraging Mrs.A. to keep further appointments at the 
clinic. 
It was agreed that Mr. and Mrs. A. should be invited to join the 
meeting. The police officers said they would withdraw while the 
parents were present. The G.P. said he would leave at this point as 
he had nothing further to add. 
M d M A had rec"",';ved a letter from the social services r. an rs.. =--
department inviting them to the meeting and explaining its purpose. 
They had been offered the opportunity to speak with a social worker 
before the meeting but had not taken this up. When they joined the 
meeting the parents were faced by the eleven people in the room, 
people with the status of authority, who obviously knew each other; 
people who were socialised into the conventions and discursive 
practices of the case conference. They seemed comfortable, which the 
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parents were not. They gave the impression of having been there for 
some time, talking together. The power struggles and the power 
alliances ( discussed below) that had formed among them would not 
have been obvious to the parents. An "atmosphere" of mutual 
confidence and familiarity among the professionals constructed an 
invisible barrier between them and the parents. 
The chair-person introduced the people present and asked the 
parents if they had understood the letter. Mrs.A. seemed to take a 
cue from her husband. Both shrugged but did not otherwise 
respond. The chairperson told them there was concern about Julie's 
very marked withdrawn behaviour, her sudden under-achievement at 
school and lack of concentration; and that social services and other 
professionals had a responsibility in law to try to help the child and 
help the parents to help her. Mr.A. said quietly but angrily that he 
could understand that but why bring in the police, and why all these 
people. It was explained that this was standard practice in the local 
authority child protection procedures, as was the case conference 
itself, and that these procedures were required by law. Mr. A. said 
angrily they had no business to be talking behind their backs and 
wanted to know what had been said. In response, the child 
protection register was explained to the parents, why there was a 
need to have all the relevant information about a child, and the 
requirement for the parents' co-operation. Mr.A. asked questions 
about the co-operation requirement and was told this meant keeping 
appointments for Julie to be seen by the child psychiatrist, for Mr. 
and Mrs.A. to keep appointments with a social worker, and for Mr .A. 
to stay away from the family home and not to be with Julie on his 
own while the matter was being further investigated. Mr.A. said 
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angrily that it seemed he had already been found gUilty; what was he 
supposed to have done? He had never touched Julie; kids went 
through funny phases without it meaning they were being abused; 
and the psychiatrist didn't know what she was talking about. He said 
he had read all this stuff about child abuse and how they managed to 
find what they were looking for without any real evidence. Mr .A. 
referred to newspaper and television reports of child abuse errors by 
so-called experts and on the incompetence of social workers. Mrs.A., 
who looked distressed, said she would keep the appointments. Mr.A. 
made no further response and gave no commitment. They were asked 
to leave and to wait while a decision was made whether to put Julie's 
name on the child protection register. 
When they had left the meeting their comments and behaviour and 
their "body-language" were discussed and interpreted. The class 
teacher suggested that if the father really had not done anything his 
anger was understandable; and she wondered if perhaps somebody 
else or something else might be responsible for whatever it was that 
was upsetting the child. There seemed to be a lot of hostility 
between the parents which was probably affecting her; and after all, 
Julie had not made any specific allegation. The psychiatrist said that 
most sexual abuse occurred within the family; and after seeing both 
parents she was still of the opinion that some form of abuse was 
being perpetrated by the father, perhaps with some degree of 
collusion by the mother in that she suspected something was going 
on. She elaborated on her concerns. 
The senior police officer said that in his opinion (Le. in the way 
meaning was constructed in his professional discourse) there was no 
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substantive evidence of sexual abuse although he respected what the 
psychiatrist was saying; but if it was recommended to put the child's 
name on the register he would go along with that as, apart from 
anything else, it would ensure priority allocation in the social 
services department and further investigation by them. 
The local authority social worker said she would be unable to work 
with the case for several weeks, which she had already mentioned to 
her supervisor, as she had a heavy caseload and was currently 
involved with a complex and long-drawn-out court hearing. She 
pointed out that the clinic social worker was already involved. 
The clinic social worker said there was nothing she could do if Mrs.A. 
would not keep appointments. She had no power to make her attend. 
Child abuse was a social services responsibility. If it was felt the 
father must be kept away from the child, somebody would have to 
monitor what was happenning. She recommended that the child's 
name should go on the register and a plan worked out between the 
clinic and social services. 
might not be appropriate. 
the mother. 
She thought her continued involvement 
She had not developed a relationship with 
The teamleader/supervisor agreed there was reason for concern but 
according to his professional discourse, the psychiatrist's evidence 
did not satisfy the criteria for the child protection register. 
Perhaps following the case conference Mrs.A. would keep appointments 
at the family clinic and the psychiatrist could do further work with 
Julie that would clarify the issues. He said there were several cases 
of child abuse on the register waiting for allocation to a social 
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worker, with some of which no professional worker was directly 
involved. 
The headteacher confirmed this as it 
attending her school. She said that 
related to some children 
while she understood the 
difficulties for social services it made a nonsense of the procedures 
and of the register and left a heavy responsibility with teachers who 
were expected to monitor children at risk. The teamleader/supervisor 
again pointed out that Mrs.A. had now agreed to keep appointments. 
Perhaps this should be tested out. 
The psychiatrist said she was prepared to continue to see Julie only 
if her name was put on the register and the local authority accepted 
their responsibilities. A plan for joint intervention must be worked 
out. It would have to be considered which social worker would work 
with the mother and who would engage the father. She was deeply 
concerned about the child. She was concerned that pressure would 
be put on her by the parents that would inhibit "disclosure work." 
Doing nothing would give the wrong message to Julie and to the 
parents. The register would put pressure on both the parents to 
co-operate and would signify the social services department's 
acceptance of responsibility for a child at risk and in need of 
services. 
The chairperson interpreted this as a recommendation for the child's 
name to go on the register. She summed up the discussion and put 
the recommendation to the meeting. As no further objection was 
raised, this was agreed. The decision was reached on the balance of 
probability rather than certainty that the child had been abused; and 
239 
to ensure the provision of sevices. The reason for the decision, not 
unanimously approved, was recorded and explained to the parents. 
The discourse of the child psychiatrist together with her personal 
drive and assertiveness, had predominated. Her knowledge of child 
sexual abuse, her expert truth, intersecting with the discourses and 
discursive practices of child protection and the law, had dominated 
the power relations with other professionals. The professional agents 
had been "disciplined" through the knowledge-power of the 
psychiatrist to provide the family with services. Through her 
knowledge-power, the family was constituted as a case, with a history, 
with information accumulated from various agencies on record; the 
members of the family were to be receivers of services, to be further 
investigated, to be required to co-operate with the professional 
agents. The parents were to be subject to the disciplinary power of 
the agents in order to protect the child, the (unwitting) "client," who 
was powerless (lacked the resources to protect herself) in the 
child/adult relationship. 
Prior to the Children Act 1989, local authority social workers might 
have applied to a magistrates' court for a place of safety order to 
enable them to remove a child from the family home, as happened in 
Cleveland, without previous notification to the parents, on the basis 
of expert paediatric or psychiatric diagnosis of abuse, whether 
physical, emotional or sexual. I have known pressure to do so put on 
social workers by paediatricians, psychiatrists and educational 
psychologists, exercising their specialised knowledge-power, seeking 
an alliance with the statutory-power of the authorised agents in order 
to operate disciplinary power over subjects through the courts. 
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The Children Act 1989 Act supplemented by the Department of Health 
Guidance and Regulations mediates the power relations between the 
authorised agents and the courts. For example, under the terms of 
the current legislation, the subsequent behaviour of the parents in 
the case quoted, if interpreted as uncooperative, could lead the local 
authority social workers to apply to a court for a Child Assessment 
Order; but the court would have to be satisfied on several quite 
specific accounts. The Department of Health Guidance and Regulations 
provide detailed information for 'professional practitioners' on the 
circumstances in which such an application can be made. They are 
required to explain these details to parents before making an 
application, this to be 'backed up by easily understandable leaflets 
outlining local authority powers and duties and the rights and 
responsibilities of parents.' (Department of Health 1991 (i)(a), pp.45-
51). A court would want to be satisfied that the applicants had 
complied with the regulations; and would not necessarily grant an 
order. If an order is made, a court has the statutory power to make 
specific directions on how an assessment is to be carried out 'as 
seems appropriate and in the child's interest.' (ibid p.47). 
Thus, the disciplinary power of the agents, constituted by their 
specialised knowledge and by the privileged status of those who 
speak what counts as true, is itself regulated by procedures, systems 
and rules. The agents who operate disciplinary power are themselves 
disciplined by the authority power of other agents. The privileged 
discourses of the specialised disciplines influence power relations 
among the agents, and dominate the power relation between 
professional agents and subjects; but the discursive practices of the 
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professional agents are subject to the rules and procedures of the 
organizations within which they operate and the discursive practices 
of the law. The organizational rules and the rules inscribed in law 
set the boundaries within which the agents operate disciplinary 
power. 
2. An Analysis of Discourses? Discursive Practices and Power Relations. 
(note: In the following analysis, repetition of the words "discourse" 
and "discursive" is unavoidable. Where reference is made to 
"practices," in order to keep repetition to a minimum, this should be 
read as signifying "discursive practices.") 
Drawing on Foucault's ideas on the ways in which language is used to 
construct the 'serious speech acts' of professional speakers, those 
who are authorised to speak the language of serious meaning, we can 
understand child sexual abuse as a contemporary truth constructed in 
the concepts and theories of the specialised disciplines of psychiatry 
and paediatrics and articulated in the language of their discourses; a 
truth that is linked with the systems of power, the knowledge-power 
and the status power of the experts, which have produced and 
'extended' it; a truth that only they are qualified to speak. 
A child psychiatrist, authorised by her qualifications to speak the 
specialised language of her discipline, having the status of one who 
speaks that which is true, operates her knowledge-power to construct 
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meaning from certain behaviours, to interpret them as signifiers of 
abuse. The 'statements' of the psychiatrist are constructed as 
serious speech acts according to the rules that regulate this 
particular 'truth game' in which other players are subject to the 
disciplinary power of her status and specialised knowledge; not only 
the parents (who do not know the rules) but also other professionals 
who, dominated by the expert truth, must obey the rules that require 
them to operate their statutory/agency power to act. 
The case conference is part of the control mechanism through which 
disciplinary power operates. Its practices are regulated by the 
institutionalised rules and procedures of the primary agency, the local 
authority. The rules require its agents to act in cases of actual or 
suspected child abuse, often on a balance of probability when there is 
evidence but no "proof." The agents are subject to the management 
discourses and discursive practices of the organization and the 
hierarchical power relations that intersect with their professional 
discourses. Local authority social workers may have no direct 
knowledge of a child or family but must act, in accordance with the 
rules and practices of the organization, on evidence that presupposes 
child abuse. This evidence may come from any source. Organizational 
discourses allow social workers to exercise their professional power 
of discretion to intepret and make a decision whether and how to 
intervene; to act directly, to organize a case conference, or to take 
no action. The 'serious statement' of an expert speaker will influence 
the decision of the agents. Professional, organizational and legal 
discourses intersect at the point of decision-making. If the evidence 
is interpreted by the agents as constituting serious risk, indicating a 
need for immediate direct action such as the removal of a child from a 
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situation of danger, the agents must act in accordance with the 
procedures, rules and systems precribed by the agency and by law. 
Networking systems operate among professional agents who are likely 
to have knowledge of the child and family, a G.P., a health visitor, a 
teacher or an education welfare officer for example, frequently before 
a decision is made on the action to be taken, sometimes subsequently. 
As the professional discourses intersect, power relations, some pre-
disposed by earlier experiences, mediated by personal agendas, come 
into play and permeate the decision-making processes and the case 
conference environment. 
The given case study demonstrates the power struggles between the 
professional agents, the way alliances and coalitions were formed and 
their effects on power relations; and the way the truth of child 
sexual abuse in the privileged discourse of psychiatry dominated 
other professional discourses and practices. It demonstrates 
organizational power relations and the privileged position power of 
managers; the way that powerful influencers, individuals vested with 
status and authority, with the legitimate power of office or position 
and the control of resources, dominate other less privileged players. 
It demonstrates the link between knowledge-power and the systems 
and mechanisms through which disciplinary power operates. 
Foucault argues that it is in discourse, 'tactical elements or blocks 
operating in the field of force relations,' that power and knowledge 
are joined together (Foucault 1979, pp.100-102). The analysis that 
follows will identify the discourses and illustrate the 'multiplicity of 
force relations' at work in the case conference. Reference will be 
made to each of the participants and their specialised discourses. 
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In the site of the case conference, the discourse of "child protection" 
was inscribed in the professional discourses of all the participants 
and was in this sense the overriding "meta-discourse." However, in 
the institutional contexts within which the child protection discursive 
practices were positioned, agency discourses, the language of agency 
responsibility and authority intersected with the professional 
discourses and the personal agendas of the participants. 
The psychiatrist constructed meaning from the child's behaviour in 
the specialised language of her expert discourse, a language that only 
she among the participants was authorised to speak. Her expert 
discourse influenced the outcome of the case conference but the 
tactical elements she brought into play were not only her expert 
knowledge but also the discourse of agency authority and 
responsibility and the institutionalised discursive practices through 
which, and only through which, disciplinary power could operate. 
The clinic social worker spoke the same professional/ agency language 
as her higher-status colleague, the child psychiatrist. 
In the educational discourse of the headteacher and the class teacher, 
the child needed help; she was not making "normal" progress or 
socialising "normally" with other children. But their professional 
discourse did not enable them to "read" her symptoms as signifiers of 
sexual abuse; nor did the discursive practices of their agency enable 
them to operate disciplinary power over the parents. The tactic of 
the headteacher was to form a strategic alliance with the psychiatrist 
over the issue of agency responsibility. The expert discourse of the 
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psychiatrist dominated the alternative "reading" of the class teacher , 
and the alliance was a determining factor in the outcome. 
The professional health-care discourse of the health visitor was 
mediated by the discourse of women's oppression. She understood 
the child's behaviour in the context of relationship problems in the 
family, poverty and the mother's physical exhaustion and depression. 
The professional social work discourse of the teamleader was mediated 
by tactical discourses of resource management, priorities and agency 
responsibility, and by the uncertain discourse of "risk." He resisted 
the knowledge-power of the psychiatrist and her interpretation of the 
"signs" and he formed a minority alliance with the social worker he 
supervised. The social worker's personal agenda of protection from 
work overload was dominated by the majority alliance and by the 
professional/management discourse of the chairperson. 
For the police officers, the discourse of child protection intersected 
with the discourse of criminality. Although they accepted the 
psychiatrist's expert construction of meaning from the signs, her 
discursive language was not the language of "proof" required for 
them to act. 
The medical discourse of the G.P. was mediated by his personal 
agenda to protect the doctor-patient relationship. He did not wish to 
meet the parents in the context of the case conference. He did not 
speak or fully understand the specialised language of the child 
psychiatrist but he "recognised" her consultant status. 
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The social worker/manager/chairperson was privileged by her 
organizational position and status and her experiential understanding 
of the expert discourse of "probability" of sexual abuse. In the 
context of the statutory responsibilities of her own agency and the 
search for "truth," the rules of case conference procedures required 
her to exercise balance and objectivity in her summing up of the 
sometimes conflicting professional discourses of the participants. 
While child abuse was identified through the expert discourse of the 
psychiatrist, her power was, initially, successfully resisted by the 
parents. Mr.A. did not attend the clinic appointments at all, Mrs.A. 
ceased to attend after keeping two appointments. At the interface 
between the psychiatrist and the parent/child, and between the clinic 
social worker and Mrs.A., the knowledge-power of the professionals 
dominated these inter-personal relationships; but the legitimate power 
of the local authority agents was necessary in order for the 
psychiatrist and clinic social worker to continue to exercise their 
expert power and discipline the parents. 
Prior to the case conference and through the networking system, the 
psychiatrist had formed an alliance with the manager/chairperson. 
After the second visit of Mrs.A. and Julie to the family clinic, the 
psychiatrist had written to the social services area office expressing 
her opinion that some form of sexual abuse had been, possibly still 
was being, perpetrated. When Mrs.A. failed to keep the third 
appointment and the psychiatrist had not received a reply to her 
letter to the social services area office, she telephoned the social 
services manager/chairperson, by-passing the teamleader/supervisor 
who was said to be "dealing with it." Through her privileged 
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position and status she had easy access to the senior managers of 
other agencies. She explained her concerns to the manager, calling 
on her experience, her knowledge and her hierarchical position, and 
their established working relationship (their professional alliance). 
Although not an expert speaker in the discourse of child psychiatry, 
the manager was familiar with its specialised language through her 
own professional training and experience. She knew the psychiatrist 
well through having worked with her on joint training sessions and 
on previous case conferences. The manager was satisfied (influenced) 
by the discourse of the psychiatrist that further investigation was 
required. In cases of suspected child abuse, whatever its form, the 
rule was that the social services department had a duty to investigate 
and follow the prescribed procedures. The manager, herself 
disciplined by the requirement to conform with the rules of the 
agency, exercised her position power to discipline her subordinate, 
the teamleader/supervisor, to obey the rules. 
The teamleader/supervisor, whose responsibility it was to "follow-up" 
referrals, had conformed with the institutionalised practices of the 
agency in accordance with his interpretation of the referral. 
Although not convinced that the information provided by the 
psychiatrist indicated sexual abuse or a priority for intervention, he 
had already initiated an investigation through the professional 
network. He "read" the text of the referral as information rather 
than as a request for action; but as he had earlier been contacted 
about the same matter by the headteacher, with whom he had a 
contentious relationship, he caused enquiries to be made, through a 
duty officer. 
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The headteacher's educational discourse and the discursive practices 
of her agency extended to monitoring the social development and well-
being of the children at her school; and to report suspected neglect 
or abuse through an organizational system of procedures. She had 
previously made a number of other referrals about children at her 
school and had complained to the managers in her own department 
and to social services managers that nothing ever seemed to be done 
about them. The teamleader felt the head teacher had generally 
unrealistic expectations of social services resources and 
responsibilities. The professional discourse of the teamleader as it 
intersected with the political discourse of resource management 
demanded attention to priority work; and his assessment 
(interpretation) of several of the headteacher's referrals did not 
accord them priority. 
From the headteacher's perspective, legitimate referrals she made to 
social services through the prescribed organizational procedures 
seemed to be ignored by the local area team. Her discourse of 
complaint and her practice of involving senior managers about what 
she interpreted as social services inefficiency had led to power 
struggles between the senior education welfare officer and the 
teamleader's manager over the need to take action. Consequently, the 
headteacher informed social services of her concerns about Julie as a 
last resort, only when it seemed to her unlikely that Mrs.A. would 
follow her suggestion of seeing the child psychiatrist. She exercised 
her position power to ensure that the education welfare officer 
attached to her school would be present at the case conference to 
1 . al h h this family was not support her concerns and comp runts, t oug 
known to the education welfare department. The historic power 
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struggles between the teamleader and the headteacher spilled over 
into their discursive exchanges at the case conference. 
Information about the family during the initial networking had been 
provided by the health visitor who, although she had not seen them 
recently, expressed the opinion that Mrs. A. seemed depressed and 
was finding it difficult to cope since the arrival of the third child. 
There were marital difficulties, the middle child was demanding and 
Mrs.A. was expecting too much of Julie who had always been shy and 
seemed rather withdrawn at various times when the health visitor had 
seen her. The health visitor had suggested that Mrs.A. should see 
her G.P. about depression and physical exhaustion. She had never 
had any concerns about the care of the children; and she was 
sceptical about the psychiatric "evidence" of sexual abuse. If 
anything, Mrs.A. was over-protective of her children. She would not 
be likely to collude with her husband. In the complex 
professional/personal/feminist/commonsense discourse of the health 
visitor, Mrs.A. was a typically over-burdened mother, oppressed by a 
husband who left all the responsibility of the children to her. 
As part of the networking process, the G.P. was contacted. He 
confirmed that Mrs.A. had consulted him about depression and had 
asked his advice about Julie seeing the psychiatrist, which he had 
encouraged and for which he had provided an introductory letter. 
According to his professional medical discourse, Mrs.A. was behaving 
responsibly in following his advice. 
After checking with the family clinic that the recommended 
appointment had in fact been made and kept by Mrs.A., the social 
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services teamleader exercised his professional/agency discretionary 
power. He took no further action until "disciplined" to do so by his 
manager. 
Following her long discussion with the psychiatrist and concerned (if 
not totally convinced) by the psychiatrist's expert discourse of child 
sexual abuse, the manager to whom the teamleader was responsible, 
exercised her hierarchical position power. She checked on the 
information that now constituted a case file and advised (directed) the 
teamleader to convene a case conference; also to discuss with the 
police, who would be invited to attend, whether it would be helpful 
for them to speak with the psychiatrist with a view to interviewing 
the father, about whom nothing was known, prior to the case 
conference. The psychiatrist, as an 'external influencer' exercising 
her knowledge-power and status power and the driving force of her 
alliance with the senior manager, had dominated in her relationship 
with the teamleader and overcome his resistance. Thus, prior to the 
meeting of the professionals at the case conference, as their 
discourses and discursive practices had intersected, alliances and 
oppositional forces were already in play. 
These underlying processes permeated the child protection discourse, 
the meta-discourse of the case conference. The headteacher strongly 
supported the child protection discourse of the psychiatrist and 
forcefully expressed her view that it was the responsibility of social 
services to become involved. According to her professional discourse, 
she herself and "her" teachers as agents of the education services 
had carried out their responsibility to monitor and refer a child 
whose educational and social development was causing concern and 
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whom they believed to be in need of other specialised services. She 
called on the education welfare officer to support her. The power 
struggles developed as a discursive alliance was formed between the 
headteacher, the education welfare officer, the psychiatrist and the 
clinic social worker, putting pressure on the local authority social 
workers to carry out their statutory responsibilities. 
Among all the professionals, personal agendas and professional 
alliances, experiences brought with them from other contexts and 
other environments, intersected with their professional discourses in 
the power arena of the case conference. No professional discourse, 
no construction of meaning, can be totally neutral and uncontaminated 
by other intersecting discourses. At this case conference, meaning 
was constructed differentially in the ways the various professionals 
presented the factual accounts of events, and the ways in which they 
variously "read" and interpreted these texts. 
For example, it emerged at the case conference that Mrs.A. had 
mentioned to the health visitor as well as to the headteacher and 
cl t he d the G P the diffl·cult relati·onship with her ass eac r an . ., 
husband; he was unsupportive, kept her short of money and 
sometimes went to stay with his parents leaving her to manage with 
the three children. She told the health visitor also that he was 
sexually demanding, although would not be encouraged to speak more 
about this. In the health visitor's initial commonsense reading of this 
text, the effects of these difficulties could reasonably account for the 
changes in the child's behaviour; the consequence of a combination of 
financial problems, sexual difficulties, a new unplanned baby, mother's 
depression, father's comings and goings, and the extra demands her 
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mother was making on Julie: a more developed version of the 
"trouble at home" reading of the text by the class teacher. The 
health visitor expressed surprise that Mrs.A. had not continued with 
the appointments at the family clinic as she had found her to be a 
conscientious mother; and she wondered whether it was simply too 
practically difficult for Mrs.A. to get there. She seemed to have no 
supportive family or friends. Perhaps she needed transport or a 
baby minder. Perhaps she needed financial advice; was the family 
entitled to benefits? Perhaps social services could help. The health 
visitor'S reading and her discourse of common-sense was derived from 
long experience of working with over-burdened mothers as well as 
her professional training. Doubtful on the issue of possible sexual 
abuse, she shifted ground and revised her reading during the case 
conference as the psychiatrist expanded on her specialised text of 
child abuse and on her own reading and interpretation of the various 
professional texts. 
The reading of the police officer who had interviewed Mr .A. was 
different from that of the psychiatrist. Both police officers were 
familiar with the discourse of child abuse and child sexual abuse, had 
had special training and had been involved with social services in 
case conferences. But their discourse was of legally permitted 
evidence, criminal charges, and presumption of innocence. Their 
reading of the texts provided no evidence that would stand up in 
court; but they accepted the expert interpretation of the psychiatrist 
that the child's behaviour and the way she had responded in the two 
sessions with the psychiatrist suggested a need for further 
investigation. 
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The G.P. did not commit himself either way on the psychiatrist's 
reading of the texts and her discourse of sexual abuse and wished to 
leave the case conference before the parents came in. 
be informed of the outcome. 
He asked to 
By the time the parents joined the case conference the professionals 
were already positioned. An alliance had formed between the 
psychiatrist, the clinic social worker, the head teacher and the 
education welfare officer. The class teachers implicitly supported the 
alliance. The discourses of the teamleader and the local authority 
social worker were dominated by the force of the combined discourses 
of the alliance. The health visitor and her manager and the police 
were "sitting on the fence." The G.P. had distanced himself from the 
proceedings. 
After the parents had joined the case conference and subsequently 
been asked to leave, the teamleader/supervisor continued with his 
oppositional discourse based on an alternative reading of the texts. 
He argued that although there was cause for concern there was at 
present not enough firm evidence to support a finding of sexual 
abuse, nor to presume that the parents would now be unwilling to 
co-operate. He urged the point that Mrs.A. had agreed to keep 
further appointments at the family clinic; and although Mr .A. had not 
given a commitment that he would attend, he had not specifically said 
he would not do so. The clinic social worker should continue her 
k . h M A and work wt'th both the parents while the wor Wit rs .. 
psychiatrist saw Julie, so that it would become clearer what was going 
on. An inevitable delay in the local authority social worker taking on 
the case had already been explained and this would not be in the 
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child's interests. Even at a later stage if she were to be involved, 
the social worker would have difficulty in allocating the necessary 
time for this complex type of work. Like the rest of his team she 
was working overtime - and not getting paid for it. It was 
recognised by senior management that the resources of the area team 
were overstretched. As the teamleader resisted the alliance power 
and the driving force of the psychiatrist and headteacher, his 
professional discourse intersected with the political discource of 
scarce resources and resource management. 
The clinic social worker, opposing the discourses of the teamleader, 
argued that she had not engaged Mrs. A. in any "work in depth" but 
had concentrated on taking a family history. According to her 
professional discourse, this process of obtaining factual information 
had not "engaged" Mrs.A. in "work." She argued that it would be 
more appropriate for a social worker to work with the family in the 
home environment, which she herself could not (meaning, would not) 
do. According to her reading of the texts, further investigation of 
suspected sexual abuse was indicated and this was a responsibility 
for the social services department not the family clinic. The problem 
of social services resources was not part of her discourse. 
The psychiatrist challenged the teamleader's discourse and his 
reading of the texts; that there was little to go on and that Mrs.A. 
would now probably continue to keep appointments. She argued that 
it was not known what part Mr.A. had played in Mrs.A's failure to 
carryon with the appointments; and had the teamleader noticed the 
way the parents interacted? If the case conference did not put the 
child's name on the register, the parents would get the message that 
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they could go away and carryon as before, they could and probably 
would refuse any intervention. Whatever the child was suffering, she 
would continue to suffer. The brief intervention by the psychiatrist 
would have a negative effect as the child would not understand the 
position in which she had been virtually abandoned. The child's 
name should go on the register and then an action plan could be 
worked out between the clinic and social services. The discourse of 
child protection and inter-agency practices demanded the intervention 
of the local authority social workers. 
The operation of power that resulted in the child's name going on the 
register derived from the specialised and exclusive discourse of the 
psychiatrist, from the true statements that only she, among the 
professionals, was authorised to speak; but underlying this were the 
political discourses of agency resources, accountability, statutory 
responsibilities and the rules of evidence. The "fact" of child sexual 
abuse, its identification, is regulated in different professional 
discourses by their rules of evidence and proof of guilt. The rules 
of evidence in the privileged discourses of the speakers of 
psychiatry and paediatrics may not accord with those required in law; 
but the truth articulated in the exclusive language of their discourses 
may provide the evidence of child abuse that will serve to 
"discipline" the social work agents to operate their statutory powers 
to take action, to intervene according to the rules and procedures of 
their agency. 
Thus, 'at the point of application,' in this particular site 'where it 
produces its real effects,' (Foucault) power can be seen to operate 
through a combination of specialised knowledge and the rules that 
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regulate the discursive practices of child protection agencies. The 
contemporary truth of child sexual abuse articulated in the specialised 
discourses of psychiatry and paediatrics influences the practices of 
other agencies; and truth achieves its effects through the 
mechanisms and apparatuses which empower the agents. The truth, 
the knowledge-power which dominates the inter-personal relationship 
between a psychiatrist and an individual subject does not allow the 
professional to operate disciplinary power over unwilling subjects who 
resist and will not make themselves available. In order to operate 
power over these subjects, the psychiatrist must influence the 
discursive practices of other agents; must invoke their 
institutionalised authority and statutory power and their power of 
sanctions against uncooperative subjects. As Lenski argues, there is 
a basic distinction within the category of institutionalised power 
between authority which is the 'enforceable right to command others' 
and influence which is 'the ability to manipulate the social situation of 
others, or their perception of it, by the exercise of one's resources 
and rights.' (Lenski 1986, p.250). The power of a psychiatrist to 
influence/manipulate others requires their consent; and in the case of 
unwilling subjects who resist, the operation of expert power depends 
on the 'enforceable right' of the statutory instruments activated 
through the practices of the authorised agents. 
Power, as Foucault posits, is everywhere. It operates in different 
forms, on different planes, and in different relational circumstances, 
to produce its diverse effects. The expert speakers of the human 
sciences are empowered through the discourses of their specialised 
disciplines which determine that which is 'true.' They exercise 
power through the influence of their truths on subjects; and 
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through the influence of their truths on the discursive practices of 
agents who are empowered by their institutionalised authority to act 
on the actions of others. Disciplinary power operates not only 
through 'truth' and knowledge but through a complex interaction of 
discourses, organizational rules and procedures that simultaneously 
empower and regulate the agents. 
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Notes to Chapter 8: 
(1) In this chapter, the author has drawn on her 18 years experience 
of local authority social work as fieldworker, supervisor and area 
manager, as well as on texts referred to in the bibliography. 
(2) These observations are based on comments made by social work 
students in their placement reports. The author has had access to 
the reports of more than a hundred social work students over the 
past four years as an External Assessor for a CCETSW practice 
teacher training programme. 
(3) In this case study, names have been changed and some of the 
details generalised from several very similar cases, in order to avoid 
any possibility of identification. The outcomes varied in each 
case, according to the professional discourses and the nature of the 
evidence. The author had considerable experience of participating in 
and chairing case conferences on child abuse and child sexual abuse 
prior to the implementation of the Children Act 1989. 
Since the implementation of the Act in October 1991 social services 
departments, in accordance with the discourses of 'partnership' and 
'Working Together' (Department of Health 1991 (ii)(a), p.6; 1991 (iii), 
pp.43/44), should facilitate the attendance of parents and children 
throughout child abuse case conferences, other than on 'exceptional 
occasions' (p.43 para 6.15). It is not known how widely spread this 
practice is, or what effect it has on outcomes where the practice has 
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been instituted. Detailed research in this area is required. It is 
likely, in any event, that networking and informal case discussions 
that will not include parents will continue among professional agents; 
and that the agendas constituted in other discourses will enter into 
the meta-discourse of child protection in the case conference arena. 
Moreover, while the presence of parents will change the environment, 
the "playing-field" will not be level. The professional agents will 
still be privileged by their resources of specialised knowledge-power, 
status, alliance-power, authority; and they will still have the 
advantage over subjects who lack the discursive language with which 
to de-construct the specialised professional discourses. 
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9. RULES, RESOURCE-POWER AND PRIVILEGE. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Central to my study has been Michel Foucault's concept of discourse, 
his dictum that discourse is 'both an instrument and effect of power' 
and also 'a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
strategy.' I have drawn on his notion of knowledge-power and the 
ways in which 'truth' and meaning are constructed in the discourses 
of the human sciences; and on his idea of 'disciplinary power' and the 
processes of 'normalization,' the apparatuses and institutions through 
which they operate. 
I have focussed on social work as one of the 'dubious' human 
sciences, specifically as it operates disciplinary power over subjects 
in its institutionalised form as part of the state apparatus. I have 
argued that statutory social work is privileged and empowered both 
by the specialised knowledge which informs its discourses, and by the 
authority conferred upon it by the law; but that its power is 
mediated by the organizational and statutory rules within which it 
operates, and by its limited access to resources. 
Throughout this thesis I have argued, and demonstrated through case 
studies, that rules and resources - ownership of, access to or control 
of resources - are significant factors in power relations; and that 
the discourses and discursive practices of expert speakers, who are 
privileged by their resource of specialised knowledge, are regulated 
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by rules which mediate the operation of their disciplinary power - the 
rules of who may speak the language of specialised discourse, the 
rules of resource management, the rules of the organizations which 
authorise them to act as their agents, a 'right' which is constituted in 
and subject to the rules of law. 
I have argued that subjects are largely self-disciplining and that 
they freely subject themselves to the rules and norms of cultural 
groups and organizations; that the operation of disciplinary power 
depends on the consent of subjects to the rules of 'normalization,' 
and failing consent, on the resource of effective sanctions; that 
subjects are increasingly withholding consent to the discursive rules 
of expert speakers and are forming alliances through which organized 
resistance assumes the force of oppositional power; that common-
sense discourses are challenging the 'truths' of the expert speakers, 
the discursive rules and the systems of power with which, Foucault 
argues, their 'regimes of truth' are linked. 
In order to broaden the canvas, I have looked at other theoretical 
approaches to the understanding of power and the ways in which it 
operates, the organizational theories of Mintzberg and Handy and the 
work of Clegg. (chapter 2). From their writings I have extrapolated 
and applied their ideas of external influencers, organizational mission 
and membership, organizational ideology and its unifying power, 
charisma and drive, power-games and the rules that regulate them. 
These ideas and Clegg's notion of 'collective organization' (alliances) 
as a basis for 'effective resistance,' (Clegg 1989) have been directly 
applied to my study of the events in Cleveland in 1987 in chapter 5 
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and to my analysis of power relations among the professional agents 
in chapter 8. 
Within the context of the institutions and apparatuses through which 
disciplinary power is exercised over subjects, I have posited the link 
between the operation of power and the organizational rules and 
structures which privilege the agents of the state. In chapter 3 I 
have discussed this power relation, Foucault's notion of bio-power and 
the historical development of state intervention in the family and the 
rearing of children. I have discussed the changing discourses of 
"the family" and the discursive construction of childhood at different 
historical periods, the development of the discourse of children'S 
rights and its articulation in the Children Act 1989. I have 
considered how this addresses the power balance between children 
and adults, and also limits the privileged discursive practices of the 
state agencies. I have argued that many of the cultural changes in 
contemporary society, including the changing construction of the 
subjectivity of the child and the changing rules of sexual behaviours, 
owe much to media discourses; that their technological power which 
enables the media to reach vast audiences within their private spaces 
has blurred the boundaries between the public and the private. 
In chapter 4 I have discussed the concept of privacy and the 
hegemonic power of the state, vested in its agents, to intervene in 
the private space of the family. I have argued that our society 
perceives the protection of children to be the ultimate responsibility 
of the state. I have considered the discourses and discursive 
practices of the agents to whom that power is delegated, and some of 
the implications for their practices inscribed in the rules and the 
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discourses of the law. I have argued that while the law empowers its 
agents, its rules also regulate and set limits on their powers. 
I have provided a case study in chapter 5 to illustrate the operation 
of disciplinary power by the agents in the field of child protection 
under the legislation that preceded the Children Act 1989. The text 
of the Butler-Sloss Report of the Inquiry into child sexual abuse in 
Cleveland in 1987 provided the basis for this study of power 
operating in 'immediate relationship with its field of application.' I 
have discussed the way meaning was constructed in the specialised 
discourses of expert speakers, and the operation of privileged 
knowledge power. I have noted Foucault's references to the general 
preoccupation in western culture with sex and sexuality, the 
'proliferation of sexual discourses,' and the way meaning is ascribed 
to certain sexual practices. The influence and resources of the media, 
the 'mediazation process' (Thompson 1990) and the construction of 
meaning in media discourses leading to a climate of moral outrage, 
have been discussed. The discourses and discursive practices of the 
professional agents, the inter-professional power struggles, the 
privileging of oppositional discourses, and the effects on power 
relations of strategic oppositional alliances, have been analysed. 
Specialised knowledge, status, organizational position, have been 
identified as privileging resources; personal drive, mission, ideology, 
tactical game-playing and strategic alliances, were shown to be 
elements operating in this field of force relations. 
I have posited the discourse of the Butler-Sloss report as a starting 
point for a strategy to modify the power of the agents, which 
became institutionalised in the Children Act 1989. Selected sections of 
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the text of the Act have been analysed in chapter 6 in order to 
examine the ways in which the language of legal discourse is open to 
ambiguous and alternative readings. I have noted how the wording of 
the Act leaves a wide margin for interpretation and the exercise of 
discretion by its authorised agents; and that while it promotes 
'partnership' between parents and the agents, it requires parents to 
be 'reasonable' and 'co-operative,' a requirement left to the 
discretionary and interpretative power of the agents. I note how the 
law privileges its agents, ascribing to them its authority to operate 
disciplinary power over subjects; but that its rules also mediate 
their power by making the agents more accountable to the discursive 
practices of the courts. The Act addresses the power imbalances 
between parents/children/the agents/the courts and it asserts the 
rights of children to be heard and to have their views taken into 
account. Although not 
universality and in its 
"sovereign," the law is privileged in its 
capacity to prescribe and regulate the 
disciplinary power of its authorised agents. 
In chapter 7 I have returned to the text of the Butler-Sloss Report 
as a reference point from which to base an analysis of the 
disciplinary power of the authorised agents, and to draw some general 
inferences from this model. I have argued that power operates in 
different forms in specific sites through the agency (mediation) of 
individual agents (instruments) who own or have access to resources 
or sanctions, who are privileged by social location, organizational 
positioning and cultural norms; that knowledge is only one of a 
range of privileging resources through which they operate 
disciplinary power over subj ects; that the exercise of their power is 
subject to management discourses and the resource (rationing) power 
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of local managers and central government; and that the greater or 
lesser resource power of subjects differentially affords them the 
capacity to make choices, and is a factor in power relations with 
professional agents. 
I have discussed the discursive practices of the agents within the 
politics of child protection, the historical background to the 
emergence of child abuse, and later child sexual abuse, as social 
problems; and the discursive and technological power of the media in 
defining these problems for public consumption, the ways in which 
meaning is constructed through selective media texts addressed to 
specific audiences. 
I have considered the ways in which the social definition of childhood 
and children'S sexuality have been re-constructed through the 
knowledge-power of professional discourses at different historical 
periods; and have noted that in contemporary society subjects, 
including persons defined as children, withhold their consent to the 
processes of 'normalization' and are not disciplined by the discourses 
of expert speakers. I have argued that sexual discourses have 
historically privileged male sexual behaviours within the context of 
male heterosexuality; that the structural and cultural positioning of 
men in our society is a significant privileging factor in power 
relations; and that there are some parallels (but also significant 
differences) between the oppression of women by men and the 
oppression of children by adults. I have discussed the changing 
norms of sexual behaviours; and how the phenomenon of child sexual 
abuse has been identified through the specialised discourses of 
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professional agents and has entered into media texts and the 
discourse of ever day speech. 
Chapter 8 provides a detailed analysis of disciplinary power operating 
at the local level in the field of child protection, focussing on the 
discourses and discursive practices of local authority social workers, 
the authorised agents of the state. I have traced the historical 
development of statutory social work and discussed the problematic of 
the complex positioning of social workers as professional agents and 
local authority officers; the conflict of interests between the 
discourses of client need, service provision and resource management. 
I have identified the discursive practices through which individuals, 
free subjects, are constituted as cases and defined as 
clients/consumers/customers/users; and the discursive practices 
through which services are rationed. Within this context I have 
discussed the concept of need, the concept of risk, the discourse of 
"balance of probabilities" and the way meaning is ascribed to the 
practices of social work through media discourses. 
Through a case study and analysis I have illustrated the way "truth" 
and meaning can be constructed in the specialised discourses of 
expert speakers; how inter-disciplinary power struggles over 
meaning among professional agents can be dominated by the status 
power, institutionalised position power and authority power of 
privileged players in a complex power-game; and how the specialised 
discourses of professional agents may be mediated by a variety of 
personal and organizational agendas and institutionalised rules. I 
have posited that in this case the power struggles were ultimately 
dominated and the outcome determined by the institutionalised rules 
267 
of the agency whose disciplinary power was authorised in the 
discursive rules of the law; and I have argued that disciplinary 
power operates through a complex interaction of discourses, 
privileging resources (including knowledge), and rules that 
simultaneously empower the agents and regulate their power. 
Meaning is not "fixed" but is constructed in discourse at its point of 
application, as knowledge-power is exercised to attain the desired 
outcomes of expert speakers. Foucault perceives discourse as 'a 
series of discontinuous segments,' (Foucault 1979, p.lOO); tactical 
elements directed towards achieving specific aims and objectives. The 
operation of power is always intentional. Discourse is the medium 
through which various strategies are brought into play in the field 
of force relations, within specific sites and situations where meaning 
is inflected to serve the "mission" of the speakers. Discourses are at 
once instruments of power and points of resistance. (ibid p.lOl). In 
its usage at the conjuncture of multiple contexts, discourse functions 
as a tactical element calculated to dominate in a complex strategical 
situation of power relations. (ibid pp.95-l02). 
In the arena of the case conference, for example, the discourse of the 
child psychiatrist which had constructed meaning from the child's 
behaviour in the clinical context became a tactical element in the 
power struggle. In her missionary drive to ensure the provision of 
service and protection of the child, and to overcome the resistance of 
other speakers, the language of agency rules and statutory 
responsibility permeated the clinical discourse of the psychiatrist, 
which remained centred on her interpretation of the needs of the 
child. In the context of their own disciplines, other professional 
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speakers resisted the truth of her discourse, challenging the 
ambiguity of her discursive language that spoke of a general category 
of sexual abuse rather than being able to identify its specific form, 
seeking alternative meanings for the child's behaviour through their 
own discourses. The language of agency procedures and resource 
management, interposed into the professional social work discourse of 
the tearnleader, was a strategic move in the power struggle over 
meaning and outcomes, countered by the discursive tactical 
manoeuvres of the psychiatrist. 
The discursive power struggle in the closed environment of the child 
abuse case conference operated within a wider environmental context, 
the organizational context and beyond. Various influences are always 
and everywhere present in the external environment, impacting on the 
relational power of professional agents; the influence of the policies, 
culture and ideology of the particular organization on its members 
(Mintzberg 1983), the influence of government policies and market 
ideology on agency resources and discourses, the influence of emotive 
media texts and (within this scenario) ambivalent public expectations 
that professionals will "do something" to protect children at risk but 
not "abuse" the rights of parents or the privacy of the family. The 
specialised knowledge-power of expert speakers operates in practice 
not in some neutral environment but at specific sites and moments 
permeated by various external influences, regulated by rules and 
procedures and in relation to particular objectives. 'There is no 
power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives.' 
(Foucault 1979, p.95). 
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Gary Wickham, in his critique of Foucault, argues that power relations 
exist only in specific sites; that these 'sites' are formed by 'an 
intersection of practices around specific operational policies ... '; and 
that power relations 'are relations of advantage/disadvantage' 
specifically 'in terms of the objectives within particular operational 
policies.' The agents involved in the site are the products of the 
intersection of the practices which constitute a specific site at a 
specific time. (Wickham 1986, pp.174-176). By focussing on a specific 
site in a discrete context as in the foregoing case study we can see 
how the site, the practices, the operational policies, are regulated by 
discursive rules, rules that privilege the agents and position the 
agents and subjects in relations of advantage and disadvantage. 
The agents are privileged by their familiarity with the policies and 
practices, by the discursive language of their specialised professional 
knowledge, by their status and resource-power; and often by the 
physical environment of the site (the hospital, the prison, the town 
hall etc.) The agents are privileged by the rules which position them 
as agents and by their knowledge of the rules that govern the 
practices. 
The agents are themselves, however, positioned differentially. In the 
'site' of the case conference, the factors which privileged the agents 
over the parents also privileged some of the professional participants. 
This particular site privileged the agents who were familiar with the 
discursive practices of child abuse case conferences and the 
operational policies of the various disciplines, the strategical use of 
language and the specialised discourses of the expert speakers. In 
particular it privileged the institutionalised position and status of the 
chairperson who "orchestrated" the proceedings according to the 
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organizational rules of case conference procedures; the rule that each 
participant must be allowed the opportunity to speak but within the 
time limits that the chairperson controlled, the rule that the 
chairperson would interpret the specialised language of her discipline 
and her agency, and the legal implications, for the benefit of those 
not familiar with the terminology, the rule that the chairperson would 
decide when to terminate the discussion and have the privilege of 
summing up, a possible tactical discursive operation of power to 
achieve a preferred outcome. 
While it is in discourse that knowledge and power come together, 
power in action is regulated by rules. The discourses and discursive 
practices of agents who are authorised to operate disciplinary power 
over subj ects are regulated both by the rules of the professional 
organizations which afford them the status of expert speakers and by 
the rules of the organizations within which they operate. Rules 
privilege and empower. As Clegg posits, 'A conception of rules is 
essential to an adequate understanding of power.' (Clegg 1989). 
Organizational rules privilege some of the agents; managers and 
supervisors over social workers, consultants over junior doctors, etc. 
The rules of the law privilege the agents of the state over subjects. 
Systems of rules, like power, are everywhere. 
"Society" is characterised by organization and, as I have argued in 
chapter 2, organization signifies rules. Essential to the ordering and 
orderliness of society, and to the multiplicity of its parts, are rules 
to which the majority of subjects more or less consent and through 
which they are more or less disciplined; rules through which the 
business of the state is carried out and rules that govern (control) 
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social behaviours; the written canon of rules, the coded language 
that comprises "the law;" the informal, culturally defined rules of 
inter-personal relations; the rules that characterise religious faiths 
and other dogmas, that discipline their adherents and afford them a 
sense of "belonging;" the institutionalised rules and the discursive 
rules that regulate and inform the discursive practices of professional 
experts, who are also "subjects" and subject to the rules; the rules 
that we make for ourselves in the way we organize our lives within 
the complexity of formal and informal rules and systems that comprise 
the social order. To be organized is to be regulated by rules. 
Rules provide a framework within which the individual positions 
him/herself and knows where (s)he stands. Rules are discursive 
constructions, both prescriptive and descriptive. They describe 
what is acceptable, what is expected, what is required. They demand 
certain actions, prohibit others, define the norms of social behaviour 
in particular environments, and prescribe the punishments for 
transgression. While rules made by others may be perceived as 
disciplinary and intrusive into the freedom and privacy of the 
subject, the instruments of what Foucault calls 'bio-power' directed to 
'normalization' of the body of the subject, (see chapter 3 above), 
their purpose is also protective, prohibiting physical violence against 
persons, protecting against disruption, un-ruliness and disorder. 
Rules protect the institutionalised cultural norms of society, to which 
the individual subject mayor may not give consent. Rules operate 
to conserve the stability of the social order, although not necesarily 
ensuring it. Rules set the boundaries within which the "social" is 
organized. The operation of power depends on consent to the given 
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rules which regulate social relationships, and on disciplinary sanctions 
against those who disobey the rules. 
In so far as the given rules satisfy our needs and there is 
"something in it" for us, we consent and conform. At a time of rapid 
social change and the emergence of new "truths," many of the 
traditional cultural rules enshrined in the discourses of expert 
speakers, the rules that regulate social behaviours, meet with 
resistance coming from "everywhere." The professional discourses of 
the human sciences and their truth claims (psychiatry, social work 
etc.) are called into question in the public arena as they are 
constantly debated in and through media discourses. New rules are 
constructed, not in the professional discourses of the experts but in 
the everyday discourses and actual practices of subjects resisting 
'normalization' and exercising their 'sovereign right' as individuals. 
(Foucault 1986, pp.241/242). 
Society is a complexity of rule-governed inter-related systems, 
regulated both by the rules of statutory law and by the informal 
rules of culturally defined interpersonal power relations. Many of the 
rules are "invisible," we are born into them, a natural order of things 
we take for granted. As children we are disciplined into the 
particular rules that structure and regulate the household and the 
power relations within the family. We resist, we break the rules, we 
test the power of adults. As Foucault posits, resistance is a 
characteristic of power relations. But we are conditioned to conform 
to those rules which give us access to the resources which will meet 
our needs. We learn the basic rules of language through which we 
may satisfy our need to communicate, and we learn the rules of 
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behaviour which will satisfy our various needs to win acceptance and 
approval as well as our material needs. 
We are subject to the rules constructed in different discourses within 
different environments, some of which we may not recognise as rules 
but simply as given behaviours to which, as a matter of course, we 
conform. We are distanced from and subject to the power of 
professional experts by the rules through which we gain access to 
them, by their institutionalised status and the rule of "difference" 
between them and us, by the specialised language of their discourses 
and the rules of who make speak that language. The modes of 
address we use to medical specialists when we are sick and need 
their expert knowledge, for example, are generally different from 
those we use with familiars from whom we need approval or affection 
rather than knowledge and expertise. The language of the "experts" 
is not the language of everyday speech; and it puts us in our 
"place." Our acceptance of this subj ective positioning lies in our 
need for their resources of specialised knowledge and technology. 
The rules of social exchange vary with the pre-determined inter-
personal power relation of the participants. These unequal power 
relations are determined by the rule systems of the social and 
professional groups which confer privilege on their members and 
exclude those who do not speak their specialised language, the 
professional "clubs" which separate them from us - the Judges, the 
police, the doctors, the social workers etc. Knowledge is one of their 
privileging resources, but it is one of a multiplicity of resources -
status, social location, organizational positioning, alliances, sanctions -
that come into play in the operation of power. 
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We learn and conform to the rules of language and behaviour to 
satisfy a basic human need to belong, to be identified with and 
accepted into the groups or institutions which are our "bits" of 
society; social groups, professional groups, work groups, religious 
groups. Intersecting with the formal rules of the organizational 
groups to which we belong are the informal cultural rules that 
regulate interpersonal relations the rules of sub-groups who 
construct their own rules, which may be in conflict with the 
institutionalised organizational rules. Even "unruly" groups are 
regulated by rules of language use, and by rules of dress and 
behaviour that construct identity and determine membership. In 
relation to the wider society they may be perceived as undisciplined, 
"out of control," as they make their own rules and struggle against 
'normalization' and the rules and the disciplinary power of the 
authorised agents of the state. But they are "disciplined" by the 
rules through which they achieve their identity as members of the 
group. Those who do not conform are ostracised or excluded, they do 
not "belong." To be organized and regulated as a group, as a 
movement, as a gang, is to be disciplined and controlled by a system 
of rules. 
Society functions as a complex organism, its control mechanisms 
incorporated in the systems of rules that regulate its disparate but 
intersecting parts; rules that have been constituted and re-
constituted throughout its historical past. Over time the rules 
change. Rules are always in process, intersecting and often 
conflicting, subject to the continual changes in the external 
environment; an accelerated process in the late twentieth century as 
sophisticated technology "shrinks" time and space and ubiquitous 
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media texts disseminate new ideas and insights. The discourse of 
privilege enters into everyday speech as subjects become increasingly 
aware of the privileging effects of both the statutory rules and the 
informal rules; among them, the rules that have traditionally ordered 
power relations between men and women, between children and adults, 
between professional agents and subjects. 
While some of the fundamental rules that govern ordered societies 
remain constant, for example, that the rules inscribed in the statutory 
law must be obeyed and punishment visited on those who transgress, 
many of the rules that govern power relations are in process, as with 
gender positioning and the norms of sexual behaviours for example. 
As the environmental context changes, through scientific and 
technological advances, major catastrophes such as war, demographic 
changes and movements of population, ideas coming from many points 
circulate as though under their own impetus to challenge the rules 
derived from the received values and meanings of the past. 
Characteristic of each 'post-modern' generation in the contemporary 
world of 'flux, discontinuity, intrigue and illusion' (Clegg 1989. see 
chapter 1 above), is its questioning of the received truths that it has 
inherited, its challenge to the rules that perpetuate perceived 
inequalities, its construction of new concepts to describe power 
relations. So for example, the concept of "marginalised" subjects and 
theories of institutionalised discrimination (against ethnic groups, 
women etc.) have entered into media discourses and, largely through 
them, into the discourses of everyday speech. The media play a 
significant part in the processes of change. The ideas of intellectuals 
and 'external influencers' (Mintzberg 1983) filtered through the media, 
enhancing public awareness of social issues, serve to modify the 
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climate of public opinion and have even resulted in some changes to 
the rules of law (in relation to the age of consent to homosexual 
behaviour for example). 
To the extent that the rules that constitute the law, the statutory 
framework of the state, "must" be obeyed, incorporating enforceable 
penalties against those who transgress, they are instruments of state 
power; instruments operated by authorised agents through the 
institutions that comprise the state apparatus, (themselves often 
withholding "consent," operating unlawful discrimination, against 
women, homosexuals, ethnic minorities, the disabled). The statutory 
rules define "the state," its territory and its autonomy, reflect the 
ideology of the political party in power, construct the subj ectivity of 
subjects as law-abiding citizens, and prescribe the sanctions against 
those subjects who transgress the rules. The statutory rules 
prescribe the apparatuses and mechanisms of surveillance, the 
mechanisms which authorise and empower the agents of the state to 
operate disciplinary power. 
The disciplinary power of the state, operated through its agents, lies 
in the hegemonic acquiesence of the majority population to the 
statutory rules, together with the mechanisms of control exercised by 
authorised agents against those who are found guilty of breaking the 
statutory rules; or those who are constructed in the specialised 
discourses of expert agents to be guilty. The rule of "presumption of 
innocence until found guilty" is sometimes suspended through the 
discursive power of the agents, as it has been in cases of child 
sexual abuse. The agents can operate disciplinary power against 
transgressors or suspected transgressors only within the limitations 
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imposed or sanctioned by the rules of law. But within those 
limitations the agents retain a margin of discretionary power, both to 
interpret the rules and over the management of their resources - in 
the field of child protection for example, their support services for 
children in need, their placement resources, their financial support to 
children leaving care etc. 
Disciplinary power operates by consent of the subject or through the 
resources available to enforce the rules and the management of the 
resources by the authorised agents. To the extent that the resources 
of enforcement are inadequate or ineffective, disciplinary power does 
not "work." Discriminatory practices continue, children continue to 
be abused by adults. Knowledge-power is not enough. The 
knowledge-power of the psychiatrist in the site of the given case 
study, faced with the resistance of the parents, could only operate 
through the organizational resource of the child protection register 
backed by the enforceable rules of the law. 
Points of resistance to the operation of power are present 
"everywhere" (Foucault, 1979 p.9S); and oppositional power, a force 
more dynamic than resistance, operates everywhere in the field of 
power relations, even against the law itself, privileged although it is 
by its status as the hegemonic instrument of the state. Operating 
through consent and through coercion and its power of sanctions, the 
law has no absolute sovereignty. It meets not only with resistance 
but with multiple forces of oppositional power. It is engaged in 
perpetual power struggles with political dissenters and special 
interest groups (environmentalists for example) seeking to change the 
rules, with organized criminal groups who make their own rules, 
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(drug-trading cartels for example), and with individual transgressors 
who break the rules. It is engaged in occasional ideological power 
struggles with large numbers of dissident subjects who withhold 
consent to a particular unpopular rule, the poll tax for example. 
When a universally applicable rule does not receive majority consent, 
is interpreted by large numbers of subjects as not "fair" or as not 
making "sense," the public voice in alliance with the media, as with 
the poll tax, is a powerful counter-force against the disciplinary 
power of the state and its privileged agents, those agents whose 
discourses influence the formulation of the rules and whose discursive 
practices are directed towards their implementation. As Foucault 
argues, we cannot reduce the operation of power to the state and the 
mechanisms and apparatuses of the law. We cannot do so even 
though the rules that constitute the law are privileged as the primary 
rules through which society is organized and controlled. 
In any specific site, however constituted by particular objectives and 
operational policies, the rule of law is always there. The agents who 
are privileged by their specialised knowledge-power to operate 
disciplinary power, who are empowered by statute to act upon the 
actions of others, must operate within the rules of the law. But the 
law, although a dominant instrument of power, and privileged by 
majority consent to its statutory framework of rules and disciplinary 
sanctions, is not the sovereign locus of power. While its rules 
permeate every aspect of the state and the lives of all its subjects, it 
not only meets with oppositional power and the environmental forces 
of change, but its mechanisms of surveillance are constrained by the 
insufficiency of its resources and are subject to the discretion and 
fallibility of its agents; its rules are open to the interpretative power 
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of lawyers and judges and other experts empowered with the 
authorised right to act as its agents and to interpret the rules. 
Rules that empower may simultaneously disempower. The "charters" 
of the 1990s, the Citizens' Charter, the Patients' Charter etc., seeking 
to empower the users and consumers of services are at the same time 
techniques of disempowerment, their discourses making the authorised 
agents of the state more publicly accountable (even if the charters 
are not notably effective in their declared aim of improving services). 
The less visible and less accountable the agents, as in a totalitarian 
state, the greater is their repressive and disciplinary power and the 
more enforceable and intractable are the rules. In our relatively more 
liberal/ democratic state, our relatively more open society, no agency 
or agent is above the rule of law. In their interactions with subjects, 
the agents although privileged by their statutory positioning and 
their knowledge of the law are in the last instance accountable. But, 
although accountable to the courts and to their supervisors and 
managers, the public accountability of professional agents is 
problematic; the language of their 'serious speech acts' (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1982, p.48) is often incomprehensible and mystifying, their 
discursive practices are often protected from public scrutiny through 
the rule of confidentiality inscribed in their professional discourses. 
The discursive language of the rules, open to interpretation, is a two-
edged instrument of power. As I have argued in chapter 6, the 
collection of rules that constitute the Children Act 1989 simultaneously 
empower and disempower its agents. The construction of meaning 
from the ambiguities of language allows the privilege of discretion to 
agents who do not make the rules but who are ascribed the statutory 
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power to ensure the compliance of subjects to the rules as they, the 
agents, interpret them. This discretionary power of interpretation 
mediates the accountability of the agents; social workers for example 
whose rules of confidentiality and "the child's best interests" - as 
the social workers define it - exclude those who are not privileged to 
speak the language of their specialised discourses, those "outsiders" 
who would seek to understand their practices but, lacking their 
specialised knowledge and theoretical understanding, would mis-
represent them. Many social workers would argue that the exercise 
of their discretionary power against public accountability for their 
actions, through the media for example, is premised both on the 
record of unacceptable media intrusion into the privacy and private 
space of subjects, and on the lack of understanding of their practices 
which leads to the predominantly negative representations of social 
work in media discourses. The professional agents operate their 
privileged discretionary power to protect their discursive practices, 
and they offset their public accountability against the subject's right 
to confidentiality and privacy. 
This privileged discretionary power of the agents and their expert 
knowledge power is being called into question, resisted and actively 
opposed, as the traditional "divide" between the experts (them) and 
subjects (us) disintegrates, albeit slowly, in many spheres of 'post-
modern' society. Through mutual alliances and alliances with external 
influencers - special interest groups, media personalities and other 
cultural "stars," politicians, charismatic dissidents - the discourses of 
marginalised groups and subjects have entered into the political 
arena. 
women, 
"Clients" of health and social services, ethnic minority groups, 
homosexuals, the disabled etc. mobilise media power to 
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challenge the "true" stater .. ~. -~.:; of expert speakers; in late 1993, over 
social workers' criteria of eligibility (in relation to ethnicity) to 
become adoptive parents for example. Special interest groups having 
their own knowledge-power and resource power, operate through the 
media to question the truths of expert discourses and the rules that 
privilege the agents of the state. Subjects, aware of their 
subjectivity, no longer willing to "know their place," mobilise media 
power, the discourses of investigative journalism, to challenge the 
knowledge and authority of the experts and the agents of the state. 
The status of the human sciences and their disciplinary power is 
unstable in post-modern British society. Their discourses and the 
serious speech acts of those who are charged with saying what 
counts as true are subject to controversy and reconstruction as 
myth. Media power is a crucial factor in the struggles over the 
relational power between subjects and expert agents. 
Increasingly in the 1990s the agents of the state and the expert 
speakers of serious speech acts are being called to account, Judges, 
Ministers of State, doctors, social workers, police officers etc., as 
their interpretations and their actions and their operation of 
disciplinary power are brought into the public domain, made the 
subj ect of debate in the press, radio and television. Through the 
technological power of the media the public voice has found 
expression and a mechanism and strategy for the exercise of 
oppositional power, both over those who make the rules and those 
who interpret and activate them. The agents, even those historically 
most privileged by status and hierarchical positioning are themselves 
subject, through the media, to the critical surveillance of the public 
gaze. 
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The operation of disciplinary power by Judges, the agents and 
arbiters of the law, their sentencing in cases of rape for example and 
their direction of juries, have been brought into question through 
media discourses, making "them" more accountable to "us." The 
media have opened up an ongoing dialectic on power relations in our 
society, "translating" the discourses of professional intellectuals into 
the more accessible everyday language of media discourses, inflecting 
meaning through the selective use of language for a targetted public. 
An informed public has been made aware through media discourses of 
the issues around power inequalities and the fallibility of the experts; 
a public given a "voice" through the media to enter the debate. 
Media discourses remind subjects of their empowerment through the 
statutory rules that accord each subject the right to complain, to 
challenge and "discipline" the experts. And the media are not 
immune from the critical gaze of the public and the rules of law. The 
media are accountable and subject to disciplinary action by subjects, 
through the processes of the law, in cases of libel or serious mis-
representation. While the media are singularly privileged by their 
technological resources and their discursive power to influence, in the 
complex field of force relations they too are subject to the rules of 
law. 
Members of Parliament, privileged by position and status, have the 
institutionalised power to frame the rules that constitute 
Parliamentary law. But Members of Parliament and "the government" 
itself are subject in the last instance to the power of the law, to the 
discourses and discursive practices of the courts and the statutory 
power of its most senior agents, those privileged by position and 
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status and expert knowledge to definitively interpret and enforce the 
rules. So, for example, in a ruling in July 1993 against a former 
Home Secretary who had 'ignored' a High Court order to return a 
deported refugee to Britain, five Law Lords, 'the most senior judges 
in England and Wales' rejected the government's claim that it was 
above the law and ruled that Ministers of State could be forced to 
obey a court order and an instruction from a judge, and said that 
courts had the power to enforce sanctions if necessary. (The 
Independent 28.7.93). This juridical power, the power invested in the 
judges, is not "owned" by them but derives from the institution 
within which they operate, a form of institutionalised power which 
they exercise in local and specific contexts. The power of the 
institution, itself statutorily prescribed in law, is privileged above the 
power of the most privileged individual agents of the law. But the 
power of the institution is regulated and limited by the statutory 
rules through which it is constituted and its powers prescribed. 
Even though power operates in many forms and we cannot reduce the 
operation of power to the mechanisms and apparatuses of the law, the 
law is privileged in its universality. All are subject to the rule of 
law. 
The law accords authority to its agents, privileging them to exercise 
surveillance and to operate disciplinary power over subjects who 
break the statutory rules. Their resources of specialised knowledge 
and their positioning within a category of experts makes them eligible 
to be so privileged; but it is the additional resource of the authority 
of the law that positions them as its agents that empowers them, that 
accords them an enforceable right to act upon the actions of others, 
to operate disciplinary power within the framework of the statutory 
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rules. The truths of their expert discourses may influence the rituals 
and practices of everday social interactions and become the common-
sense rules of inter-personal relations, they may (or may not) 
influence the discourses of the law makers and their construction of 
the rules; but influence is not the same as authority, which is 'the 
enforceable right to command others ... (while) Influence, by contrast, is 
much more subtle. It is the ability to manipulate the social situation 
of others, or their perception of it, by the exercise of one's resources 
and rights, thereby increasing the pressure on others to act in 
accordance with one's own wishes.' (Lenski 1986 p.250). In the field 
of child protection the serious speech acts of the experts construct 
meaning from the "signs" and influence the rule-makers; but it is 
their statutorily ascribed authority, the rules of law, that empower 
the agents to act upon the actions of others. 
The specialised knowledge of expert speakers may influence the 
behaviour of subjects; but subjects are not necessarily disciplined 
into the rules of behaviour inscribed in the expert discourses. 'Free 
subjects' who face 'a field of possibilities' (Foucault 1982, p.221) have 
discretionary power, the freedom of choice within the law, whether to 
believe or reject the "true" statements of expert speakers and 
whether to be disciplined by them into their prescribed behaviours; 
sometimes not necessarily resisting but simply withholding consent. 
The knowledge and the theories of expert speakers about transmission 
of the HIV virus, for example, or about the effects of smoking, 
excessive alcohol consumption or over-eating, have influenced social 
norms but have not necessarily disciplined subjects into conforming 
to the rules of prescribed behaviours of safe sex, moderate drinking 
or non-smoking. 
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There are different rules about rules, about the serious rules which 
are inscribed in universal moral codes, and those inscribed in the 
cultural norms of different social groups. But even the serious 
implicit rules inscribed in the moral codes and those made explicit in 
the rules of law, rules that "must" be obeyed, such as those that 
prohibit and punish murder and acts of violence against persons and 
property, have not disciplined subjects. The truth of child abuse 
and the laws for the protection of children have not disciplined 
adults into obedience to the rules, transgressions of which are often 
not readily visible. The serious rules of law do not effectively 
discipline subjects who are driven by their personal needs and the 
drive to satisfy them into breaking the rules that "must" be obeyed, 
risking the sanctions if they are discovered and made accountable. 
Despite the rules designed to protect the children and despite the 
surveillance and knowledge power of the professional agents, the 
oppression of children within the privacy of the family, and even 
within the public systems designed to protect them, continues. 
As public awareness grows, largely through media discourses, of 
continuing oppressions and power inequalities and the insufficiency of 
the rules, new rules are formulated based on new concepts -
partnership between agents and subjects, children'S rights, parents' 
rights and responsibilities, the subject's right to complain. The 
'sovereign rights of the individual' (Foucault 1986 p.242) intersect 
with the disciplinary power of the state and its agents - 'sovereignty 
on the one hand' and 'normalization on the other' in the mobile field 
of force relations. 
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In the context of change at an unprecedented rate - widespread 
demographic changes, technological developments, cultural and 
religious "pluralism" and the decline in the disciplinary power of the 
religions - the rules that formerly regulated the family, (married 
parents, dominant father, obedient children, veneration of the old), 
that formerly regulated gender relations and sexual behaviour, have 
drastically changed over the past five decades. The rules have 
changed, the "truths" have been re-constituted, language has new 
meanings, (unmarried women are no longer "spinsters," for example); 
the meaning of partnership has been re-constructed. The sanction of 
stigma and social ostracism of those who break the traditional rules of 
the family has ceased to be effective, as 'free subjects,' opposing the 
disciplinary power of traditional experts, exercise their power of 
choice; although the struggle over meaning and the concept of the 
"ideal" nuclear family form continues. Even the ultimate sanction of 
death has failed to discipline subjects at risk of dying from heart 
disease or Aids into preventive behaviours and life styles. Free 
subjects, resisting the "true" discourses of the experts and 
effectively rej ecting their disciplinary power, exercising their power 
of choice, construct their own common-sense discourses and make 
their own rules. 
At the micro-level of inter-personal relations, between individuals, in 
the context of social and domestic interaction, behaviour is regulated 
by rules, unwritten, unspoken but implicit and culturally determined 
by social class, ethnicity, gender, age. These rules are always in 
process, subject to the influences of wider societal movements. The 
rules that regulate social behaviour are influenced by "fashion," 
largely promoted through media discourses; influenced by changing 
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values and new meanings coming from "everywhere" that in turn may 
influence the rules of law - those regarding sexual behaviours for 
example. And as the controversial "truths" of the expert speakers 
are disputed among the experts themselves and are re-constituted 
from time to time, the population becomes more knowledgeable and 
articulate, more aware of uncertainty and the fallibility of the expert 
"truths," distrustful of the obscure and mystifying language of 
specialised discourse. The influence of the expert speakers of the 
human sciences and their knowledge-power is being increasingly 
challenged by the common-sense discourses of the people, by 
oppositional alliances resisting 'the privileges of knowledge' and 
constituting an oppositional force against 'secrecy, deformation and 
mystifying representations imposed on people.' (Foucault 1982, p.212). 
The serious speech acts of those who are charged with saying what 
counts as true are the sites of controversy and re-construction, 
largely through the agency of media discourses which place the 
dissident acts of individual subjects and groups into the public arena 
and onto the map of everyday reality. 
The statutory rules, the rules inscribed in law, predominate and are 
thus privileged over other organizational and cultural rules, the 
implicit rules that regulate social behaviour and interpersonal 
relations. The effectiveness of these secondary rules as instruments 
of disciplinary power is relative to the context within which the 
individual or organization operates and to the sanctions that can be 
applied to those who resist, oppose or ignore the rules. In the 
context of the family the rules applied to the rearing, disciplining and 
education of children vary according to the norms of the 
cultural/ethnic/religious group to which the parent(s) belong or to 
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whose ideologies they subscribe. For example, there are different 
norms (implicit rules) among different cultural groups for educating 
their children. In some groups it is the norm for children to be sent 
to boarding school at an early age, or to be sent to religious 
denominational schools, or to be entered for prestigious fee-paying 
schools, or to be allowed to truant or attend school irregularly. 
Different cultural and religious pressures influence these practices 
and have the effect of disciplining subjects into the norms of the 
particular social or religious group of which they are "members." 
(see Chapter 2 for discussion of the notion of 'organization' and 
'membership'). But some of the secondary rules of cultural groups 
are dominated by the statutory rules, and may be overriden by the 
discursive practices and strategies of authorised agents who 
formulate, interpret and implement the statutory rules. For example, 
the agents who regulate the number of school places locally are able 
to deny the right of choice to parents who lack the resource power 
(wealth, assertiveness, alliances with external influencers) to ensure 
that their children will attend their preferred school. Subjects who 
resist the power of the agents but lack resources or effective 
oppositional strategies are unable to exercise free choice over their 
children'S schooling despite the rule of subjects' "rights." These 
subjects, lacking resource power, are disciplined through the 
authority power of the agents. But the power of the agents, their 
"enforceable right," has its limitations in the multiple field of force 
relations where power, multi-directional, comes from "everywhere." 
All the knowledge power of the experts, (the educational 
psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers), the authority power of 
the agents, the statutory power of the law, has not found an effective 
strategy or effective resources through which to discipline persistent 
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truants or "disruptive" or "delinquent" children or children who 
smoke, drink, use drugs; children who disobey the rules of law and 
the rules of the dominant social groups in society. 
The rules that regulate social groups are rooted in history, in the 
handed-down traditional rites, religious beliefs, superstitions and 
moral codes, and the discourses of expert speakers of earlier ages. 
The rules have evolved over time, have become institutionalised in the 
cultural behaviours, practices and rituals received by each 
generation. But they are always in process, always in tension as the 
discourses and truths of expert speakers, contemporary soothsayers, 
shamans and medicine-men, intersect with the discourses of everyday 
speech and are measured against the experience and the common-
sense discourses of the new generation. So, for example, the rules 
that inform "good" parenting have been formulated at different 
historical periods by expert speakers who at one time prescribed 
swaddling of infants, rigid disciplines of child-rearing, strict regimes 
of feeding and sleeping, childen to be seen and not heard and the 
benefits to the child's development of severe physical punishments. 
Rules that become institutionalised as the contemporary norms are re-
constructed from time to time, both in the discourses of the 
professional experts and, significan tly, in the common-sense 
discourses of subjects with the drive to challenge the expert "truths" 
and change the rules; women, for example, with the drive to resist 
and oppose the rules that have subjected them to the domination of 
men and the oppressions visited on them and on their children by the 
traditional rules of gender relations. 
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The oppositional power of subjects, developed through the spread of 
literacy and knowledge and, significantly, by the opening up of public 
debate on child-rearing practices in media discourses, has begun to 
alter the unequal power balance between experts and parents. The 
uncertainties and revisions of the "true" statements of the experts, 
the demystification of their discourses, has empowered parents. So, 
while a new generation of expert speakers constructs all forms of 
physical punishment as an abuse of adult power which will lead to a 
continuing cycle of violence, many parents discount this expert 
discourse and continue to smack their children. While the knowledge 
power of the expert speakers and their discursive construction of 
meaning has influenced child care law and extended the disciplinary 
power of its instruments, its agencies and agents, many of the 
practices of parents remain beyond the reach of the influence and 
disciplinary power of the experts. Their practices are ordered by 
their own cultural rules, and by the power of their privileged status 
as adults. Moreover, parents are learning the discursive language of 
the experts - the language used to describe the condition of dyslexia 
for example. Parents are forming alliances and learning how to 
overcome the mystifying language of expert discourse and how to 
operate their non-specialist knowledge to demand access to resources 
that will meet the special needs of their children. 
At another level of power relations the agents are subject to 
governmental and organizational resource limitations as the policies 
and practices of public service resourcing form another site of power 
struggles. Yet in the unequal and complex field of force relations in 
different sites and on different experiential planes, the agents remain 
privileged over subjects, empowered by their 'social location' 
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(Thompson 1990. see chapter 3 above;, by their privileged 
factors in power relations. Knowledge is a privileging resource; not 
only the specialised knowledge that informs the discourses of the 
human sciences that privileges the professional agents but also 
knowledge of the rules of the game. For example, the Children Act 
1989, which t runs to more than 200 pages' (Department of Health 1991, 
(ii)(a) p.5), the rules of which have implications for all children and 
parents, is supplemented by explanatory resource documents issued 
by the Department of Health for the professional agents. They 
contain detailed notes of guidance on the rules for the agents; and 
they allow for discretionary interpretation of the rules at the point of 
application where the agents operate their authorised right to 
exercise disciplinary power. Additional training directed to their 
understanding of the rules and the discourses of the Act has further 
supplemented the knowledge resource of the agents. The agents have 
the privilege of access to other specialised resources for consultation, 
advice and guidance, as well as the resource of cumulative experience 
and precedent. On the other hand, the knowledge resource of 
subjects, their understanding of the rules which regulate parenting 
and of the sanctions which may be applied by authorised agents, may 
be no more than the information about the Act made available to 
subjects in two brief explanatory booklets, which they may not have 
read. Even if read, subjects may not have understood the rules and 
the implications for their particular circumstances. The language of 
the legal discourses, concepts such as "need," requiring detailed 
explanatory notes for the agents, is not translated into everyday 
speech to enhance subjects' understanding of the rules. Moreover, 
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the language of the professional discourses of the authorised agents, 
social workers and lawyers, doctors and psychiatrists, magistrates and 
judges, is often obscure and mystifying to subjects who are 
dependent on them for an explanation of the rules and for the 
objectivity of their interpretations. The dependence of subjects is a 
contributory factor to the resource power of the agents. 
Status, position, authority, rights, knowledge, are inter-linking 
resources that privilege agents in their operation of disciplinary 
power over subjects. Power and privilege reinforce each other. 
Lenski argues that although the forms of power change, power 
continues to be the determinant of privilege. (Lenski 1986, p.249). 
As I have argued in chapter 7, the agents are privileged by their 
resources of specialised professional knowledge and the status this 
affords; by their institutionalised positioning and the authority this 
affords; by their knowledge and understanding of the rules that 
authorise their actions; by their right to interpret the rules and by 
their right to construct meaning from certain behaviours, (to 
determine what constitutes neglect, abuse, etc.); and by their 
enforceable right to adminster sanctions against subjects who 
contravene the rules as they, the agents, have interpreted them. 
But privilege is not solely the prerogative of agents. While subjects 
are generally disadvantaged by the authority power and resource 
power of the agents, subjects themselves are variously privileged 
through ownership, control of or access to resources that can be 
used to influence and bring pressure to bear on others and on the 
professional agents; resources of status, wealth, education, alliances, 
and personal qualities of drive and assertiveness. Ownership of 
293 
such resources both empowers and privileges; privileges parents to 
purchase the education of their choice for their children; empowers 
parents to oppose, not simply resist, the power of the experts and 
the rule-makers. For example, an alliance of articulate and assertive 
parents, teachers and sections of the media resulted in changes to 
the ability-testing of children proposed in 1993 by influential 
educational experts in alliance with the Minister of State. The 
resource power of the parent/teacher/media alliance pre-dominated 
over the knowledge power of the experts and over the disciplinary 
power of the principal agent, the Minister of State. The agents of 
change and speakers of truth in an informed and educated population 
are not necessarily the professional experts who speak the language 
of the human sciences. It is disadvantaged subjects, lacking 
resources, - children, inarticulate minority groups, the poor, the 
illiterate - who are more susceptible to the disciplinary power of the 
authorised agents and the rule-makers than those who are privileged 
and empowered by their ownership of and access to resources. 
Not necessarily ownership but control of resources is a strategic 
privileging factor in power relations; for example, between the rule-
makers who manage (control) the resources and the professional 
agents who provide the services in the increasingly privatised public 
sector, education, health, social welfare. A political party having a 
While it majority in Parliament is privileged by its resource power. 
has no sovereignity of power and is subject to the resistance and 
oppositional power of its political opponents, the advantage of its 
majority privileges the "ruling" party in the power struggles over 
the rules relating to the resourcing of public services. The 
discourses of resource management based on the market ideology have 
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been privileged by the Conservative government above the public 
service ideology and the discourses of the professional experts. The 
rules have changed as the authorised agents are disciplined by 
market forces through the privatisation of public services, through 
compulsory contracting out and rationing at the local level, and 
through the centralised control of resources by government. 
Management discourses of economy and rationalisation predominate 
over the professional discourses of doctors and educationalists whose 
specialised knowledge and authorised position privilege them to 
operate disciplinary power over subjects at one level but who are 
powerless against the political strategies that lead to the closure of 
hospitals and schools. The historically privileged status power and 
knowledge power of doctors may still predominate in the 
doctor/patient relation; but the doctors are dominated by the agents 
who are privileged to make the rules and control the resources that 
regulate the services within which the doctors operate. 
Privilege, like power, has many forms, it has no absolute sovereignty 
but confers advantage, both on individuals and institutions. 
Privilege characterises the "haves," distinguishing them from the 
"have-nots," those who know and who are "in the know" from the ill-
informed and the ignorant. It" allows" relative licence to the 
advantaged person or institution and access to other privileged 
resources of persons and institutions. Privilege may be inherited, 
acquired or ordained by statute. It is appropriated through property 
(material or cultural, including specialised knowledge), and through 
membership of groups and institutions which constitute their own 
rules of inclusion and exclusion, - the monarchy, Parliament, the 
church, the major professions, the police and judiciary. It is 
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ordained through the enforceable n·ght f o statute and the acquired 
right of organizational authority. The "recognition" by subjects of 
this authority d . an nght privileges the agents who operate 
disciplinary power. Professional experts, unless they have the right 
inscribed in statute which gives them the status of authorised agents, 
the statutory right of local authority social workers for example, do 
not have an enforceable right to operate disciplinary power. 
But the operation of disciplinary power does not necessarily require 
an "authorised" right. The experts in the human sciences who are 
not privileged by statutory right continue to operate disciplinary 
power over subjects in many spheres through the influence of their 
discourses on policy-making; and on the need of subjects for access 
to their specialised knowledge and to the resources they do not own 
but over which they have some control. Their power lies also in the 
recognition accorded to them by subjects as "authority;" in their 
institutionalised positioning and the bureaucratic procedures through 
which subjects gain access to them and to other resources they 
control or to which they have privileged access; supportive services, 
hospital beds etc. Their resource power, their own resources and 
those they control, enables them to exercise sanctions or to provide 
something of value to individual subjects; to punish or deny or 
provide services that will heal, instruct, support etc. They are 
privileged by the bureaucratic rules and procedures that protect 
them, and by the discretion to ration or make available to those in 
"need" both their own knowledge resource and other resources which 
they control or to which they have access. Their power is relative to 
the extent of the dependence of others on these resources; the 
dependence of the patient, disempowered by pain, anxiety, fear of 
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death, on the doctor for his expert knowledge and also on the 
material resources (drugs, hospital beds etc.) to which he has access' , 
the dependence of the pupil/student on the teacher not only for 
"knowledge" but for grading and advancement; the dependence of 
frail elderly persons on social workers for residential "placements;" 
the dependence of "believers" on the expert speakers in whom they 
place their faith, the missionaries and the priests whose truths and 
discourses meet their needs for comfort, support or direction in their 
lives, and on the psychiatrists and counsellors for the healing powers 
of their "confessionals." Even though the status of the experts and 
"respect" for their knowledge are in decline as the imperfections and 
failures of their discourses and truths are opened to public scrutiny 
and common-sense debate through various media forms, they continue 
to exercise disciplinary power over subjects in need. 
Along with the decline in the status and discourses of the secular 
experts, the influence of religious discourses and the institutionalised 
disciplinary power of their appointed agents has declined in the last 
decades of the twentieth century; even the discourse of the 
sovereignty of God the father, even the existence of God, is disputed 
among the experts themselves. But, although in decline, religion as a 
disciplinary force is not dead. While Freudian discourses and 
psychoanalytic language have entered into everday speech and into 
media representations and have opened up new (and disputed) truths 
and added to the 'proliferating discourses of sex and sexuality' 
(Foucault), the speakers of religious truths are engaged in the 
contemporary power struggles over the rules that regulate sexual 
behaviours, sexuality, and gender, their discourses part of the public 
debate. For the committed disciples of the evangelical movements and 
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sects such as Jehovah's Witnesses, the ideologies of their religious 
discourses promote a truth more powerful than the secular ideological 
truths of expert speakers; the disciplinary power of their agents has 
a greater force than that of the agents authorised to uphold the 
secular law. The status of their agents is privileged above the status 
of secular experts; their status is as agents of God. And yet, the 
highest level of agency, instrumentality, in the person of the Pope, 
meets with resistance from subjects who question the absoluteness of 
God's "truth" and withhold their consent to some of the rules, the 
rules on contraception, abortion, extra-marital sex etc. For such 
dissident subjects, the sanctions of hell and damnation have lost their 
force. Even" divine" power vested in its primary authorised agent is 
dependent on the consent of the subject and on effective sanctions, 
as much as is the statutory secular power of the state and the 
knowledge power of the human sciences. 
Power balances are constantly shifting as subjects withhold their 
consent to the received moral absolutes, the rules and the discourses 
of the traditional expert speakers, discounting their truths and 
resisting their disciplinary power. And yet, influenced by new 
truths, subjects voluntarily submit themselves to new forms of 
disciplinary power; to psychoanalysis for example which, as Foucault 
argues, has provided an alternative to the religious confessional in 
Western societies. The truths and discursive practices of expert 
therapists and counsellors, liberating subjects from their subjectivity 
to the disciplinary imperatives of the traditional discourses, at the 
same time construct a new form of unequal power relations, a new 
form of subjectivity to the expert other. 
298 
The greater the personal resource power of the subject, constituted 
through wealth, property, cultural capital, drive, status, alliances, 
knowledge of "the system," the less is his/her total dependence on 
the expert other and the greater his/her discretionary power to 
circumvent the rules, and to resist the disciplinary power of the 
experts and the authorised agents. The power of choice, personal 
resource power, enables privileged subjects to take their custom 
where they will, to purchase expertise, to form alliances; to change 
the power imbalance between the dominance of the expert and the 
dependence of the subject. Knowledge of their rights and of the 
rules of the game is one constituent of the resource power of 
privileged subjects through which the truths of expert speakers are 
challenged and their disciplinary power resisted, circumvented or 
opposed. 
Knowledge is one of a range of privileging resources that are always 
in play in the operation of power. It privileges those who possess it 
above those who do not. Foucault argues that knowledge and power 
are inter-connected in a mutually generative fashion: 'power 
produces knowledge power and knowledge directly imply one 
another there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.' (Foucault 
1977, p.27). As subjects become better informed, acquire a broader 
range of "knowledges," become more aware of their rights and the 
power of alliances with each other and with external influencers (the 
media for example), they are better "positioned," less disadvantaged, 
in relation to the experts and the authorised agents. 
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Subjects who lack resource power, whether th h· roug Ignorance, 
isolation, poverty, low status or lack of drive, are likely to be 
dominated by the rules formulated by others and by the operation of 
their disciplinary power. These "others" are not necessarily the 
expert speakers of the human sciences whose 'serious speech acts' 
define a field of specialised knowledge through which meaning and 
truth are constructed. The disciplinary power of "others" over 
acquiescent subjects who lack resources derives from the power of 
the "truths" inscribed in their discourses, promoted through the 
strategies and the missionary drive and charismatic leadership of 
often self-appointed agents; the leaders of evangelical religious 
movements, minority political movements, revolutionary movements. 
Leadership qualities, drive, charisma and sense of mission are 
powerful personal resources in all power relations, at the inter-
personal level of social interaction and in organizational relations. 
Power operates among the experts themselves through the higher 
status of privileged professional discourses, (for example the dominant 
status among medical professionals of the consultant); but partly 
through the personal drive and charisma of "natural" leaders who 
dominate their professional peers as well as dependent subjects - the 
power that 'resides in the person.' (Handy 1985. see chapter 2 
above). 
Charisma is a discursive construction, postulating a quality more 
easily recognised than defined. Owing much to media discourses, 
especially film and television, it is recognisable in the everyday 
discourses of inter-personal relations at the micro-level and within 
groups and organizations. It is a privileging resource in a culture 
that venerates and rewards "star" quality and looks for it in its 
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leaders. The charismatic leader does not possess sovereign power, is 
still subject to the statutory rules that regulate subjects, and to the 
"rule" that in a democratic state no individual power is allowed to be 
absolute; but the charismatic leader driven by a sense of mission can 
influence the cultural values of an organization or even of the wider 
society and discipline subjects into obedience to the rules of his/her 
discourses. 
So, for example, the (cultivated) charismatic leadership and missionary 
drive of Margaret Thatcher in her latter years as prime minister 
dominated the power struggles within her own political party as well 
as those with the oppositional parties; and her political discourses 
dominated the discourses of the expert speakers of the human 
sciences who unsuccessfully resisted her mission to market and 
privatise public services. Through her drive and assertive leadership 
she operated disciplinary power over her colleagues and disciplined 
individual dissident Ministers by exercising her power of sanctions. 
Her ascribed resources of status, position, authority as the elected 
principal agent of the state were supplemented by her personal 
resources of drive, assertiveness and sense of mission and the 
personal charisma that dominated her disciples. Resistant forces 
among her colleagues and individual challenges to her power were 
ineffectual - until a strategic alliance within her own party, helped 
by media discourses constructing and reflecting "public opinion" and 
the implicit rule against "sovereign" power, operated effective 
oppositional power to bring her down. 
The charisma of public figures is subject to the privileged resource 
power of the media and its strategies for according a high profile to 
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favoured individuals; and its strategies for constructing a negative 
image of those it does not favour. As never before in history, the 
technological resource power of the media, the power of print 
reinforced by images and sound, mediates our view of the world and 
of the privileged agents who are authorised to exercise power. Media 
discourses form part of our experience of the world as they speak to 
us directly, bringing the news and events of the day into the 
domestic domain, so that we can see and hear for ourselves, we can 
recognise and know, the "grey" men and the "stars" 
media forms construct them in their "true" discourses. 
as various 
There is no meta-discourse which overrides all others, no sovereign 
power, as Foucault argues. Many forms of power operate in and 
through a range of discursive practices, strategies and technologies. 
Disciplinary power is a labyrinthine concept operating through the 
structures, rules and discursive practices of institutions, through the 
influential discourses of privileged speakers, through the informal 
rules of social groups and the received moral codes of society and 
through the statutory rules and sanctions inscribed in law. The 
'field of force relations' is complex and unstable; but among the 
more privileged discourses and the most influential are those of the 
media in their various forms and with their vast technological power, 
and those of the law with its enforceable right of sanctions. The 
personal drive, charisma and sense of mission of individual agents are 
factors in power relations and in promoting discursive truths; but 
these agents are not necessarily the professional experts who speak 
the language of the human sciences. Although privileged by their 
multiple-resource power, the status of these experts is unstable in 
post-modern British society. While Parliamentary law may be informed 
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by the specialised knowledge of the experts in the human sciences, 
the truths and serious speech acts of their discourses are subject to 
re-construction by the more privileged agents of the state who 
formulate the policies and the statutory rules and control the 
resources. The discursive practices of the professional experts are 
regulated by the agent-managers as the discourse of market forces 
predominates as the new "truth" of our times. 
Power, taking many forms, coming from everywhere, multi-directional, 
operating at different levels, with different degrees of serious effect, 
remains a difficult and elusive concept. Specialised knowledge and 
the discretion to interpret the rules, institutionalised authority, 
access to sanctions, and professional alliances are privileging 
resources in the field of force relations. But even the most 
privileged individuals or institutions through which various forms of 
disciplinary power operate are themselves subject to the operation of 
disciplinary power in different contexts and at different historical 
moments. While some groups in society have the capacity to 
influence the actions of others through their specialised knowlege and 
the recognition accorded to their truth claims, their capacity to act 
on the actions of others, to operate disciplinary power, is regulated 
by the institutionalised rules and discursive practices of the 
organizations through which they operate and by the discourses of 
the law. 
Complex networks of organizational structures and discourses 
intersect with the specialised discourses of professional experts. 
While we can analyse the rules, the organizational structures, the 
specialised discourses and discursive practices that inform power 
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relations in a specific site in a discrete context at a given moment in 
time, there is no simple way of saying what are the determining 
factors in the operation of power. As external forces impinge on the 
specialised discourses of expert speakers the balances of power shift. 
Foucault focussed on the specialised knowledge of the human sciences 
as a significant constituent in the complex technologies of power; but 
he recognised also the effects of institutionalised power and the 
effects on power relations of the increasing intervention of the state 
and its agencies into the private space of individuals. 
This study has identified many forms of power and a diversity of 
intersecting discourses, sometimes mutually re-inforcing sometimes in 
opposition, in which knowledge and power were joined together. It 
has illustrated the discursive practices, strategies and technologies 
that operate within complex and unstable fields of force relations. It 
has illustrated the ways in which agents are privileged within specific 
contexts; and the ways in which institutions, notably the law and the 
media, are privileged but not sovereign. The 'major mechanisms of 
power' can be seen to operate in the unstable environment of a 
society undergoing an accelerated process of cultural change amidst 
ideological uncertainties and struggles over rights and responsibilities 
in which, as subjects and as "agents," we are all involved. 
As I have identified the particular dilemmas for social workers caught 
up in complex power networks, I have reflected uneasily on the low 
regard in which social work is often held and the mis-representation 
of the actions and the power of social workers in media and popular 
discourses. Social workers are aware of power issues, of what is 
perceived as power coming from the top, of power inequalities around 
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gender and ethnicity, and of their own expert/authority power in 
relation to their clients; but by analysing the discourses and 
discursive practices, the rules and tactics that regulate the power 
games, I have opened up a new discourse on power relations for 
social work. If social workers are to use the 'privileges of 
knowledge' for the benefit of the clients/users of services they must 
recognise how the 'mystifying representations' they impose on people 
effectively disempower them. They must recognise the rules and 
tactics of strategic game-playing that dis empower the clients, the 
tactic of interpreting unmet need as 'unmet choice' for example; and 
as they enter into 'partnership' with the users of services, the 
agents who are privileged to interpret and implement the rules must 
be wary of colluding with a strategy of notional empowerment which 
does nothing to change the balance of power. 
Studying power at its point of application through a methodology 
derived from the ideas of Michel Foucault has enabled me to recognise 
more clearly than before the complex power games and the elements at 
work in the 'multiple and mobile field of force relations' in which we 
are all enmeshed. While I have applied the theoretical ideas to a 
particular site and the discipline of social work, the theory and the 
methodology used for this investigation may be applied to other sites 
and other disciplines where useful lessons may be learned from a 
clearer understanding of the strategies and tactics through which 
'disciplinary power' is exercised. 
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